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Abstract 
	
	
The purpose of this dissertation is to establish a historically specific theory of 
landed property in Australia that can serve as the foundation for a socially 
significant theory of mineral-rent. This task is necessary because the orthodox 
theory of rent is unable to explain effectively the formation and distribution of 
mineral-rents. This failure of the orthodoxy not only obscures clear 
understanding of the social significance of rent but also retards the rational 
organisation of the minerals industry. It is therefore imperative that the theory 
of rent is critically examined. 
	
	
	
This critical reappraisal of economic theory will be conducted in relation to the 
operations and consequences of the global mining industry within Australia in 
the contemporary period. The aim of this analysis is to illuminate the dynamics 
of capital accumulation that underpinned debates around the ill-fated 
Australian ‘mining tax’. It is argued that these parliamentary-political 
machinations were a phenomenal manifestation of an essential contradiction of 
the capitalist mode of production. As landed property conditions the formation 
and distribution of mineral-rents, the question becomes one of how to identify 
the character and function of modern landed property in relation to the 
dynamics of capital accumulation. This research contributes to debates within 
the fields of Marxist rent theory, the political economy of Australian capitalism 
and the theorisation of landed property. The methodology employed 
throughout the analysis can be characterised as a generative class analysis in 
the tradition of the materialist conception of history utilising dialectical 
reasoning. 
	
	
The analysis is organised according to three distinct yet connected parts. The 
first part establishes the case for a new theory of mineral-rent by critiquing the 
prevailing orthodoxy in rent theory. The second part demonstrates the need for 
a theory of landed property as a necessary precondition for a new, socially 
significant, theory of mineral-rent. The third part elaborates a historically 
specific theory of landed property in Australia in relation to the dynamics of 
capital accumulation. The dissertation concludes by reiterating the core thesis, 
comprised of three interconnected claims: orthodox rent theory is incapable of 
explicating the social signification of rental payments for the use of mineral 
lands; a new theory of mineral-rent necessarily requires a theory of landed 
property in relation to the dynamics of capital accumulation; the modern form 
of landed property in Australia is denoted by the separation of ownership and 
control functions. 
 	
Introduction 
	
	
The following dissertation elaborates a historically specific theory of landed 
property in Australia. It does so in order to rectify a fundamental flaw in the 
orthodox and prevailing theory of rent. The substance of this thesis is therefore 
a novel contribution to contemporary debates on rent theory and on the theory 
of landed property in capitalism. 
	
	
	
These debates intersect numerous scholarly disciplines but the contribution of 
this current study can be firmly situated within the fields of political economy 
and Australian history. In particular, this study contributes to the dynamic 
traditions of historical materialism by addressing lacunae in Marxist theories of 
rent and landed property within the context of the Australian social formation. 
	
	
	
The significance of this study can be demonstrated with reference to a 
contentious policy debate that dominated Australian politics between 2010 and 
2014. At issue during this time were the desirability and efficacy of two taxes, 
the Resources Super Profits Tax and Mineral Resources Rent Tax. These 
initiatives were underwritten by the conviction that mineral-rents were an 
economically viable and socially responsible source of public revenue. 
Minerals were public goods and fair compensation for their extraction was 
expected. The real question was what constituted ‘fair’ compensation and, 
more importantly, why? 
	
There was no consensus reached on this issue. These initiatives were 
implemented at the height of potentially the most lucrative export-oriented 
 	
minerals  boom  in  Australian  history.  Such  were  the  interests  of  the 
 	
stakeholders. The detail of these ructions warrant, and receive, further analysis 
below but suffice it to say for now that disagreement centred on how much, who 
would pay, who would be paid and from when. 
	
	
	
The political and economic significance of these conflicts is still largely unclear. 
Not enough time has elapsed to lend insight to speculation over the causes and 
effects. What is clear though is that the episode itself needs to be understood. 
The investment phase of the minerals boom has ended and the protracted 
production stage is underway. Prices for coal and iron ore have decreased 
drastically meaning that the volume of minerals extracted will increase as 
mining firms compete to remain profitable. The antiquated ‘royalty’ system of 
compensation for the right to extract minerals remains in place even after the 
comprehensive review of the tax system that prompted these debates had 
judged the taxation regime for mineral resources to be ineffective considered on 
the basis of neutrality. The end result is that a finite public good will potentially 
be exhausted at an increased rate without reasonable compensation. The need 
for understanding this episode in recent Australian history is therefore 
imperative. 
	
	
	
This complex and important task has attracted considerable scholarly attention. 
The elements of political influence, economic power and historical linkages 
make this episode fertile ground for social-scientific inquiry. Where 
contemporary scholarly debates intersect aspects of the political debates, 
scholars have been quick to make insightful and relevant connections. 
 	
Paul Cleary’s two-part polemic on the mining boom and its effects is one notable 
contribution. It is also indicative of the prevailing approach to understanding 
the resources boom and the debates surrounding the mining tax. For  these reasons 
it is worth examining the positions Cleary develops. Too Much Luck and Mine 
Field were published within twelve months of each other from 2011. The books 
are complementary volumes. The message is clear and can be glimpsed in two 
excerpts. Cleary states, in the preface to Too Much Luck, that ‘unless we 
manage this extraordinary boom more effectively, our good fortune will curse 
future generations’.1 The most effective way, Cleary contends, to mitigate the 
deleterious effects of the resource curse in Australia is through the creation of a 
sovereign wealth fund to stabilise the otherwise volatile cycles in commodity 
prices and demand conditions for minerals. In Mine Field, Cleary focuses on the 
social costs of the mining boom and seeks ‘solutions to better manage the once- 
only development of our resources for the benefit of all parts of society and our 
economy, and for the benefit of future generations of Australians’. 2 The 
problem, therefore, is one of regulatory capture, which is why the solution is, 
what Cleary calls, a ‘well-resourced federal “super regulator” to be run jointly 
with the states’.3 Across the two volumes, Cleary builds a compelling case that 
states Australia is suffering from the resource curse, with  all  the  attendant social 
problems, and should respond with a suite of legislative reforms to mitigate the 
undesirable effects of a resource-export driven economy. 
	
	
	
1 P. Cleary, Too Much Luck: The Mining Boom and Australia’s Future, Black Inc., Collingwood VIC, 
2011, p. xi. Emphasis added. 
2 P. Cleary, Mine Field: The Dark Side of Australia’s Resources Rush, Black Inc., Collingwood VIC, 
2012, p. xii. 
3 Ibid, p. xi. 
 	
The evidence used to substantiate this position is extensive and the key claims 
themselves are articulated with clarity. The result is a seminal contribution to a 
growing discourse that aims to expose the inimical and pernicious exigencies of 
mineral-dependent economic  development while  offering up  solutions 
pertaining to legislative reform. Joining Cleary in this critical scholarship is a 
host of other important recent contributors. Guy Pearse coined the phrase 
‘quarry vision’ in his Quarterly Essay to describe the ‘lunacy’ of continuing to 
cultivate an export-oriented coal industry within the context of the existential 
crisis that is climate change.4 Quarry vision, according to Pearse, ‘blinds us to 
history and its biggest lesson: nations squander the proceeds of booms with 
monotonous regularity’.5 Australia would have done well, argues Pearse, to note 
‘that an abundance of resources has come to be seen by many economists as a 
guarantee of macro-economic volatility, even as a curse rather than a blessing’.6 
James Goodman and David Worth took note of Australia’s resource curse in an 
article published in the Journal of Australian Political Economy in 2008. This 
work questions the almost celebratory optimism surrounding the minerals 
boom and provides a sobering examination of three curses attached to the 
boom in accordance with three contradictions inherent to the capitalist mode of 
production more broadly: the capital-labour contradiction; the capital-capital 
contradiction; and the capital-nature contradiction.7 
	
	
	
	
	
4 G. Pearse, ‘Quarry Vision: Coal, Climate Change and the End of the Resources Boom’, Quarterly 
Essay, No. 33, 2009, pp. 94-95. 
5 Ibid, p. 16. 
6 Ibid, p. 16. 
7 J. Goodman and D. Worth, ‘The Minerals Boom and Australia’s “Resource Curse”’, Journal of 
Australian Political Economy, No. 61, 2008, pp. 201-202. 
 	
These important investigations are united in their critical approach. Each takes 
issue with the negative effects of the mining boom and questions the efficacy of 
existing legislative structures in mitigating these outcomes. Their unity in 
approach is a key strength and simultaneously their key limitation. These 
contributions and the discourse on the mining boom more generally accept 
certain problematic assumptions and concepts. Taxation, for example, is agreed 
to be an area in need of reform but the question of what is to be taxed is not 
approached in any more than a superficial way. A rent tax is a good idea but rent 
itself is taken as received wisdom from Pearse’s ‘many economists’.8 Similarly, 
the existence of a resource curse is uncritically accepted. The resource curse is 
the underlying theme to most of the literature written about the socioeconomic 
effects of the mining boom. While this line of inquiry is certainly useful in 
identifying the social problems inherent to resource-driven  economic 
development it lends to descriptive accounts rather than analytical inquiry. The 
social dynamics that promote resource-dependent economic development and 
the social structures that compel or deny legislative action are obscured when 
the issues are framed in this way. The recommendations derived from these 
analyses need to be strengthened by a critical engagement with the orthodox 
conceptions that are at the very root of the problem. The extant scholarship 
explains what is wrong and speculates upon how to remedy the situation. This 
study addresses why these problems exist and seeks to construct more 
substantial analytical tools to inform the search for solutions to these 
quandaries. 
	
8 Op. Cit. Pearse, ‘Quarry Vision: Coal, Climate Change and the End of the Resources Boom’, 2009, 
p. 16. 
 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Part I 
	
	
	
	
The Case for a New Theory of 
Mineral-rent 
 	
Chapter 1 
	
	
The Dialectic of Mineral-rent in Australia 
	
	
The theory of rent prevailing in the contemporary period is flawed because it 
does not account for the social signification of rental payments for the use of 
land and its appurtenances. This failing can be addressed by constructing a 
historically contingent theory of landed property within the capitalist mode of 
production because mineral-rent in capitalism presupposes private ownership 
of mineral lands to the exclusion of all others. The modern form of landed 
property within the contemporary Australian social formation is characterised 
by a division of labour between the owners and managers of mineral lands - the 
state and indigenous landowners as owners and the neocomprador fraction of 
the bourgeoisie as managers. Just as capital, as a class, expropriates surplus 
value generally and is fractured along various lines, modern landed property, as 
a fraction of capital, expropriates surplus value specifically in the form of rent 
and is fractured along one important line. 
	
	
	
The theory of mineral-rent is concerned specifically with rental payments for 
access to mineral lands. This implies that there is a logical necessity for a 
corresponding theory of property in land because it is assumed that a payment 
for access to mineral lands means that the ownership of mineral lands is 
monopolised by certain persons to the exclusion of all others. A theory of 
mineral-rent, why it exists, how it is determined and how it comes to be 
distributed therefore presupposes a theory of landed property within the 
capitalist mode of production. This dialectic defines the parameters of this 
 	
dissertation. Each facet of the argument presented herein can be triangulated 
within this logical construct. The purpose of this chapter is to sketch broadly the 
contours and limitations of the investigation. The following chapters will 
elaborate the specific problems to be addressed in more detail and also link 
together each thematic section. The discussion between this paragraph and the 
concluding paragraph of this chapter will explain the movement from the 
dialectic detailed above to the specific hypothesis articulated throughout the 
remainder of this dissertation. 
	
	
	
The various scholarly problems addressed in this dissertation stem from one 
concrete question: why, between 2010 and 2014, was the Australian Federal 
government unable to effectively implement a rent-targeting tax on the 
resources sector in the midst of potentially the most lucrative mining boom in 
Australian history? From this concrete question stem various avenues of 
inquiry. Surveying briefly the divergent attempts to address the initial question 
best illuminates these avenues. 
	
	
	
One type of  response that gained  popularity was to  blame apparently inept 
politicians and bureaucrats for poorly implementing a poorly designed tax. An 
example that typified this approach came from the free-market think tank, the 
Institute of Public Affairs. The IPA argued that the ‘failure of the RSPT can be 
attributed to extraordinary arrogance’.1 Davidson explains that the ‘tax was a 
creature of bureaucracy - it was first imagined by academics and bureaucrats, 
	
1S. Davidson, ‘The Mining Tax Debacle’, Institute of Public Affairs Review, Vol. 63, No. 3, 
September 2011, p. 21. 
 
	
and then proposed by bureaucrats, designed by those same bureaucrats, and 
ultimately introduced by politicians who didn’t understand the tax design or the 
industry they proposed taxing’.2 
	
	
	
Another tack was to emphasise the political power of resources companies and 
their supporters. Marsh, Lewis and Chesters considered the defeat of the mining 
tax as a ‘case that illustrates the influence that powerful interests can have in 
contemporary politics’ whereby the government ‘failed to use the resources it 
had, particularly its legitimacy, to institute an effective mining tax’.3 Verrender 
expressed similar sentiments in more emotive terms when he claimed that the 
‘stunning victory by the mining houses over the federal government was a 
victory of renters over owners, and a triumph of misinformation and emotion 
over logic’.4 
	
	
	
Some posed the answer that the political antagonisms inherent to the Australian 
Federalist system were to blame. The conflicts between state and federal 
governments over the distribution of funding, particularly with regard to the 
equalisation of mining-based revenue across the Federation, were, therefore, at 
the root of this problem.5 Such were these tensions that Geoff Gallop, the former 
Premier of WA, was moved to pose the question, does the ‘stroppy state’ really 
	
2 Ibid. p. 21. 
3 D. Marsh, C. Lewis & J. Chesters, ‘The Australian Mining Tax and the Political Power of 
Business’, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2014, pp. 723-724. 
4 I. Verrender, ‘An Opportunity Missed on Mining Super Tax’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 
February 2011, viewed 25/5/14, 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/an-opportunity-missed-on-mining-super-tax-20110214- 
1atq1.html 
5 M. Stutchbury, ‘Mining Blows Up Fair-go Federalism and Opens the Way for Genuine Tax 
Reform’, Weekend Australian, Canberra, A.C.T., 2 April 2011, p. 11. 
 	
want to secede?6 Others ventured the opinion that the problem was one of 
flawed financial and economic principles informing the public debate. Kraal’s 
study indicated that the major multinational mining companies knowingly used 
dated accounting methods and principles to shirk their responsibilities as good 
corporate citizens in order to justify ideologically charged arguments against 
the tax.7 
	
	
	
Each of these dominant themes has informed generally the debates surrounding 
the failed implementation of the RSPT and the subsequent MRRT. This study 
attempts to draw out more specific analytical problems for scholarly analysis 
within the disciplines of historical inquiry and political economy. 
	
	
	
Each of these responses raises serious and important questions deserving of 
scholarly analysis. The role of business groups in determining government 
policy and the specific machinations that led to the eventual repeal of the 
mining tax need careful examination. These tasks have many worthy attendants 
and the passing of time will illuminate further the dark corners of the doomed 
mining tax. This study, however, seeks to undertake a task rather more limited 
in scope and ambition. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
6 G. Gallop, ‘Does the “Stroppy State” Really Want to Secede?’, Farm Weekly, Victoria Park, 5 July 
2011, accessed 12/3/12, http://www.farmweekly.com.au/news/agriculture/agribusiness/general-
news/does-the- stroppy-state-really-want-to-secede/2216310.aspx?storypage=1 
7 D. Kraal, ‘Australia’s Resource Rent Tax: The Multinational Mining Industry Response’, The 
Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2012, pp. 105-106. 
 	
This undertaking proceeds from the observation, raised throughout the 
protracted debates surrounding the mining tax, that the conception of ‘rent’ 
itself may be flawed.8 This thesis will examine this aspect of the tax debate and 
claims that a new theory of mineral-rent must be constructed which is capable 
of explicating the social signification of the rental payment for the use of land 
and its appurtenances. This new theory of mineral-rent, by virtue of its 
emphasis on the role played by the system of ownership in land, presupposes a 
theory of landed property specific to the historical context of Australian 
capitalism. As a new theory of mineral-rent presupposes a theory of landed 
property, this thesis will propose a platform for the construction of the former 
by articulating a historically contingent examination of the latter. 
	
	
	
A theory of rent specific to land in general, and to mining in particular, 
presupposes a theory of landed property within the capitalist mode of 
production. The current prevailing theory of mineral-rent is insufficient as it 
does not account for the social signification of rental payments for access to 
minerals. The orthodox conception of mineral-rent is based primarily on 
Ricardian propositions within the framework of Neoclassical general and partial 
equilibrium theory. Both traditions proceed from the erroneous assumption 
that landed property exists purely as a juridical construct within capitalism. 
That is, landownership is simply a claim to rent as it is distributed passively, 
	
	
8 Notable examples of this argument can be found in, 
J.S. Dickson, ‘WIOML 2015: Economic Rent Theory “Fundamentally Unsuitable” for Mining’, 
Industrial Minerals, London, 28 May 2015, accessed 25/6/15, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1691545174?accountid=36155 
M. Bulearca, C. Popescu, M. Muscalu and C. Ghiga, ‘Resources Management and Rent Theory in 
Mining Industry’, Communications of the IBIMA, Vol. 2012, July 2012, p. 2. 
 	
rather than the system of landownership being an active determinant of the 
structures and patterns of capital accumulation. This inadequacy of orthodox 
rent theory is part of the reason for the legislative failures to introduce rent- 
targeting taxes within the extractive resources industry. Attempts to capture the 
rents generated by the extraction of finite mineral resources have failed in both 
the significant mining booms since the end of WWII. This thesis will contribute 
to addressing this challenge by first providing a critical re-appraisal of mineral- 
rent theory before extending critically Karl Marx’s theory of ground-rent. The 
ultimate aim of this dissertation is to provide a theory of landed property within 
the context of the Australian social formation in order to provide a starting 
point for the theorisation of mineral-rent which is capable of accounting for the 
social signification of rental payments. 
	
	
	
The central thesis consists of three interconnected arguments: the current 
orthodox theory of mineral-rent is flawed as it does not entail a theory of landed 
property and therefore cannot explain why rent exists; a modern theory of 
mineral-rent, capable of explicating its social signification, must be able to 
explain the dynamic social relation between the modern form of landed 
property and the modern form of capital specific to mining; the manager 
component of the modern form of landed property, the neocomprador fraction 
of the bourgeoisie, is currently aligned with the interests of transnational 
mining capital to the detriment of the interests of the Australian people who are, 
in the juridical sense, the owners of the minerals within the bounds of the 
Australian state. These rudimentary observations will be developed throughout 
 	
the following examination of landed property in the Australian social formation 
in relation to the self-expansion of capital globally. 
	
	
	
The first section of the thesis outlines the scope of the problems inherent to 
prevailing theories of mineral-rent. This is achieved through a critical survey of 
mineral-rent theory with a focus on the orthodoxy currently informing the 
discourse on taxation in relation to the minerals industry. It is argued that the 
root of the problem for orthodox rent theory is the assumption, drawn from 
Ricardian propositions and flowing into Neoclassical general and partial 
equilibrium theory, that landed property does not exist, except in a superficial 
juridical sense, within the capitalist mode of production. Ricardo assumed away 
landed property in his conception of rent because the existence of landed 
property meant the possibility of an absolute rent on land owing to a class 
monopoly of land. The existence of absolute rent vitiated Ricardo’s labour 
theory of value because it meant that land and not labour had created value. For 
this reason, Ricardo proceeded from the assumption that landed property did 
not exist in capitalism. This assumption was carried forward through the 
Marginalist revolution of the 1870s and came to inform the Neoclassical theory 
of rent. The centrality of general and partial equilibrium in the Neoclassical 
tradition meant that rent became generalised across the economy and not 
specific to land. Rent then did not function as the economic expression of a 
political antagonism capable of acting as a barrier to the accumulation of capital 
as it could have done in the Ricardian framework. 
 	
This first section also entails a discussion of the methodology informing the 
dissertation. The analysis is framed within the various traditions of historical 
materialism and adopts the methodological devices developed within these 
traditions. The critique of political economy pioneered by Marx and Engels in 
the nineteenth century forms a point of departure for this evolving 
methodological tradition. The key features informing this study can be 
summarised as the materialist conception of history utilising dialectical 
reasoning. This approach to historical inquiry, in accordance with the critical 
development of economic principles, complements a generative approach to 
class analysis that seeks to frame the examination of a particular social class in 
relation to the dynamic processes of capital accumulation, which 
simultaneously determines and is determined by it. These fundamental points 
will be elaborated in detail in the discussion on methodology. 
	
	
	
The second section of the thesis deals with the history of economic thought in 
relation to the development of rent theory. This discussion entails a selective 
and critical survey of theories of rent beginning with the school of Physiocracy 
in the Eighteenth century. The contributions of the Classical, Marginalist and 
Formalist Schools will then be examined in turn. The contemporary orthodoxy 
in economic thinking about mineral-rent is constituted by elements derived 
from the contributions of each of these schools of economic thought. While the 
focus of this section is primarily ideas, the discussion of economic theories will 
be cast against analysis of salient features of the historical context of each 
period. 
 	
Economic problems stemming from the antagonism between landed property 
and capital will inform primarily this element of the discussion. It is argued that 
the key contributions to the development of rent theory were reactions to 
qualitative shifts in the class relations between landed property and capital at 
each given historical conjuncture. As rent is the economic expression of a class 
antagonism, each new theory of rent is necessarily an expression of the evolving 
relation between landed property and capital. Physiocratic notions of rent 
reflected the primacy of agriculture in French society of the eighteenth century 
along with the deterioration of feudal social relations of production. Classical 
rent theory marked the emergence of a dominant industrial capitalism and 
sought to provide a theoretical justification for the political reproach of the 
landed class. The Marginalists and Formalists were faced with the declining 
relevance of landed property in the capitalist mode of production and hence 
denied the relevance of a theory of rent specific to land, generalising the rent 
relation across all economic spheres. Since the qualitative shift in the dynamics 
of capital accumulation from the 1970s, the primacy of landed property in 
determining broader patterns of capital accumulation has reemerged as an 
important political and economic issue. It is, therefore, now necessary to mount 
a critical reappraisal of rent theory in general and of the theory of mineral-rent 
in particular. 
	
	
	
The third Part of the thesis engages with an alternative avenue of inquiry for the 
theorisation of rent first broached in the nineteenth century by Karl Marx. The 
critical historical materialist methodology developed by Marx and Engels 
permitted  the  prescient  observation  that  the  capitalist  mode  of  production 
 	
presupposed landed property and must therefore preserve its function, if not its 
form, in order to reproduce capitalist social relations of production. Put simply, 
abolishing private ownership in land meant undermining the entire system of 
private ownership that formed the foundation of capitalist social relations of 
production. Marx proceeded from this point to develop his own theory of 
ground-rent as a critique of the extant theories of rent developed by the 
Physiocrats and the Classical school. Marx’s contribution was historically 
contingent and therefore unable to grasp the shifts in the dynamic relation 
between landed property and capital after his death. His theory of ground-rent 
is inadequate for contemporary analysis in the sense that it could not have 
anticipated developments in the dynamics of capital accumulation of a 
qualitatively different nature to those that prevailed in his own time. The 
fundamental aspect of his theory to be taken up in this dissertation is the 
acknowledgement that capitalism presupposes landed property and that 
therefore a theory of rent within capitalism presupposes a theory of landed 
property within capitalism. This fundamental point constitutes the basis of an 
epistemological break with not only the Classical school but of orthodox rent 
theory in the contemporary period. The remainder of the dissertation will 
engage rent theory in accordance with this alternative epistemology. 
	
	
	
Once the technical aspects of the epistemological break in Marx’s theory of 
ground-rent have been established the discussion will move onto the extension 
of this line of inquiry in contemporary scholarship. Three important contributions 
to this heterodox discourse will be examined. Ben Fine’s attempt to move toward 
a general theory of mining will be critically examined with 
 	
particular reference to his notion of vertically integrated systems of provision. 
Chibuzo Nwoke’s analysis of price formation of mineral commodities in the 
global context will be engaged critically with a specific focus on the claim that 
the state in capitalism functions as the modern form of landed property. Finally, 
David Harvey’s claim that the theorisation of rent according to a historical 
materialist methodology necessarily requires an analytical distinction between 
what are termed ‘revenues’ and ‘capital’ will be engaged critically before being 
incorporated into the framework of analysis. Key elements of each contribution 
will inform the construction of a framework within which to examine the 
development of the modern form of landed property in relation to the modern 
form of capital in Australia. 
	
	
	
The fourth and final section of the thesis will explicate a historically and 
geographically contingent theory of landed property in Australia.  The discussion 
will entail analysis of the historical development of landed property on the 
continent of Australia since 1788. This periodisation is necessary because the 
traditional mode of production, which prevailed on the continent prior to the 
European invasion, did not have a system of landed property within a mode of 
production productive of a surplus, thereby creating a social antagonism based 
on the appropriation of land. This dissertation is concerned with developing a 
theory of landed property within the capitalist mode of production and will 
therefore only include a cursory discussion on the form of property in land that 
existed outside of capitalist social relations. 
 	
The analysis will be organised according to four historical periods that 
correspond to developments in the form of landed property. The first period 
looks at the form of landed property during the early colonial period from 1788 
until the 1860s. It is argued that capitalist relations of production had not yet 
emerged as the dominant mode of production within the colonies and therefore 
the form of landed property accords with an earlier form of capitalist 
development than the one that existed in North Western Europe at the time. The 
second period deals with the Land Reform movements from the 1860s through 
to the Federation of the colonies in 1901. It is argued that the passing of the 
Robertson and Duffy Land Acts in the early 1860s marked the point at which the 
industrial bourgeoisie became the motive force in the social formation emerging 
on the continent. It is from this point that the capitalist mode of production 
becomes the determinant force of development and therefore marks a shift in 
the dynamics of power between landed property and capital. The third period 
dates from Federation until the passing of the Native title Act in 1993. It is 
argued that this period is marked by the development of the Federalist 
arrangements that permitted the state to exact a portion of the rents generated 
through the extraction of minerals. 
	
	
	
The fourth period is from the passing of the Native title legislation and its 
associated common law cases from the 1990s until the repeal of the MRRT in 
2014. The juridical recognition of indigenous people as landed proprietors must 
be considered in the construction of a theory of landed property in the 
contemporary context. However, it must be stressed that the appropriation of 
mineral-rent, if any, by this group does not constitute a large enough share of 
 	
the total rents to warrant attention beyond the acknowledgement of a technical 
component of modern landed property. Indigenous landowners do not 
constitute a barrier to the accumulation of capital across the economy due to 
their juridical role as a constituent of modern landed property. This is because 
mineral-rent, as the payment for the use of mineral lands, is not simply 
mediated by ownership but rather also by access to capital. This is what 
distinguishes the indigenous landowners from the next constituent group of 
modern landed property, the neocomprador fraction of the bourgeoisie. 
	
	
	
The discussion then turns, after detailing the historical evolution of landed 
property since 1788, to an examination of the formation and social 
reproduction of what is termed initially, the neocomprador fraction of the 
bourgeoisie. This section argues that this powerful class fraction dominates, 
both directly and indirectly, political processes through various mechanisms of 
control. The misappropriation of mineral-rents is the primary source of social 
reproduction for this class fraction but it also indirectly affects the dynamics of 
capital accumulation in Australia, and globally, through its control of access to 
vertically integrated systems of provision. The near monopoly control over 
exploration activities, access to the state apparatus, mineral tenements, links to 
transnational mining capital and links to transnational finance, make this class 
fraction the primary constituent of the modern form of landed property. Their 
ownership of the mineral lands is not of the juridical kind, as with the Native 
titleholders and the State. Rather, the comprador bourgeoisie control access to 
the minerals. This is how they have been able to misappropriate the majority of 
mineral-rents generated throughout the lucrative mining boom dating from the 
 	
early 2000s. Feudal landed property combined the ownership and control 
functions of landed property in one visible class. Modern capitalist landed 
property in Australia entails a division of labour which sees the ownership 
function delegated to the state and indigenous groups while the control 
function, the most important, falls to a fraction of the bourgeoisie whose social 
reproduction depends upon controlling access to mineral lands. 
	
	
	
This concludes the brief outline of the substantive arguments of each section. 
The broad structure of the study has now been established. First, the prevailing 
theory of mineral-rent will be critically evaluated. Second, an alternative 
conception of mineral-rent, premised upon the construction of a historically 
contingent theory of landed property, will be put forward in order to address 
the failings of the orthodoxy. Third, the development of landed property in 
relation to capital will be examined in historical context in order to provide a 
sound platform for the move toward a socially significant theory of mineral- 
rent. The discussion will now turn to sketching the broad context of the problem 
of mineral-rent in Australia. 
 	
The Broad Context of the Problem 
	
Hegel says somewhere that all great historic facts and personages 
recur twice. He forgot to add: “once as tragedy, and again as farce” 
Karl Marx (1852)9 
	
When R.W. Connell penned the preface to Ruling Class, Ruling Culture in 1977, 
the prophetic irony of the opening lines could not have been known. Writing 
about the dismissal of Labor Prime Minister E.G. Whitlam, Connell remarked, 
If there remained any lingering doubt about the class nature of Australian politics, 
the events of late 1975 must have resolved it. There is hardly a clearer case, in the 
recent history of ‘western democracies’, of the way a threatened ruling class is able 
to mobilize fragments of state power, business connections, financial resources, 
and the legitimacy given them by the dominant culture, in a campaign to remove an 
offending government.10 
	
Three decades later, it would be another Labor Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, 
who would draw the ire of the global bourgeoisie. This time the offending 
government would remain in power but under the leadership of Australia’s first 
female Prime Minister, Julia Gillard. But by the time the federal Labor party was 
defeated by the Liberal coalition led by Tony Abbott in the September 2013 
election, Rudd, the formerly deposed Prime Minister, would be returned to the 
party leadership. The remarkable narrative of this tumultuous period was 
perhaps best captured by another book written about the Whitlam government 
in 1974 by Bruce McFarlane and Bob Catley: From Tweedledum to Tweedledee.11 
	
	
	
The Federal Labor government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd, announced its plan to legislate a Resource Super Profits Tax (RSPT) on 2 
	
9 K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Trans. Daniel De Leon, Charles H. Kerr 
and Company, Chicago, 1907, p. 5. 
10 R.W. Connell, Ruling Class, Ruling Culture: Studies of Conflict, Power and Hegemony in 
Australian Life, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977, p. vii. 
11 Robert Catley and Bruce McFarlane, From Tweedldum to Tweedledee: The New Labor 
Government in Australia, A Critique of its Social Model, Australia and New Zealand Book 
Company, Sydney, 1974. 
 	
May 2010 in accordance with the findings of a review of Australia’s tax system 
headed by Treasury Secretary Ken Henry.12 The Australia’s Future Tax System 
Review, otherwise known as the Henry Tax Review, was a ‘root and branch’ 
reappraisal of the existing taxation regime with a view toward reform that was 
commissioned in 2008 by the Rudd government.13 The initiative occurred in the 
context of a crisis in global capitalism initiated by the sub-prime mortgage crisis 
in the USA. In order to address apparent fiscal deficits incurred, in part, by the 
counter-cyclical stimulus programs implemented in response to the crisis, Henry 
proposed taxing the super-profits generated by the boom in the export- oriented 
resources sector that had been in effect since around 2005.14 Henry claimed 
that the current taxation arrangement for the resources sector did not capture 
an appropriate return for the broader community because it was unresponsive 
to changes in profit and distorted production and investment decisions. 15 
Moreover, the  report called  for the replacement  of  current arrangements with a 
uniform resource rent-based tax to be administered by the Commonwealth.16 
	
	
	
12 Kali Sanyal and Paige Darby, Budget 2010-11: Taxation, Resource Super Profits Tax, Parliament 
of Australia, 2011, viewed 12/2/15 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library 
/pubs/rp/BudgetReview201011/TaxationRSPTax, 
13 The stated aim of the review, as per the preface to the final report to the Treasurer, was to 
‘create a tax structure that will position Australia to deal with its social, economic and 
environmental challenges and enhance economic, social and environmental wellbeing’, 
K. Henry et al, Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer, Australian Government 
Publishing Services, Canberra, 2010, p. v. 
14 There are various claims regarding when the mining boom actually began. This  
approximation was made by the Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia and is judged 
according to increases in investment and commodity prices. 
Ric Battelino, ‘Mining Booms and the Australian Economy’, RBA Bulletin, March Quarter, 2010, p. 
67. 
15 Op. Cit. K. Henry et al, Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer, 2010, p. 217. 
16 Ibid, p. 217. 
 	
The RSPT prompted vehement criticism from mining company executives, 
business organisations and politicians. Marius Kloppers, the CEO of Broken Hill 
Proprietary Billiton (BHPB) at the time, claimed that although he had ‘been 
through two Brazilian crises and the Asian crisis’, this tax posed the greatest 
sovereign risk that he had seen, ‘by an order of magnitude’.17 In a similar vein, 
Rio Tinto’s CEO, Tom Albanese, claimed that ‘from my own perspective, this is 
my No. 1 sovereign risk issue on a global basis’.18 These claims were supported 
by calls from the Minerals Council of Australia to re-evaluate the tax based on 
the ‘loss of confidence in Australia as an investment destination’.19 In addition, 
the Business Council of Australia called for the tax to be scrapped and 
reconstructed in consultation with the resources sector or there would be ‘long- 
term consequences for investment and growth prospects’.20 Some critics even 
characterised the tax as a socialist measure. Julie Bishop, the shadow Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and Trade at the time, linked the conceptual basis of the 
RSPT to Karl Marx’s Das Kapital.21 Meanwhile, the mining magnate Clive Palmer 
	
17 Jennifer Hewett, ‘Tax Biggest Danger to Mining: BHP Billiton CEO Marius Kloppers’, The 
Australian, 7 June 2010, viewed 10/2/2015, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/tax-biggest-danger-to-mining-marius- 
kloppers/story-e6frg8zx-1225876203592 
18 Scott Murdoch and Susannah Moran, ‘Miners go over the top on sovereign risk’, The 
Australian, 29 May 2010, viewed 10/2/2015, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/miners-go-over-the-top-on-sovereign-risk/story- 
e6frg8zx-1225872750820 
19 AAP, ‘Minerals Council want RSPT Uncertainty Resolved’, Australian Financial Review, 9 June 
2010,  viewed   10/2/2015, 
http://www.afr.com/p/business/companies/minerals_council_wants_rspt_uncertainty_2JExkfL 
QNIV3A9qitoEQwI 
20 AAP, ‘BCA says start all over again on RSPT’, Australian Financial Review, 21 June 2010, 
viewed    9/2/2015, 
http://www.afr.com/p/national/bca_says_start_all_over_again_on_NfhYYLQnOCQblEtdy0jm0N 21 
Julie Bishop, ‘Super Profit Right Out of Das Kapital’, The West Australian, 8 May 2010, p. 33. 
Marx’s critique of political economy certainly does contain lengthy expositions of surplus value 
and profit although it is difficult to pinpoint exactly where he examines ‘super profits’. The 
editions published in English by Progress Publishers Moscow of the three volumes of Capital 
and the three volumes of The Theories of Surplus Value (also known as the fourth volume of 
 	
went so far as to call the Treasurer Wayne Swan a communist and referred to 
the Prime Minister as ‘comrade Rudd’.22 
	
	
	
While the RSPT could not in any meaningful way be characterised as a socialist 
measure, and it is safe to assume that Das Kapital was not consulted in its 
making, Marx’s critique of political economy may shed light on the material 
context within which these lofty debates are grounded. It is rather difficult to 
take seriously the claims of Kloppers and Albanese with regard to sovereign risk 
when both BHPB and Rio Tinto were heavily invested in countries with 
considerable sovereign risk owing to political and economic instability. At the 
time those comments were made, Rio Tinto was involved in a $5 billion copper- 
gold project at Oyu Tolgoi in Mongolia, a country that had received $236 million 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2009 as a means to ensure 
financial stability. 23 Similarly, Broken Hill Proprietry-Billiton (BHPB) was 
invested in a $5.2 billion alumina project in Guinea where, at the time Kloppers 
bemoaned the RSPT, a military junta was dealing with a deepening political 
crisis.24 So why then did Albanese and Kloppers express such disdain for the 
RSPT as a sovereign risk issue? Much of the commentariat, along with pro- 
	
Capital) do not contain any mention of ‘super profits’. The translation of ‘extra merwhert’ is  
extra surplus value, which is referred to as surplus profit. In volume three of the Penguin edition 
of Capital, there is one instance of ‘super-profit’ appearing in a footnote on page 268. This 
footnote, however, belonged to Engels and was added while editing the volume after Marx had 
died. Moreover, Bishop’s claim seems dubious when one considers the likelihood of Rudd or 
Henry having ever read Das Kapital, let alone getting to the third volume. 
22 ABC, ‘Transcript: Miners Revolt Against Super Tax’, Lateline, 7 May 2010, viewed 8/2/2015, 
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2010/s2892642.htm 
23 M. Murphy, ‘It’s a War-zone: Rio’s Albanese on our Sovereign Risk’, SMH, 25 May 2010, 
viewed  4/2/2015, 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/its-a-war-zone-rios-albanese-on-our-sovereign-risk- 
20100524-w832.html 
24 B. Fitzgerald, ‘BHP fears risk in Guinea project’, SMH, 10 September 2011, viewed 3/2/2012, 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/bhp-fears-risk-in-guinea-project-20110909-1k21q.html 
 	
mining tax politicians, dismissed these claims as self-interest and greed on 
behalf of the mining executives. This may partially explain such sentiments but 
the very real investment strikes which followed such as BHPB’s Olympic Dam 
expansion project point to deeper issues.25 
	
	
	
If Kloppers and Albanese were sincere about the sovereign risk issue posed by 
the potential RSPT, the question then becomes why this tax would outweigh 
political and economic instability of the magnitude faced in Guinea and 
Mongolia. Here the answer may reside in Das Kapital. Marx’s exposition of 
ground-rent and critique of extant theories of rent provide fertile points of 
departure for engaging with the real reasons the RSPT posed such a sovereign 
risk issue. The RSPT represented a direct attack on the material basis of the rent 
relation: the political power to appropriate the rent generated through mineral 
extraction, processing and distribution. That the RSPT was to be 
retrospectively implemented meant that what Marx called differential rent type 
II which would normally accrue to the capitalist, by virtue of a fixed rent for a 
fixed period of time, would now accrue, in part, to the landowner, the state. The 
flow of surplus-value in the form of mineral-rent would be negligible but the 
precedent it would set, and the model it would provide, for countries with 
mineral endowments was unacceptable to Kloppers and Albanese. This is what 
	
	
25 M. Bennet, ‘Olympic Dam Expansion at Risk Over Tax: Morgan Stanley’, The Australian, 16 
June 2010, viewed 5/6/2011, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/business-old/olympic-dam-expansion-at-risk-over- 
tax-morgan-stanley/story-e6frg9no-1225880335279; 
P. Ker, ‘BHP Mothballs Olympic Dam Expansion’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 22 August 2012, 
viewed    22/8/2012, 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/mining-and-resources/bhp-mothballs-olympic-dam- 
expansion-20120822-24m4i.html 
 	
Albanese meant when, after Rudd had been deposed, he warned, ‘Policymakers 
around the world can learn a lesson when considering a new tax to plug a 
revenue gap, or to play local politics’.26 
	
	
	
The inability to gain political consensus and popular support for the mining tax 
led to Rudd being deposed as Prime Minister by his own party and to his 
replacement by Julia Gillard. After a protracted period of factional turmoil 
destabilising the mandate of the Labor party in government, Tony Abbott led 
the Liberal Party to a considerable victory in the 2013 federal election and 
repealed the mining tax in September 2014.27 In the four years since the 
proposal was raised, it had undergone significant amendment, rendering the tax 
somewhat impotent as demonstrated by the negligible sums actually paid by 
mining companies.28 
	
	
	
This episode in Australian politics prompts consideration of numerous political 
and economic issues. The concept of autonomous democratic governance 
beholden to the will of the citizenry approaches farce when this issue is viewed 
through the lens of what Connell described in relation to the Whitlam dismissal. 
The circumstances surrounding the replacement of Rudd by Gillard are different 
26 P. Wilson, ‘Rio’s Albanese uses Rudd example as a warning to other governments’, The 
Australian, 10 July 2010, viewed 3/2/2011, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/rios-albanese-uses-rudd-example-as-a-warning-to- 
other-governments/story-e6frg8zx-1225890000530 
27 E. Griffiths, ‘Mining tax repeal: Joe Hockey says $6.5 billion hit to budget bottom line is 'damn 
good deal' for Australians’, ABC Online, 3 September 2014, viewed 5/3/2015, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-02/government-strikes-mining-tax-deal-with-palmer- 
united-party/5713116 
28 M. Chambers, ‘Rio Tinto Pays No Mining Tax’, The Australian, 9 August 2013, viewed 
6/4/2014, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/rio-tinto-pays-no-mining-tax/story- 
fn59niix-1226693857717 
 	
but the commonalities with regards to the influencing of political processes by 
business groups are glaring. Moreover, the implications of such commonalities 
pose various important questions regarding the social dynamics underpinning 
Australian society. Key areas of economic policy reform are contingent upon the 
ability of the federal and state governments to address fiscal deficits occasioned, 
in large part, by the economic downturn currently plaguing the global economy. 
Issues of taxation, and hence government revenue, relating to the resources 
sector are some of, if not the most, significant political and economic issues 
confronting scholars in the contemporary period. It is necessary to develop 
further our understanding of what transpired, how exactly it happened and, 
most importantly, why. Understanding the implications and motivations 
underpinning this event is critical to planning the most appropriate ways to 
manage the continuing boom in Australia’s resources sector. The question then 
becomes, how can this episode in Australian history be understood? 
	
	
	
This study seeks to contribute to this process of understanding by interrogating 
the validity of orthodox rent theory as a basis for progressive  taxation  in relation 
to the resources sector. This brief attempt to frame the investigation has 
suggested that there are explanations of a fundamental nature that explain the 
appearances of political turmoil surrounding the mining tax debate. It has been 
suggested that in order to understand the class dynamics, the very concept of rent 
needs to be rearticulated in terms of the dynamic social relations of production 
that engender class antagonisms.  The  following   section   will specify further the 
nature of the research problems in terms of their epistemological and ontological 
premises. 
 	
Formulation of the Problem: Theory, Practice and Methodology 
	
	
	
	
The previous two sections of this chapter have established broadly the 
limitations of this study. The first section sought to outline the fundamental 
logical basis that informs all avenues of inquiry raised throughout the 
dissertation. To reiterate briefly, this study proceeds from a simple dialectic in 
which mineral extraction according to capitalist conditions of production 
presupposes rent which, by virtue of its specificity to mining, could be 
appropriately labelled mineral-rent; mineral-rent is demanded by the owner of 
the minerals for the permission to extract them which therefore implies there is 
a barrier to the flow of capital onto mineral-lands; the theory of mineral-rent in 
capitalism presupposes private property in land, which therefore requires a 
theory of landed property. The second section sought to establish the social 
significance of the contemporary debates surrounding the theory of rent in 
general and of mineral-rent in particular. It was argued that a deeper scholarly 
engagement with the underlying forces that both create and determine the 
distribution of rents would permit a greater understanding of one of the most 
tumultuous political and economic periods in recent Australian history. This 
section will build upon these foundations by articulating specific research 
questions and indicating initial responses to be elaborated in detail in the 
following chapters. The research methodology informing the analysis of these 
research questions will also be elucidated in this section. 
	
	
	
The problem of mineral-rents in Australia is that apparently, there is no 
problem. This prevailing consensus prompted the Chairman of the Productivity 
 	
Commission, Gary Banks, to deliver a conference paper in 2011 entitled 
Australia’s Mining Boom: What’s the Problem? 29 The current orthodoxy in 
economic reasoning justifies the political inability to impose rent-targeting 
taxes upon firms operating in the mining sector. Public discourse on the issue of 
exacting mineral rents generally accords with the view that current 
arrangements are ‘fair’. This study seeks to problematise the prevailing 
economic theory while investigate the political refusal to pursue rent- 
maximising strategies in order to provide a constructive contribution to the 
public discourse on the issue of mineral-rent appropriation in Australia. A 
justification for this critical historical analysis is to be found in a body of 
scholarship that suggests transnational mining companies have tended to 
dominate host governments in relation to the appropriation of mineral-rents. 
Empirical studies have shown that since 1945, this relationship of 
subordination, whereby mining firms do not adequately compensate the owners 
of minerals, has in fact become the generalised form of conducting mining 
operations  globally. 30 In  light  of  such  findings,  the  proposition  that  the 
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and The Australian Economic and Social Outlook Conference, 30 June 2011, viewed 14/7/2015, 
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distribution of mineral-rents in Australia is equitable becomes dubious. Even if 
such a proposition were true, the question of how Australia has managed to 
defy a generalised global trend needs to be answered. In either case, the 
problem of mineral-rents in Australia is an issue deserving of scholarly analysis. 
	
	
	
There are various problems to be solved within the broader quandary of 
mineral-rents. This complex issue straddles numerous scholarly disciplines 
including international political economy (IPE), comparative economic history, 
the history of economic thought, Australian mining history and the political 
economy of Australian capitalism. While it would be impossible to make any 
meaningful contribution to each and every field within a single dissertation it is 
argued that analysis of the problems inherent to the issue of mineral-rents 
within the Australian social formation warrants a broad methodological 
approach that at least engages with these various discourses. Here, it is 
instructive to recall Pierre Vilar’s remarks regarding methodology in historical 
inquiry, 
The trade of history has something in common with the detergent 
industry: in both, novelty is frequently passed off as real innovation. 
But there is also a difference: in the former business, brand-names are 
very poorly protected. Anybody can call himself a historian. Anybody 
can add ‘Marxist’ to the title if he sees fit. Anybody can call anything 
he likes ‘Marxist’. Nevertheless, if there is one thing more difficult and 
rare than to become a historian, it is to be a Marxist historian. For the 
term ought to imply the strict application of an elaborate theoretical 
mode of analysis to the most complex of all scientific subject-matters: 
the social relationships among men and their modalities of change. 
One may even wonder if the high standards of this definition have 
ever been met.31 
	
	
	
	
Review, Vol. 29, No. 10, March 1978; H.W. Singer, ‘The Distribution of Gains Between Investing 
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31 P. Vilar, ‘Marxist History, A History in the Making: Towards a Dialogue with Althusser’, New 
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While Vilar’s goad to Althusser must be read as such, it does at least indicate the 
difficulties involved in seeking to understand the myriad social factors and 
forces involved in determining the current contours of not only the debates 
surrounding the issue of mineral-rents, but, more importantly, the material 
context that gave rise to them. Therefore, the broad methodology to be 
employed in this study will draw on the various traditions of historical 
materialism. It is argued here that this interdisciplinary approach is the one 
most capable of explicating the issue of mineral-rents within the scope of 
analysis set out above. 
	
	
	
Two components that inform the current study can usefully be characterised 
initially as issues of theory and issues of practice relating to mineral-rents. 
While it may seem gratuitous to state that such distinctions are purely for 
analytical purposes and do not reflect the integration of these issues in reality, it 
is a necessary qualification given the nature of the prevailing scholarship on 
such matters. The issues relating to theory circle and intersect the key debates 
within the extant scholarship on the concept of mineral-rents. The problems to 
be addressed in relation to this concept are twofold: does the current theory of 
mineral-rents sufficiently explain the creation and distribution of surplus-value 
in the sphere of mineral extraction; and, to what normative end does this theory 
portend? These questions beget analysis of how the theory of mineral-rents has 
manifested in practice. What policy frameworks have this theory informed and 
more importantly, what social forces underpin such frameworks? The following 
discussion will survey the contours of these problems and arrive at a set of 
 	
specific research questions that are derived from research gaps within the 
extant scholarship surrounding mineral-rents. 
	
	
	
The first observation to be made is fundamentally important and will locate the 
subsequent discussion in its proper context. Following Harvey, rent is simply a 
‘money payment for the use of land and its appurtenances’, however, ‘this 
simple money payment can conceal a host of possible social significations that 
can be unraveled only through careful socio-historical investigation’.32 It is from 
this basis that this critique of orthodox theories of mineral-rents will proceed. 
The prevailing conception of mineral-rents, firmly grounded within the 
Neoclassical tradition of economic thought, is valid to the extent that it permits 
the measurement of one type of rent and perhaps the implications of this as an 
allocative mechanism for investment. What the theory fails to grasp, however, 
are the social significations inextricably embedded within the rent relation. 
These include, but are not limited to, the dynamics of the class relations 
determining the magnitude of mineral rents, the inherent antagonism and 
exploitation rooted within those relations and the mechanisms by which the 
distribution of mineral-rents are effected. Moreover, in relation to the 
normative aspects of the theory, there is no scope to explore such issues within 
the orthodox framework because the creation and distribution of mineral-rents 
is characterised as a technically given and politically sterile process bereft of 
such considerations. Thus, even policy prescriptions aimed at improving the 
contribution   of   mining   to   the   welfare   of   the   nation   such   as   the 
	
32 D. Harvey, ‘Land Rent and the Transition to the Capitalist Mode of Production’, Antipode, Vol. 
14, No. 3, 1982, p. 25. 
 	
recommendations of the Henry Review can be easily dismissed within political 
debates because the theory underpinning such policies is regarded separately to 
the complex social relations that underpin the Australian social formation 
within the context of the global political economy. The starting point for 
appropriately considering these complex issues is to broaden the scope of 
analysis with regard to the theory of mineral-rents. That is, the task of theory is 
not merely to construct a framework for the measurement of mineral-rents but 
also to ‘establish the underlying forces that give social meaning to and fix the 
level of the rental payment’.33 
	
	
	
To begin the task of developing a theory of mineral-rents with a broader 
explanatory scope the analytical framework employed must be capable of 
moving through and between the arbitrary lines delineating scholarly 
disciplines. To this end, this study appeals to the dynamic traditions of historical 
materialism. The genesis of these traditions can be traced to Marx’s critique of 
political economy in the four volumes of Capital34 and draws its strengths, and 
limitations, from his attempts to generate a theory of class by analysing the laws 
of motion underpinning an evolving capitalist mode of production throughout 
the nineteenth century. This methodology, as it has developed in the vast 
discourse of class analysis inspired by the work of Marx and Engels, is far from 
uncontentious. Indeed, proponents of this approach agree less with, and are 
often more critical of, each other than those who entirely disavow historical 
	
33 Ibid, Harvey, ‘Land Rent and the Transition to the Capitalist Mode of Production’, 1982, p. 25. 
34 The Theories of Surplus Value, of which there are three volumes, constitutes the fourth volume 
of Capital, referred to here. Much of the material published in the Theories of Surplus Value is 
thought to have been intended by Marx to be integrated into further volumes of Capital. 
 	
materialism. The approach forwarded here does not seek to accord with any 
one variant that has developed within these traditions but rather aims to adopt 
the dialectical and materialist methodology employed throughout the work of 
Marx and Engels, although primarily in Capital, for an analysis of a particular 
aspect of the Australian social formation in a specific historical period. This 
methodology, due to its dialectical and materialist nature, is difficult to define in 
and of itself. As Vilar notes, Marx ‘discovered his method by practising it’ and 
‘we can only recover it in his practice’.35 Marx and Engels’ statement in a letter 
to the German economist Walther Borgius in 1894 provides a useful starting 
point: 
Political, legal, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic etc. 
development rests on the economic  base.  It  is not  that  economic 
conditions are the sole active cause and everything else mere passive 
effect. Rather there is interaction on the basis of a prevailing 
economic necessity in the last instance.…Hence there is not…an 
automatic effect produced by economic conditions; rather men make 
their history themselves, but in a given milieu which conditions them; 
they do this on the basis of pre-existing relations, amongst which the 
economic are decisive in the last instance, though they may be 
influenced by other relations, political and ideological; yet in the last 
instance they are decisive and constitute the sole guide to 
knowledge.36 
	
It is clear from this passage why the accusation of ‘economic reductionism’ has 
been, and is often, levelled at Marx, Engels and those who attempt to practice 
the methodology drawn from this observation. Such claims can be rejected on 
the basis of a misreading of not only the work of Marx and Engels but also of the 
majority of analysis within the traditions of historical materialism. To draw on 
	
35 Op cit, Vilar, ‘Marxist History, A History in the Making’, 1973, p. 67. 
36 K. Marx and F. Engels, Werke, Volume 39, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1956, p. 206. 
The better known version of this statement is to be found in Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire 
of Louis Bonaparte, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1937, p. 5. 
‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under 
self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted 
from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the 
living.’ 
 	
Vilar again, writing in 1973, ‘in spite of all the residues left by a century of 
misunderstanding, it is now starting to be accepted that historical materialism 
is not a form of economic determinism’.37 The passage above demonstrates the 
dialectical nature of the logic employed by Marx and Engels rather than the 
vulgar economic reductionism it has been mistaken for. 
	
	
	
As Engels states in Anti-Dühring, ‘the materialist conception of history starts 
from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life 
and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all 
social structure’.38 This is no more an economic reductionist argument than it is 
to state that human beings need to eat in order to live. Production in this sense 
refers to the concrete production of material needs but the term can also be 
used to designate production of a different kind. Marx seemed to imply a certain 
economic reductionism in the Grundrisse when he claimed that, 
Production predominates not only over itself, in the antithetical 
definition of production, but over the other moments as well. The 
process always returns to production to begin anew. That exchange 
and consumption cannot be predominant is self-evident. Likewise, 
distribution as distribution of products; while as distribution of the 
agents of production it is itself a moment of production. A definite 
production thus determines a definite consumption, distribution and 
exchange as well as definite relations between these different 
moments. Admittedly, however, in its one-sided form, production is 
itself determined by the other moments. For example if the market, 
i.e. the sphere of exchange, expands, then production grows in 
quantity and the divisions between its different branches become 
deeper. A change in distribution changes production, e.g. 
concentration of capital, different distribution of the population 
between town and country, etc. Finally, the needs of consumption 
determine production. Mutual interaction takes place between the 
different moments. This is the case with every organic whole.39 
	
	
	
	
37 Op cit, Vilar, ‘Marxist History, A History in the Making’, 1973, p. 71. 
38 F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1943, p. 316. 
39 K. Marx, The Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Penguin, London, 
1973, p. 40. 
  
	
The two types of production here are concrete production (i.e. of commodities) 
and the production of surplus-value (i.e. in the abstract). It is the latter that 
predominates over all else. The production of surplus-value is not in and of 
itself strictly an economic matter. It is a complex set of social relations that 
subordinates concrete production, exchange and distribution. Marx did not 
reduce the myriad complexities of social reality to concrete production. He 
simply made the accurate claim that all social formations where the capitalist 
mode of production prevails are subordinated in the first instance to the 
continued production of surplus-value. That the technical definition of 
economic recession is two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth bears 
testament to this fact. 40 Here in these passages is the crux of historical 
materialism, whereby the ‘economic’ is a social activity that humans engage in 
to meet material needs, which simultaneously determines social structure, 
while being determined by it. The causality is reflexive and any understanding 
of these social relations must take account of the agents who ‘make their 
history’ but always in relation to the ‘given milieu which conditions them’. 
	
	
	
Another fundamental point informing the methodology of this study relates to 
what Marx wrote, or rather, did not write, about class. It is well known that the 
section on ‘Classes’ - chapter 52 - of the third volume of Capital remains an 
unfinished fragment numbering less than two pages. In it, Marx identified the 
dominant classes of his time by asking ‘What makes a class?’ before stating that 
	
40 J. Irvine, ‘The Definition of Recession? Just Apply the Duck Principle’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
21 January 2009, viewed 16/2/2012, 
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/the-definition-of-recession-just-apply-the-duck- 
 	
‘this arises automatically from answering another question: “What makes wage- 
labourers, capitalists and landowners the formative elements of the three great 
social classes?”’.41 The section breaks off after Marx problematises his rhetorical 
responses with ‘at first sight, the identity of revenues and revenue sources’ 
which would mean that ‘doctors and government officials’ but also ‘forest- 
owners, mine-owners’ would need to form distinct classes.42 The  point  was being 
made that the identification of revenues and revenue sources was not a sufficient 
means to distinguish class. 
	
	
	
Another clue lies in his letter to the journalist and soldier J. Weydemeyer in 
1852 where he claimed that the novelty of his discovery was not the existence 
or anatomy of the three great classes or the struggle between them. The 
bourgeois historians already knew this, according to Marx, long before. Rather, 
Marx’s discovery lay in the fact he could prove: ‘(1) that the existence of classes 
is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of 
production, (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to 
the abolition of all classes and to a classless society’.43 What these insights 
demonstrate is that Marx saw the essence of class as something deeper than the 
source of  revenue  according  to  the  complex division of  labour  and  that 
whatever the distinction, it remained historically specific and dynamic. The 
	
	
41 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume Three, Penguin, London, 1981, pp. 
1025-6. 
42 Ibid, p. 1026. 
43 K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Correspondence, 2nd. Edn., Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, 
p. 69. 
 	
content of these statements is not technically informative with regard  to  a theory 
of class but it does suggest that class is a concept that is contingent upon the 
material realities of the social context within which it exists. Perhaps the reason 
Marx’s explication of ‘classes’ in Capital remained unfinished was because the 
essence of class was to be found in the theoretical elaboration of the vast mode of 
production that generated them. 
	
	
	
This approach to class has been usefully characterised as a generative approach 
by R.W. Connell. According to Connell, Marx’s was a ‘theory of class as a 
structure generated by the operation of some fundamental and highly general 
processes, whose effects ramify from the labour market into all other spheres of 
life’.44 This is distinct from the categorical approach to class analysis that is 
concerned with a systematic way of sorting people where ‘the task of theory is 
to discover and formulate the bases of…division and ordering in various 
societies, and the task of research is to trace out their correlates and 
consequences’.45 This tradition of class analysis forms the basis of stratification 
theory in sociological analysis and draws, according to its practitioners, on Max 
Weber's definition of a ‘class situation’ as the sharing of a ‘specific causal 
component of…life chances’.46 Here the emphasis is on the distribution of life 
chances rather than understanding the social systems that produce them. A 
generative theory of class is concerned instead with the ‘way in which 
elementary structures and processes are seen to generate a huge and complex 
	
	
44 Op cit, Connell, Ruling Class, Ruling Culture, 1977, p. 4. 
45 Ibid, p. 4. 
46 M. Weber, Economy and Society, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978, p. 927. 
 	
historical reality’ where the emphasis is on the ‘processes producing social 
groupings, rather than the categories they produce; and on the activity  of people, 
not merely their location in space’.47 The generative approach to class analysis 
is capable of moving beyond the criticism of categorical class theories levelled 
by E.P. Thompson who claimed that even the ‘finest meshed sociological net 
cannot give us a pure specimen of class, any more than it can give us one of 
deference or of love’.48 Thompson, in his seminal history of the English working 
class, argued that class needed to be understood as ‘an historical phenomenon 
unifying a number of disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the 
raw material of experience and in consciousness’, emphasising its ‘historical’ 
character and not merely conceiving of class as a “structure”, nor even as a 
“category”, but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have 
happened) in human  relationships’.49 Insofar as the methodologies of historical 
materialism entail a generative approach to class analysis, Connell is correct in 
claiming that ‘Marxism of Marx’s kind remains the most important and fully 
developed instance of generative theory’.50 
	
	
	
The key aspects of the historical materialist methodology that will be employed 
in the service of establishing the underlying forces that gives social meaning to 
and determines the magnitude of mineral-rents can be briefly summarized as 
	
	
47 Op cit, Connell, Ruling Class, Ruling Culture, 1977, p. 5. 
48 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, Pantheon Books, New York, 1964, p. 
9. 
49 Ibid, p. 9. 
50 Op cit, Connell, Ruling Class, Ruling Culture, 1977, p. 5. 
 	
follows. In accordance with Connell’s endorsement of ‘Marxism of Marx’s kind’, 
this study seeks to undertake a generative class analysis in the tradition of the 
materialist conception of history utilising dialectical reasoning. This approach is 
uniquely placed to analyse the problem of mineral-rents in the Australian 
context because it entails a focus on the underlying processes of accumulation 
that generate class formations. The brief survey of the context surrounding the 
debates on the issue of resource-rent taxation demonstrated the existence of 
significant tensions between political actors, vested interests in the mining 
industry and within the institution of the state more broadly. Whereas a 
categorical approach to class analysis may be able to illustrate the contours of 
this problem, the generative approach permits an analysis of why these tensions 
exist and could illuminate potential avenues for resolving them. In practical 
terms, applying the methodology outlined here to the problem of mineral-rents 
in Australia may provide a substantive point of departure for planning ways to 
manage the future of the Australian mining industry. 
	
	
	
The discussion up to this point has been concerned with outlining the broad 
context of the focus of the study in relation to methodological concerns. It has 
been argued that in order to understand the issue of mineral-rents in the 
Australian context, the analysis need be informed by the materialist conception 
of history utilising dialectical reasoning. The focus will now turn to elaborating 
the specific questions that will be addressed using this methodology and to how 
exactly this will be achieved. In accordance with the methodological guidelines 
established previously, the analysis from this point onwards will be guided by 
the following questions: 
 	
	
	
	
	
	
(1) What underlying social forces determined the magnitude of mineral-rents 
within Australia during the most recent minerals boom? 
(2) How has the distribution of mineral-rents been affected throughout this 
period and what specific social mechanisms have facilitated this? 
(3) What are the potential avenues available to ensure the contribution of 
mining to the welfare of the nation is commensurate to the costs of 
permitting the extraction, processing and distribution of finite mineral 
resources? 
	
	
	
The preliminary responses to these questions revolve around the central thesis 
of this dissertation: the development of large scale mining in Australia since 
1945 has led to the emergence of a neocomprador fraction of the bourgeoisie 
which, in conjunction with an emergent transnational mining capital, has 
effectively misappropriated mineral-rents to the effect that the extraction of 
finite mineral resources no longer contributes in any meaningful way to the 
welfare of the country. Furthermore, in order to rectify this situation, it is 
necessary to nationalise the ownership of all existing mining operations in 
conjunction with the implementation of a broad legislative and regulatory 
infrastructure that can ensure the maximum level of mineral-rents is exacted in 
the extraction, processing and distribution of mineral commodities within the 
bounds of the Australian state. 
 	
	
	
The response to these research questions revolves around three axes: the place 
of the Australian mining industry within the global minerals industry; the 
circulation of what are termed revenues in relation to the flows of capital; and, 
the role of the distribution of mineral-rents as a determinant of patterns of 
capital accumulation in relation to the upstream activities of mineral extraction, 
processing and distribution, known collectively as, systems of provision. The 
investigation along these lines of inquiry will entail analysis of the global 
context, not just in terms of the minerals industry, but also of the conditions 
determining the global demand for mineral commodities as well as the 
competition between suppliers of mineral commodities. 
	
	
	
The frame of analysis with regard to the global minerals industry identifies 
transnational mining companies as  representative  of capital and the host 
government as the landlord, by virtue of their exclusive rights of ownership 
over the minerals within their jurisdictions. This relationship typifies the 
contractual arrangements within the global minerals industry and permits 
analysis of the distribution of mineral-rents between these parties. It is assumed 
here that the relationship is also an antagonistic one, as both parties seek to 
maximise their share of mineral-rents. This framework has is problematic for 
various reasons that will be elaborated in detail below. Suffice it to say for now 
that such a framework does not account for the division of labour within 
modern landed property between the ownership and control functions. 
Examination and explication of this division is what distinguishes this current 
study from other Marxist approaches to understanding the rent relation in 
 	
extractive industry. This distinction is a key element of this current study and 
will be substantiated in relation to the Australian context in Part 3 of this 
dissertation. 
	
	
	
The distinction between flows of capital and flows of revenues is in accordance 
with the theory of ground-rent articulated by Marx within the context of his 
broader theory of value. Here the distinction is necessary and analytically useful 
because the theory of ground-rent Marx developed forms the point of departure 
for a critical engagement with the current prevailing theories of mineral-rents 
with the aim of moving toward the development of a new theory of mineral- 
rents that accounts for the social significance of mining. Moreover, Marx’s 
theory was concerned solely with the flow of capital and assumed away the role 
of the circulation of revenues in this process. Therefore, it is necessary to 
operate on the basis of this distinction when attempting to develop a critical 
extension of this theory within the contemporary context. 
	
	
	
Finally, the analysis of systems of provision incorporates the upstream activities 
necessary to the functioning of extractive mineral operations. These upstream 
activities include, but are not limited to, procurement services for labour and 
capital goods, finance and logistics. The analysis of these activities in relation to 
each other and in the context of an integral unity demonstrates that mineral- 
rents are not simply a passive element of distribution but are in fact an active 
determinant of broader patterns of capital accumulation. Each of these axes of 
inquiry is drawn from existing bodies of work within the historical materialist 
scholarship on mineral rents. The current synthesis draws specifically from the 
 	
work of Chibuzo Nwoke, David Harvey and Ben Fine respectively with regard to 
the concepts outlined above. These frameworks will be explained in  detail below 
in the section discussing the theoretical orientation of this study. The next 
chapter turns to the prevailing conceptions of mineral rents and provides a critical 
evaluation. 
 	
Chapter 2 
	
	
The Contemporary Theory of Mineral-rent 
	
	
Theory is always for someone and for some purpose…There is, 
accordingly, no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a 
standpoint in time and space. When any theory so represents itself, it is 
the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its 
concealed perspective. 
Robert W. Cox (1981) 1 
	
This section discusses two subjects: the prevailing approach to the theorisation 
of economic rent in relation to mineral commodities; and, the ‘resource-curse’ 
hypothesis as it relates to the Australian social formation. The ‘resource-curse’ 
hypothesis is directly related to theories of mineral-rents because the latter is 
the fundamental mechanism that determines the former. Both, as an allocative 
mechanism for investment, and, as a distributional consideration, the flow and 
magnitude of mineral-rent primarily determines the nature of the externalities 
associated with a ‘resource-curse’ situation. An examination of the ‘resource- 
curse’ hypothesis in historical context is imperative at a time when  policy debates 
are focused upon addressing the fiscal ramifications of the end of the investment 
phase of the minerals boom. As noted in the introduction, much of the 
scholarship seeking to understand the significance of the minerals boom from 
a social-scientific standpoint accepts, almost uncritically, the conventional 
interpretation of the ‘resource curse’. For these reasons, it is necessary  to engage 
critically with the resource curse literature to clarify its significance for 
understanding the Australian context. The extant scholarship on the ‘resource- 
curse’ hypothesis as it relates to the Australian context throughout the post-War 
	
1 R.W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, 
Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1981, p. 128. 
 	
period will now be surveyed with a view to moving beyond the current binary 
conceptions and offering suggestions for broadening the scope of analysis to 
include heterodox theories of mineral-rents. 
	
	
	
The discussion proceeds from the observation that economic theories and the 
normative prescriptions that flow on from them are politically constructed and 
not technically given. Political considerations always underpin economic 
concepts and therefore the latter need always be analysed with a view to the 
former. The concepts used to understand dynamic social phenomena must change 
in accordance with their objects of analysis. While such observations seem like 
obvious statements, they do not inform the prevailing economic thinking that 
determines government policy on mineral taxation, regulation of mineral 
industries and contractual frameworks underpinning relations between the state 
and mining firms. Conventional wisdom on such matters is built upon a foundation 
of ahistorical absolutes that were developed pragmatically in response to 
historically specific political and economic problems. While the technical 
apparatus and the technical architecture built upon this foundation are 
sufficiently logical and sophisticated, both seek to address the wrong set of 
problems. Rather than concepts adapting to material circumstances, this mode 
of inquiry has sought to create its own object of analysis, removed from reality, 
raising tautology and sophistry to a science. The scope of policy debate is 
constrained because the circular reasoning of the economic logic is incapable of 
justifying anything but more of the same. Real problems emerge in relation to 
the contribution of mining to the welfare of the nation if there is any truth to the 
sentiments expressed by John Maynard Keynes when he wrote that ‘Practical 
 	
men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, 
are usually the slaves of some defunct economist’.2 However much this holds, 
such idealism tells only half the story and mistakes correlation for causation. 
Keynes needs to be tempered and carried forward by Engels in that ‘the final 
causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in 
men’s brains, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange’.3 
Therefore, while ideas will form the substance of the following analysis they will 
be cast against concrete developments in the material context in which they 
were spawned and came to change. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
2 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan, London, 1936, 
p. 383. 
3 Op cit, F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, 1943, p. 316. 
 	
The Prevailing Conception of Mineral-rent in Australia 
	
	
	
	
	
The Commonwealth government of Australia announced a review of the tax 
system on 13 May 2008. In the official media release, the federal Treasurer and 
Deputy Prime Minister, Wayne Swan, claimed that the review was aimed at 
positioning the country to deal with the ‘demographic, social, economic and 
environmental challenges of the 21st century’.4 The ‘Henry review’ as it came to 
be known bore the name of Treasury Secretary Ken Henry who led the expert 
panel that presided over the review process. One of the key considerations of 
the review was how to reform existing arrangements relating to mineral 
resource taxation. This aspect of the review was highly contentious owing to the 
interests of key stakeholders in the mining industry and the magnitude of 
economic activity occurring within the mining sector at the time. The 
contribution of the mining sector in terms of gross value added increased 161 
per cent between 2004/05 and 2010/11, more than double the construction 
sector, which was the second largest increase at 62 per cent over the same 
period. 5 When the review was announced, Australia was in the midst of 
potentially the most lucrative, at least in terms of returns to the mining 
companies and rentiers, mining boom in its history. For these reasons, it is 
crucial to understand exactly what the contours of the subsequent debate 
	
	
	
	
4 W. Swan, Media Release No. 036, Australia’s Future Tax System, The Treasury, Australian 
Government, 2008, viewed 29/4/2015, 
http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2008/036.htm&pageID 
=003&min=wms&Year=2008&DocType=0 
5 G. Bailey et al, The Economic Impact of the Current Mining Boom on the Australian Tourism 
Industry, Tourism Research Australia, Canberra, 2013, p. 3. 
 	
around resource-rent taxation were and what political and economic forces 
underpinned them. 
	
	
	
A point of departure is the definition of economic rent adopted by the Henry 
review. The final submission to the Treasurer in 2009 used the following 
definition: 
An economic rent is the excess of the return to a factor of production above the 
amount that is required to sustain the current use of the factor (or to entice the use 
of the factor). For example, if a worker is paid $100,000 but would still be willing to 
work at the same job if they were paid $75,000, their economic rent would be 
$25,000.6 
	
It is obvious from this simple and abstract definition that the point of 
understanding the concept of rent is to keep a factor of production in use or to 
what it will take to bring it into use. When this definition is applied to 
considerations of mineral resource taxation, the factor of production in question 
is land. Or, more specifically, the minerals embedded within the land. Rent, in 
this context, is viewed as an allocative mechanism that determines patterns of 
investment within the sphere of mineral production. The ‘excess’, or economic 
rent, becomes the object of analysis with regards to political and economic 
inquiry. Thus the problem of resource rents and how and who should 
appropriate them is limited by the definition of rent as an allocative mechanism 
which then determines the use of a factor of production. The subsequent scope 
of all policy debate that follows from this economic argument is limited by the 
binary consideration, to use, or not to use, the land. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
6 Op cit, Henry et al., Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer, 2009, p. 737. 
 	
How was this definition of rent derived and what are the political and historical 
dimensions of its apparently ubiquitous validity? The luminaries of this field of 
economic inquiry are Ross Garnaut and Anthony Clunies-Ross.7 Garnaut has 
been referred to in recent times as the ‘father of rent tax in Australia’.8 His role 
in informing state policy also extends to publishing a series of reports 
commissioned by the Federal government in his capacity as an ‘eminent 
neoclassical economist’ on the issue of ‘climate change [where he] recognises 
the need for investment in the transition to a low carbon emissions economy’.9 
Garnaut’s work in the field of mineral resource taxation is world-renowned and 
has informed the taxation regimes of successive Australian governments since 
the first post-War mining boom which ended in the mid-1970s. As this work 
informs much of the contemporary literature, it serves as an appropriate point 
of departure for a critical engagement with contemporary orthodox rent theory. 
	
	
	
Garnaut published a paper in the Australian Economic Review in December 2010 
entitled ‘Principles and Practices of Resource Rent Taxation’. The paper was a 
timely intervention considering that the RSPT, which had been generally 
informed by the Henry review, was replaced by the MRRT after Julia Gillard 
became PM in June that year. It is instructive to note Garnaut’s definition of 
economic rent in the paper as ‘the revenue derived from some activity minus 
the sum of the supply prices of all capital, labour and other “sacrificial” inputs 
	
7 The following volume by these authors is still considered the authoritative text on mineral 
resource taxation: R. Garnaut and A. Clunies-Ross, The Taxation of Mineral Rents, Clarendon 
Press, New York, 1983. 
8 J. Passant, ‘The Minerals Resource Rent Tax: The Australian Labor Party and the Continuity of 
Change’, Accounting Research Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2014, p. 19. 
9 J. Courvisanos, Cycles, Crises and Innovation: Path to Sustainable Development - A Kaleckian- 
Schumpeterian Synthesis, Cheltenham, UK, Edward-Elgar, 2012, p. 195. 
 	
necessary to undertake the activity’.10 While couched in more technical terms, 
the definition is fundamentally the same as that provided in the Henry review. 
The objective of defining rent relates specifically and solely to the conditions 
needed to ‘undertake the activity’, which in this case is mining. Garnaut 
proceeded to argue that the current arrangements regarding taxation of non- 
renewable mineral resources are insufficient from the standpoint of government 
revenue maximisation. The stated aim of any mineral-rent taxation regime is 
‘neutrality’. That is, the contract between the owner of the minerals (the state) 
and the private entity (the mining firm) must be mutually beneficial and, more 
importantly, not provide a disincentive to invest. To this end, taxation of economic 
rents provides a potentially effective means to meet this ideal of neutral 
taxation. 
	
	
	
Garnaut posits two reasons why governments are expected to seek to extract 
economic rent as revenue: ‘it has a lower economic cost than other forms of 
taxation; and it represents the value of public property that is being transferred 
to private ownership’.11 The discussion then goes on to outline the six main 
forms of mineral rent taxation available to governments and argues that a 
combination of three of these instruments should be utilised in the Australian 
context to achieve ‘neutrality’ and an optimal rate of resource depletion. 
Garnaut’s proposal is essentially for a resource rent tax (RRT) modelled on the 
existing Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT), supplemented by a Flat Fee (FF) 
	
	
10 R. Garnaut, ‘Principles and Practices of Resource Rent Taxation’, Australian Economic Review, 
vol. 43, no. 4, December 2010, p. 347. 
11 Ibid, p. 348. 
 	
exacted at the point of allocation of an exploration licence and the introduction 
of a Brown Tax (BT) during the exploration phase to offset exploration 
expenditure against the RRT in order to mitigate the disincentive to investing in 
future exploration activities.12 Such a regime, according to Garnaut, would 
‘secure neutrality’ at the production stage, ‘generate an approximation of 
neutrality’ at stages of new mine development and Brownfields expansion or 
mine life extension and ‘secure full utilisation of economically valuable 
resources’.13 
	
	
	
The problem with this definition of rent is that it is drawn from a theoretical 
approach that is broadly ahistorical and claims universal applicability. This 
definition of rent is constrained to problems of optimal efficiency within limited 
and given parameters. These assumptions are static and therefore falsified with 
the passage of time and the development of productive forces. For example, the 
discovery of new deposits, the application of more productive extraction 
techniques or the fluctuation of commodity prices are taken as exogenous forces 
to be incorporated into this allocative model rather than endogenous 
characteristics flowing from the exploitation of the land itself. Any taxation 
regime formulated on the assumption that rent is simply an allocative 
mechanism determining the use of land must necessarily be reactive to 
conditions, which are not technically given but are, in fact, determined by the 
parties with which the taxation authority is engaged in an antagonistic 
economic relationship i.e. the state vis-à-vis mining firms. If it is acknowledged 
	
12 Ibid, p. 355. 
13 Ibid, p. 355. 
 	
that appropriation of rents is mediated through a political process, that is, 
influenced by power relations, this situation does not bode well for the ability of 
states to appropriate their ‘fair’ share. In essence, through assuming equal 
bargaining positions in theory, inequality of power relations is justified in 
practice. Leaving considerations of equity aside, there is an economic argument 
to be made regarding appropriation of mineral-rents by the institution entitled 
to it so as to facilitate optimal efficiency in the exploitation of mineral resources. 
	
	
	
The research gap is evident when the various citations of Garnaut’s paper are 
taken into account. His 2010 publication on resource rent taxation is cited by 
eleven scholarly sources and scrutinised by none. A brief review of these 
articles demonstrates the seemingly unanimous acceptance of Garnaut’s 
conception of mineral-rents. John Freebairn, in his economic case against the 
establishment of a sovereign wealth fund to stabilise currency price 
fluctuations, refers to the Garnaut paper as one of the various contributions to 
the ‘extensive literature on the relative merits of different forms of special 
taxation of natural resources in fixed geographic supply’, arising from the Henry 
review and concerned with specific reform options for taxing the Australian 
mining sector.14 There is no need to discuss Garnaut’s claims any further 
because Freebairn employs the same theoretical understanding of mineral- 
rents; ‘Well endowed mines with low costs earn relatively large rents, while 
marginal mines with costs close to the market price earn a zero rent’.15 That is, 
	
	
14 J. Freebairn, ‘Mining Booms and Government Budgets’, The Australian Journal of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics, Vol. 56, p. 210. 
15 Ibid, p. 204. 
  
	
mineral rents are of a purely differential nature, reflecting the productivity of 
the mine in relation to the current market price of the commodity. Garnaut 
employs the same logic when he states that ‘mineral deposits will be developed 
sequentially, with the higher quality deposits – those with greatest rent value 
per unit of production – going first’.16 On face value, it seems misguided to take 
this theory to task. It is, of course, correct in suggesting that the marginal mines 
with high costs generate less profit than well-endowed mines with low 
production costs. This much is obvious. But stating the obvious does not amount 
to analysis. If the theory of rent is to serve any purpose, it needs to be analytically 
useful and contribute to solving social problems. 
	
	
	
Boulus and Dowding, in their 2014 analysis of how media coverage framed the 
debate around the RSPT, cite Garnaut in a descriptive account of the proposals 
contained in the final report of the Henry review. The government proposed, 
according to Boulus and Dowding, to use the ‘revenue raised by the tax to 
implement corporate tax cuts, increase the superannuation guarantee and boost 
infrastructure construction in the mining states’. 17 This observation was 
attributed to Garnaut although it is difficult to ascertain exactly how and where 
Garnaut made such an insight considering the only mention of superannuation 
in his article relates to the established principle of past income not being 
affected by current changes in taxation as has been demonstrated in the cases of 
	
	
	
	
	
16 Op cit, Garnaut, ‘Principles and Practices of Resource Rent Taxation’, 2010, p. 354. 
17 P. Boulus and K. Dowding, ‘The Press and Issue Framing in the Australian Mining Tax Debate’, 
 
 
 
	
‘the taxation of superannuation lump sums and of capital gains, and changes in 
corporate and individual income tax rates’.18 
	
	
	
Following this article, a citation of the Garnaut piece appears in a 2013 
sustainability study of the Italian aggregates industry. Here Mazzanti and Zoboli 
evaluate the prospects of combining environmental taxes and environmental 
planning policies to address issues arising from the extraction of sand, gravel 
and crushed rocks in the Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna regions in northern 
Italy. They conclude that while taxes are important, ‘they need to be integrated 
within a complementarity framework with other instruments’ because ‘the 
matter is more one of capturing and managing the rents society owns from a 
collective natural resource, and reinvesting such rents’…‘rather than using 
prices to internalise externality in a conventional fashion’. 19 While their 
conclusion is certainly relevant to the Australian context, their unqualified use 
of the Garnaut article is symptomatic of the broader methodology identified 
above. Again, Garnaut’s article is cited along with various other ‘recent papers 
on resource taxation issues [which] have appeared on the most consolidated 
theoretical side’.20 To use the word consolidated implies that the theory has 
somehow been improved, evolved or become a theorem. It is doubtful any 
concept employed to explain dynamic social realities could ever meet such a 
standard. This is more than a semantic criticism when it is considered that the 
	
	
18 Op cit, Garnaut, ‘Principles and Practice of Resource Rent Taxation’, 2010, p. 352. 
19 M. Mazzanti and R. Zoboli, ‘Resource Taxation and Regional Planning: Revenue Recycling for 
Local Sustainability in the Aggreggates Sector’, Journal of Environmental Planning and 
 
 
 
	
theory of mineral-rents has been uncritically accepted in its current tautological 
form. Perhaps the most important insight offered by Mazzanti and Zoboli for the 
current discussion, notwithstanding insights gleaned from their empirical 
research, relates to the claim that their study ‘is coherent with a “political 
economy” approach, where the analysis of externality generated by extraction 
(of water, soil, minerals) and related rents cannot be disjointed from issues such 
as (land) rent capture and the reinvestment of rents’.21 Locating the problem of 
mineral-rents within the broader issues of how rather than simply if land should 
be used prompts consideration of the material conditions determining the social 
relations manifest in the economic form of mineral-rents. 
	
	
	
Chen and Randall offer an economic analysis of the contest between coal seam 
gas operations and agriculture on prime farmland in the Darling Downs region 
in southern Queensland. Garnaut’s work is cited as one of the various accounts 
that discuss economic considerations of designing mineral resource rent taxes 
that meet the economic sustainability condition set out by Solow and Hartwick 
in 1974 and 1977 respectively.22 The study finds that ‘the long-term economic 
net benefits from agriculture-only exceed those from CSG-only and CSG- 
agriculture coexistence cases’.23 Moreover, it is argued that ‘the Australian 
national interest depends on how much of the CSG rents (i.e. the economic 
value  of  resources  depleted)  are  retained  in  the  country’ as ‘it  is  well 
	
	
21 Ibid, p. 896. 
22 C. Chen and A. Randall, ‘The Economic Contest between Coal Seam Gas Mining and 
Agriculture on Prime Farmland: It May be Closer than we Thought’, Journal of Economic and 
  
	
known that an exhaustible-resource-extracting country can achieve 
economic sustainability only if all of the rents from resources depleted are 
reinvested in productive capital’.24 
	
	
	
This remark, along with the study more generally, follows uncritically the work 
of Solow (1974) and Hartwick (1977) on the notion of sustainable development. 
This concept generated much debate throughout the 1980s and came to 
prominence when it formed the theoretical basis for an initiative to come out of 
the United Nations Conference on Economic Development (UNCED) held in 
1992 in Rio de Janeiro entitled ‘Agenda 21’.25 In general terms, sustainable 
development relates to the ability to exhaust a non-renewable resource at the 
same rate of investment in a substitutable renewable resource. Or, for a more 
technical account which incorporates ‘Hartwick’s rule’, ‘If labour and 
constructed capital are fully employed, if the conditions of intertemporal 
efficiency are met, and if the economy invests in reproducible capital at each 
instant the exact amount (value) by which the non-renewable capital stock is 
being diminished, then society will just be able to maintain a constant stream of 
consumption into the infinite future’.26 The issues here are that first, Chen and 
Randall, like the other scholarly sources cited previously, accept Garnaut’s 
hypothesis uncritically, and second, that ‘sustainable development’ is perceived 
as the unquestioned policy goal. As one critic of the discourse suggests, ‘For the 
	
24 Ibid, p. 26. 
25 W. Beckerman, ‘”Sustainable Development”: Is it a Useful Concept?’, Environmental Values, 
Vol. 3, No. 3, 1994, p. 192. 
26 D.W. Bromley, ‘Sustainability’, in S.N. Durlauf and L.E. Blume (Eds.), The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition., Online, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, viewed 8/7/15, 
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_S000482> 
 	
concept of sustainability in the process of development to be operationally 
useful it must be more than just an expression of social values or political 
preferences disguised in technical language’.27 Indeed, the concept of mineral- 
rent must itself be more than a sterile technical category to be mobilised in the 
service of justifying agendas like ‘sustainable development’. 
	
	
	
Zhang’s 2014 study of energy prices and resource tax reform in China refers to 
Garnaut as representative of the ‘current economic theory’  and  argues  that while 
a RRT may be ideal, the difficulties involved in measuring production costs 
means taxes levied on revenues are a more attractive option for governments.28 
This is perhaps more critical of Garnaut’s proposals than the rest of the 
literature but it still does not engage with any underlying conceptual definitions. 
Similarly, Obeng-Odoom, in his 2014 study of urban property taxation in the oil 
twin-city of Sekondi-Takoradi in Ghana, refers to Garnaut only in passing to 
demonstrate the existence of a growing literature concerned with ‘rent research’. 
29 Whereas, Gago gives a more specific characterisation of Garnaut’s work in 
their 2014 ‘panorama on energy and green tax reforms’, listing it as belonging 
to the scholarship coming from an ‘optimal tax approach’ concerned with ‘taxes 
levied on natural resources’.30 In each case, as with the entire sample of articles, 
Garnaut’s definition of rent was uncritically accepted 
	
27 H. Brooks, ‘Sustainability and Technology’, in International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (ed.), Science and Sustainability: Conference Proceedings, International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, 1992, p. 30. 
28 Z.X. Zhang, ‘Energy Prices, Subsidies and Resource Tax Reform in China’, Asia & the Pacific 
Policy Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 449. 
29 F. Obeng-Odoom, ‘Urban Property Taxation, Revenue Generation and Redistribution in a 
Frontier Oil City’, Cities, Vol. 36, 2014, p. 59. 
30 A. Gago, X. Labandeira and X.L. Otero, ‘A Panorama on Energy Taxes and Green Tax Reforms’, 
Hacienda Pública Española, Vol. 208, No. 1, 2014, p. 3. 
 	
and so too, therefore, were the subsequent methodological  constraints embedded 
within it. 
	
	
	
This is not to say that each article within this sample, by virtue of its reference 
to Garnaut’s work, is somehow flawed. The point of this exercise was to 
demonstrate how pervasive and unquestioned the conception of rent employed 
by Garnaut in his paper is within the contemporary period. Indeed, the papers 
discussed above employ contending methodologies and provide intersectional 
analyses across various disciplines. However, when it comes to the issue of 
mineral-rents, the debate has seemingly been settled in favour of a concept 
firmly grounded within the Neoclassical tradition in economics. This theory of 
rent is ahistorical, relies upon unrealistic assumptions and is imbued with 
political bias by virtue of the fact it assumes equitable bargaining positions 
between unequal parties. That it remains undeveloped indicates it is either 
appropriate for the task of explaining the material conditions of mineral 
resource depletion or that the methodology underpinning it is unable to 
develop it further. Given the various questions and problems surrounding the 
issue of appropriating mineral-rents in the contemporary Australian context, it 
seems the latter option deserves consideration. As such, the discussion will now 
turn to alternative approaches to understanding mineral-rents and their 
underlying methodologies. 
 	
Beyond Australia’s ‘Resource Curse’? 
	
	
	
	
The link between the ‘resource-curse’ hypothesis and mineral-rents is one of 
contingent and reflexive causation. In a statement of the obvious, Davis and 
Tilton note that ‘where the extraction costs for a mineral commodity are less 
than its market price, mining generates an economic rent’.31 This much  is certain 
but this does not necessarily mean that countries with substantial mineral 
endowments reap the benefits of the mineral-rents generated through the 
extraction of their mineral commodities. Much of the ‘resource-curse’ literature 
consists of contributions from ‘a growing number of scholars [who] have 
reported a negative association between mining on the one hand and a host 
of different indicators of economic development on the other’.32 Indeed, it is 
evident that since the 1970s economies reliant upon mineral extraction 
demonstrate lower growth rates and exhibit higher levels of poverty and 
corruption after controlling for GDP per capita.33 
	
	
	
This section  argues  that  a  clearer understanding  of  the  class  relations 
underpinning mineral-rents will dispel the fallacious notion of a ‘resource- 
curse’/‘resource-blessing’ dichotomy. A ‘resource-curse’ exists when a state is 
unable to capture mineral-rents. The rents are still there but the  ability  to capture 
them is what is at stake. This implies a question of class power. The 
	
	
31 G.A. Davis and J. E. Tilton, ‘The Resource Curse’, Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 29, 2005, p. 
233. 
32 Ibid, p. 233. 
33 P. Stevens, ‘Resource Impact: Curse or Blessing? A Literature Review’, Journal of Energy 
Literature, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 5. 
 	
issues are inextricably linked and must be taken together for any meaningful 
resolution to be reached beyond this redundant binary conception. Mineral 
endowments are not altogether ‘natural’. Reserves have to be found, proven and 
then extracted. The economic value of a mineral deposit is directly linked to the 
ability to mobilise capital in its extraction, processing and distribution. In this 
sense, the ‘resource-curse’ has as much to do with access to minerals, as it has to 
do with access to capital. Access to capital depends upon the social relation 
between landed property and capital. That is, the resource-curse is inextricably 
linked to the social relation underpinning mineral-rents. 
	
	
	
Prior to the introduction of his Political Economy of the Resource Curse, Michael 
Ross cites three famous quotations to punctuate the significance of his study: 
It is the devil’s excrement. We are drowning in the devil’s excrement. 
Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso, Founder OPEC 
	
We are in part to blame, but this is the curse of being born with a copper spoon in 
our mouths. 
Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia 
	
All in all, I wish we had discovered water. 
Sheik Ahmed Yamani, Oil minister, Saudi Arabia34 
	
Scholars of resource economics have long used these well-known statements of 
lament to either endorse or critique the notion of a ‘resource-curse’. It is often 
accepted that because those who lived through the experience of poor economic 
outcomes due to resource endowments attest to such fates, there must be a 
causative linkage. This is to mistake correlation for causation and to ignore the 
historical contingency of these outcomes. It is unlikely any President of the USA 
has ever uttered regret at having an abundance of oil, arable land or minerals. It 
	
	
34 M. Ross, ‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse’, World Politics, No. 51, 1999, p. 297. 
 	
has long been argued that abundant natural endowments may have a direct 
causal relationship to detrimental economic outcomes. As Ross states, the central 
question this scholarship seeks to answer is: ‘How does a state’s natural- resource 
wealth influence its economic development?’35 
	
	
	
This phenomenon has been dubbed the ‘resource-curse’ and has found 
expression, it has been argued, in several countries at various historical 
conjunctures. The most notable of these in recent history have been the oil-rich 
nations of the Middle East and the mineral-rich nations of South America. The 
hypothesis underlying this so-called curse argues that, contrary to orthodox 
theories of comparative advantage, being endowed with abundant natural 
resources in fact leads to lower economic growth and development over time. 
The key mechanisms that facilitate this ‘curse’ are associated with the 
deterioration of terms of trade owing to the long-run decline of primary 
commodity prices relative to the price of manufactured goods. 36 The appreciation 
of the exchange rate as a consequence of mineral booms is also noted in the 
literature as a primary vehicle for creating a ‘resource curse’ situation.37 
	
	
	
This empirical outcome contradicts contemporary liberal trade theory. Broadly 
speaking,  this  approach  argues  that  countries  should  exploit  their  factor 
	
35 Ibid, p. 297. 
36 See R. Prebisch, ‘The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems’, 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. 7, 1950, pp. 1-12. and H.W. Singer, ‘The Distribution of 
Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries’, American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, Vol. 40, 1950, pp. 473-485. 
37 R.G. Gregory, ‘Some Implications of the Growth of the Mineral Sector’, Australian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 20, pp. 71-91. 
 	
endowments intensively in order to optimise the gains from so-called ‘free’ 
trade. This theory claims to build upon Adam Smith’s theory of absolute 
advantage and David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. Smith’s theory 
of international trade proceeded from his observing the ‘human propensity to 
truck, barter and exchange one thing for another’ which derived from either 
‘those original principles in human nature’ or from the ‘necessary consequence 
of the faculties of reason and speech’.38 The theory of absolute advantage posits 
that ‘a country has an absolute advantage in the production of good x if it costs 
fewer resources to produce a unit of x in that country than abroad’.39 Smith’s 
theory of trade, its role in facilitating economic development and the increasing 
division of labour were inextricably linked.40 
	
	
	
The normative prescriptions that flow on from this theory make the case for 
free trade based on the gains to be sought from an increasing division of labour 
and were posed as a reaction against the prevailing Mercantilist thinking and 
autarkic policy. Ricardo’s development of absolute advantage suggested that ‘a 
country has a comparative advantage in the production of a good x if the 
opportunity cost of producing a unit of x, in terms of other goods foregone, is 
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and its incorporation into Neoclassical static trade theory, see R. Schumacher, ‘Adam Smith’s 
Theory of Absolute Advantage and the Use of Doxography in the History of Economics’, Erasmus 
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40 H. Myint, ‘Adam Smith’s Theory of International Trade in the Perspective of Economic 
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lower in that country than abroad’.41 This meant that all countries have a 
comparative advantage in the production of some goods because the advantage 
was pegged to opportunity cost rather than absolute productivity. It is this 
notion of comparative advantage that has become the cornerstone of 
contemporary liberal trade theory. 
	
	
	
Two further developments of Smith and Ricardo’s work are worthy of note in 
relation to what the ‘resource-curse’ hypothesis seemingly contradicts. The 
Hekscher-Olin theorem, or factor proportions model, builds upon the theory of 
comparative advantage by incorporating two observations relating to factor 
endowments and factor intensities. Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin sought to 
understand the relation between the factor endowments of a given economy 
and its subsequent comparative advantage.42 The model entails three important 
predictions: ‘countries have a comparative advantage in (and hence will export) 
goods that are produced through the intensive use of factors of production with 
which they are relatively well endowed’; the ‘gainers and losers’ from trade 
within each economy can be identified; ‘trade will tend to bring about the 
convergence of factor prices across countries’.43 
	
	
	
The conclusion reached in applying the H-O model dictates that trade is 
‘substantially driven by differences in countries’ resources and the concomitant 
	
41 Op cit, Venables, ‘International Trade’, 1996, p. 431. 
42 See E. Heckscher, ‘The Effect of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income’, Ekonomisk 
Tidskriff, 1919, pp. 497-512., translated in American Economics Association, Readings in the 
Theory of International Trade, Philadelphia, Blakiston, 1949, pp. 272-300; and B. Ohlin, 
Interregional and International Trade, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1933. 
43 Op cit, Venables, ‘International Trade’, 1996, p. 435. 
 	
different intensities with which they use them’.44 The logical progression of this 
line of reasoning would suggest that intensifying the exploitation of a country’s 
factor endowment would result in optimal gains from trade. Thus, a mineral- 
endowed economy would, given the assumptions of the theory of comparative 
advantage hold, gain from intensively exploiting mineral resources relative to 
the production of commodities utilising factors of production with which they 
are relatively less well-endowed. 
	
	
	
This conclusion is extended by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that argues free 
trade benefits locally abundant factors of production and harms scarce ones.45 
Stolper and Samuelson’s study of protection and its effects on real wages in 
1941 argued that ‘protection benefits (and liberalization of trade harms) owners 
of factors in which, relative to the rest of the world, that society is poorly endowed, 
as well as producers that use that scarce factor intensively’; while ‘protection 
harms (and liberalizaton benefits) those factors that - again, relative to the rest 
of the world - the given society holds abundantly, and the producers who use 
those locally abundant factors intensively’.46 Both the S-S and H-O models 
would seem to advocate the intensive exploitation of mineral endowments as a 
means to optimise comparative advantage. 
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Taken together with Smith and Ricardo’s contributions to trade theory, these 
arguments form the basis of the prevailing consensus regarding approaches to 
economic development for countries with mineral endowments. The results of 
empirical studies since the 1970s have cast significant doubt upon these 
hypotheses. Two notable examples are the Leontief paradox and the Prebisch- 
Singer hypothesis. These findings, along with accounts documenting the 
inability of mineral-exporting countries to achieve economic development, have 
fuelled the expansion of ‘resource-curse’ literature since that period. The 
discussion will now turn to the dominant explanations for the ‘resource-curse’. 
	
	
	
The problem that the ‘resource curse’ hypothesis posed to the orthodox line of 
economic reasoning was why exactly countries which were well endowed with 
natural resources and exploited them intensively registered declining rates of 
growth and deteriorating economic outcomes over time. Such a result was 
registered in the OPEC countries from the 1970s and also in the so-called 
‘peripheral’ economies of Latin America from the same period. The 
proclamation of a New World Economic Order, heralded from 1974 by the UN, 
argued that there was an emerging shift in the balance of economic power 
globally, suggesting that the global South, through its endowment of natural 
resources, would supersede the global North. Clearly, this was not the case. Four 
prominent economic explanations for the ‘resource-curse’ were put forward in 
response: ‘a decline in the terms of trade for primary commodities, the 
instability  of  international  commodity  markets,  the  poor  economic  linkages 
 	
between resource and nonresource sectors, and an ailment commonly known as 
the “Dutch Disease”’.47 
	
	
	
Each of these finds expression in specific historical conjunctures across various 
geographical locations. While there is no scope in the present discussion to 
explore these contested explanations thoroughly, it is instructive to briefly note 
the specificities of each argument. A decline in the terms of trade for primary 
commodities was first theorised and empirically substantiated by Raul Prebisch 
and Hans Singer in the context of Latin America in 1950.48 They argued that 
prices of primary commodities would decline over time relative to the price of 
manufactured commodities. This effectively meant that economies reliant upon 
the export of primary goods would not gain overall from the intensive 
exploitation of their factor endowments purely for export. The Prebisch-Singer 
hypothesis became the theoretical basis of the policy of Import-Substitution- 
Industrialisation whereby tariff walls were erected to facilitate the development 
of import-competing domestic industry. 
	
	
	
Some scholars emphasise this approach as the theoretical basis of the 
Australian post-War economy within the context of a broader Keynesian 
framework of demand management.49 Instability of international commodity 
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markets has been well documented and explanations for why this is the case 
have been forwarded, most notably by people like Joan Robinson in her 
explication of imperfect competition and monopoly.50 Bob Gregory built upon 
the work of Sir Ronald Wilson to demonstrate the linkage between resource and 
non-resource sectors in the Australian economy  mediated  by  the  exchange rate. 
51 Gregory and Wilson figure prominently  in a broader Australian contribution 
to international trade theory based loosely around the ‘dependent economy’ 
model, renamed the ‘Salter-Swan-Corden-Dornbusch model in 1995.52 Richard 
Auty figures most prominently in the development of a discourse around what 
has been termed the ‘Dutch Disease’.53 
	
	
	
This has left the debates surrounding the ‘resource curse’ hypothesis at 
somewhat of a stalemate. Proponents of the hypothesis argue that exploitative 
geo-politics and social relations of production within the exporting countries 
are to blame for the lack of development. More sophisticated analyses have put 
forward the argument that there are technical relationships between terms of 
trade and currency prices that vitiate the orthodox models of comparative 
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advantage. In any case, owning abundant resources seemingly amounts to an 
economic curse. Detractors of the ‘resource curse’ argument claim that it is the 
management of the resources within the resource-rich countries that is the 
problem. The political element of this technically economic phenomenon is to 
blame. Corruption in Africa or extortion in Latin America is the cause of under- 
development. Comparative advantage would work if government simply got out 
of the way of the self-regulating market. These conflicting views inform the 
binary debates about the ‘resource curse’ today. Both approaches have 
redeeming qualities that are diminished by severe limitations. 
	
	
	
The notion that a natural resource endowment is either good or bad for economic 
prosperity is misleading and simplistic. Both sides of the argument rest upon 
the assumption that resource endowments automatically produce economic 
outcomes. It is as if people and the social relations between them were not 
involved in mediating the processes of production that turn raw materials into 
useful and saleable commodities. Social processes mediate the conversion 
natural resources into economic outcomes so the solution to the riddle of 
resource endowments needs to be explained ‘socially’. The attempt to understand 
the complex social relationships that both mitigate and facilitate the production 
of land-based commodities, often simultaneously, in  conjunction with the myriad 
factors that affect economic growth, through a binary dualism, is pure folly. 
	
	
	
The problem with the ‘resource curse’ hypothesis is that it implies there is some 
kind of ‘resource blessing’ on the other side. The truth of the matter in any 
 	
circumstance is that abundant natural resources do not simply amount to either 
a curse/blessing dichotomy. The outcome is not technically given. Just as the 
production of land-based commodities is complex in nature, so are the social 
relationships that mediate this process. Therefore, a more nuanced and 
pragmatic approach to understanding the determinants of land-based 
commodity production must be formulated. The point of departure for such an 
initiative must be to transcend the binary resource curse/blessing hypothesis. 
	
	
	
This work has already begun. One notable recent example is the work of Franklin 
Obeng-Odoom. His study of the oil twin-city of Sekondi-Takoradi in Ghana 
offers a point of departure for problematising the resource curse. According to 
Obeng-Odoom, the curse/blessing dichotomy cannot account for the complex 
nature of land-based commodity production in the case of oil in Ghana. His 
solution is to offer a synthesis of the ideas of Henry George, David Harvey, 
Hossein Mahdavy and Chibuzo Nwoke to form a heterodox rent approach 
focussed upon the urban setting.54 This approach entails  thinking about the 
outcomes of rents, their distribution and the dispossession caused by their 
accumulation. Another contribution to this critical scholarship is that of James 
Goodman and David Worth in relation to the Australian context. Their 
contribution has been noted above in the introduction to this  thesis.  These critical 
contributions to the debates surrounding the resource curse hypothesis prompt  
consideration  of  the  severe  analytical  limitations  of  such  a  binary 
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conception of resource endowments. The question then becomes how can this 
impasse be resolved? 
	
	
	
This chapter  has argued that the  orthodox theory of  mineral-rents currently 
informing the majority of political and economic discourse on the subject of 
taxation of mineral industries is fundamentally flawed. The methodology 
underpinning mineral-rent theory does not permit the analysis of class relations 
and is therefore unable to explicate the social significations of the rental payment 
for access to minerals. The mineral-rents generated by mining are not a 
technically given outcome but rather, the result of a process mediated by 
social relations of production. Therefore, an understanding of this process must 
take into account the broader social structures which determine both the 
distributional element of mineral-rents as well as the effect this process has on 
broader patterns of capital accumulation. This linkage has been identified within 
the context of the discourse surrounding the ‘resource-curse’ hypothesis. It has 
been argued that this scholarship is limited by its binary conception of resource 
endowments and may be positively developed by incorporating ‘access to, and 
control over, capital’ as a mediating factor in conjunction with ‘natural’ resource 
endowments. The following chapter will examine the historical evolution of 
rent theory as a means to understand exactly how and why such limitations to 
the current theory of mineral-rents have arisen. 
 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Part II 
	
	
	
	
The Subsequent Case for a 
Theory of Landed Property 
Within the Capitalist Mode of 
Production 
 	
Chapter 3 
	
	
The Development of Rent Theory in Historical 
Perspective 
	
	
The history of rent theory is the history of the struggle to resolve a fundamental 
contradiction of the capitalist mode of production. Capital seeks to overcome all 
obstacles to its self-expansion. It therefore must seek to eradicate landed 
property because it is an unproductive institution, which poses a barrier to 
capital accumulation. However, capital simultaneously relies upon the system of 
private property in land to facilitate the social reproduction of capitalist 
relations of production. This contradiction has manifested in various historical 
conjunctures from the French bourgeois revolution of the late eighteenth 
century to the protracted struggle to implement the Corn Laws in the first half 
of the nineteenth century in the UK and in the struggle to tax mineral-rent in 
Australia during the last two mineral booms since 1945. The following 
discussion will examine the development of rent theory within the context of 
this fundamental and dynamic tension. 
	
	
	
This examination is not a general historical survey of theories of economic rent. 
Many scholars have attended to that task.1 The aim here is rather to identify 
aspects of the contemporary orthodox theory of mineral-rent as they relate to 
the contradiction posed by landed property in capitalism. These aspects of the 
	
	
1 See for example: Chibuzo Nwoke, ‘The Evolution of Rent Theory in the History of Economic 
Thought’, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1981; D.H. Buchanan, 
‘The Historical Approach to Rent and Price Theory’, Economica, No. 26, June 1929, pp. 123-155; 
Csaba Deák, ‘Rent Theory and the Price of Urban Land: Spatial Organisation in a Capitalist 
Economy’, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cambridge University, 1985. 
 	
modern theory were drawn from the contributions of the school of Physiocracy, 
the Classical school of political economy and then jointly from the Marginalist 
and Formalist schools. It is argued that each development of rent theory 
represented the growing dominance of capital vis-à-vis landed property. The 
fundamental contradiction of landed property in capitalism however is 
irreconcilable and this tension is what renders the current orthodox theory of 
mineral-rent ineffective in providing justification for political mobilisation 
against modern landed property and capital. It should be noted that while this 
discussion will proceed chronologically, there is no assumption that the 
development of rent theory was teleological. 
	
	
	
Each contribution to rent theory examined here was constructed within a 
different ‘paradigm’2 or ‘problematic’3. As Fine notes in relation to Buchanan’s 
seminal paper on rent theory4, ‘Different theories utilise different concepts and 
theoretical frameworks as well as posing different questions, ones which may 
not be posed let alone be answerable within another theory’.5 The aim here is 
merely to trace the trajectory of rent theory in relation to the development of 
landed property in capitalism. 
	
2 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Second Edition, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1970, pp. 10-23. 
3 As Althusser notes, 
‘Without a theory of the history of theoretical formations it would be impossible to grasp and 
indicate the specific difference that distinguishes two different theoretical formations. I thought 
it possible to borrow for this purpose the concept of a ‘problematic’ from Jacques Martin to 
designate the particular unity of a theoretical formation and hence the location to be assigned to 
this specific difference, and the concept of an ‘epistemological break’ from Gaston Bachelard to 
designate the mutation in the theoretical problematic contemporary with the foundation of a 
scientific discipline.’ 
L. Althusser, For Marx, Penguin, London, 1969, p. 32. 
4 Op. cit., Buchanan, ‘The Historical Approach to Rent and Price Theory’, June 1929, pp. 123-155. 
5 B. Fine, ‘The Historical Approach to Rent and Price Theory Reconsidered’, Australian Economic 
Papers, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1983, p. 133. 
 	
	
	
The discussion is organized into three sub-sections that examine the 
contributions to rent theory of the Physiocrats, the Classical political 
economists and the Marginalists and Formalists in turn. A final sub-section will 
elaborate concluding remarks which reiterate the central claim that the 
contemporary theory of mineral-rent is flawed because of its erroneous 
conceptualisation of modern landed property. 
 	
Physiocracy and the Emergence of Capitalist Landed Property 
	
	
	
	
The Physiocrats constituted one important contribution to what would later emerge 
as the discipline of Classical political economy. Their stated aim was to ‘attain 
to the greatest degree of prosperity possible for the society’ in accordance 
with the ‘general laws of the natural order’.6 This initiative led the Physiocrats 
to inquire as to the origins of value, its distribution in practice and the 
consequences of these movements. The outcomes of these investigations were 
seminal contributions to an evolving social science. The French scholars that 
comprised the school of Physiocracy can be grouped together, for the purposes of 
the current study, with the British scholars William Petty, John Locke, Dudley 
North, John Law, James Steuart, David Hume and Richard Cantillon. The English 
and French traditions of political economy contained within the writings of 
these contributors would find unity in the writings of Adam Smith to form the 
foundation of Classical political economy.7 
	
	
	
The common threads uniting these various bodies of economic thought were 
primarily the shift of focus from the sphere of exchange which underpinned 
Mercantilist thought to that of production and the primacy of land as the driver 
of economic activity and as the source of value. There is not the scope or need 
within the current study to discuss the contribution of the aforementioned 
English political economists to the theory of rent so, for the sake of brevity, their 
	
6 F. Quesnay, ‘General Maxims for the Economic Government of an Agricultural Kingdom’, in R.L. 
Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy: Essays and Translations, Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1963 (1766), p. 231. 
7 E. Roll, A History of Economic Thought, Fifth Edition, Faber and Faber, London, 1992, p. 111. 
 	
conceptualisation of rent will be taken together with the Physiocratic theory. 
The Physiocratic theory of rent is discussed as a means to understand the 
epistemological shift evident in economic theories attempting to grasp the 
disintegration of feudal social relations and the emergence of the capitalist 
mode of production. Therefore, the theories of the French economists as 
representative of the dominant conceptualisation of rent of the time will suffice. 
The discussion will now turn to the concept of rent as per the school of 
‘Physiocracy’. 
	
	
	
The key theorists of the school of Physiocracy were François Quesnay and Anne- 
Robert-Jacques Turgot. Quesnay was an eminent surgeon in France and 
personal physician to Madame de Pompadour, the official Chief Mistress of King 
Louis XV. His skillful use of the systems of patronage of his time saw Quesnay 
elevated to an influential position within the court of Louis XV from which his 
economic theories came to dominate the French tradition of economics.8 The 
publication of Quesnay’s Tableau Économique in 1758 laid the foundation for 
the body of economic thought collectively known as Physiocracy. The etymology 
of this term can be traced to the Greek terms physis, meaning nature,  and kratein, 
to rule. The substance of this line of economic reasoning is reiterated in Turgot’s 
Réflexions sur la Formation et la Distribution des Richesses, where he wrote that 
the earth ‘is always the first and only source of all wealth; it is that which as 
the result of cultivation produces all the revenue; it is that also which 
	
	
	
	
8 C. Théré and L. Charles, ‘François Quesnay: A “Rural Socrates” in Versailles?’, History of 
Political Economy, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2007, p. 212. 
 	
has provided the first fund of advances prior to all cultivation’.9 Both Quesnay’s 
and Turgot’s writing informed the broad school of thought derived from the 
principle that land, or nature, was the source of value.10 
	
	
	
The Physiocratic theory of value meant that rent played a significant part in 
their system of political economy. This school of thought has been credited with 
affecting a pivotal shift within economic thought that helped craft the conditions 
for the French bourgeois revolution.11 The epistemological shift facilitated by 
Physiocracy was the movement from the sphere of exchange to the sphere of 
production as the focus of economic inquiry. Whereas the Mercantilists thought 
that value was produced through the exchange of commodities, the Physiocrats 
along with their English counterparts, considered value as derived from the 
process of material production. In so doing, the Physiocrats  contributed  to laying 
the foundations for an analysis of the capitalist mode of production.12 
	
	
	
The primary limitation of economic theory of their time was the 
underdeveloped concept of exchange-value. This meant that use-value was the 
only perceived form of value, which therefore obscured the relation of value 
production in industry outside of agriculture. From the perspective of use-value, 
	
9 A.R.J. Turgot, Reflections on the Formation and Distribution of Riches, New York, Macmillan, 
1898 (1770), p. 46. 
10 Op. cit. F. Quesnay, ‘General Maxims for the Economic Government of an Agricultural 
Kingdom’, 1963 (1766), p. 232. 
‘the land is the unique source of wealth’ 
11 A. Orain, ‘Figures of Mockery: The Cultural Disqualification of Physiocracy (1760-1790)’, The 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2015, p. 384. 
12 Op cit, Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Vol. I, 2000, p. 45. 
‘The Physiocrats transferred the inquiry into the origin of surplus-value from the sphere of 
circulation into the sphere of direct production, and thereby laid the foundation for the analysis 
of capitalist production’ 
 	
it is most easily discernible in agriculture that the labourer produces a surplus 
by virtue of consuming less agricultural product than they produce. The 
production of a surplus in manufacturing is mediated by processes of exchange 
and therefore requires a theory of exchange-value. The Physiocrats, equipped 
with only rudimentary conceptions of exchange-value could only perceive the 
creation of a surplus within the sphere of production where the production of 
use-value beyond the means of subsistence is most clearly evident. 
	
	
	
Therefore, in their estimation, ‘agricultural labour is the only productive labour, 
because it is the only labour that produces a surplus-value, and rent is the only 
form of surplus-value’. 13 This conception of value had two important 
implications: landed property by virtue of its rent-appropriating function was 
the most powerful class in society; however, landed property was an 
unproductive, or sterile, social class. It is this insight that provides the basis for 
both the construction of a labour theory of value and also of the political 
campaign against the sterile class of landed proprietors, which represented the 
vestiges of feudal social relations of production. The material effect of the 
economic theories of the Physiocrats was to open a line of critique against 
landed property, which had the important result of legitimising further the 
social function of capital. As Roll notes, ‘in retrospect the Physiocrats must be 
given a high place among those who prepared the ground for the French 
Revolution’.14 
	
	
	
13 Ibid, p. 46. 
14 Op cit, Roll, History of Economic Thought, 1992, p. 120. 
 	
There were various material factors that compelled the Physiocrats to 
investigate the determinants of economic activity and their implications for 
French society. Among the most important were the relative backwardness of 
French manufacturing relative to English industry and the retarded 
development of agriculture due to the constraints imposed by feudal relations 
of production. Agricultural production was characterised by intensive 
exploitation of the peasantry and sharecropping by absentee landlords. This 
situation was aggravated by the imposition of various taxes, such as a grain 
export tax, which were used to fund a series of ‘disastrous wars’ and the 
‘extravagance of the Court’. 15 In conjunction, ‘revolts had become chronic’ 
among the peasantry.16 These pressing issues forced the Physiocrats to confront 
the economic problems posed by the emergence of dominant capitalist relations 
of production within the context of the disintegration of the feudal social 
relations. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
15 R.L. Meek, The Economics of Physiocracy: Essays and Translations, Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1963, p. 25. 
16 N.J. Ware, ‘The Physiocrats: A Study in Economic Rationalization’, American Economic Review, 
Vol. 21, No. 4, p. 613. 
 	
Classical Political Economy and the Industrial Bourgeoisie 
	
	
	
	
	
The theory of rent developed by the Physiocrats followed logically from their 
theory of value, which credited nature as its source. The epistemological shift 
affected by the Classical school of political economy was to identify labour, 
rather than land, as the source and, consequently, the measure of value. The 
material development within the emerging capitalist mode of production that 
prompted this theoretical advance was the increasing rate of the self-expansion 
of capital. As capital came to penetrate further the sphere of agriculture, the 
social division of labour, whereby capitalist tenant farmers would  employ labour 
and capital upon land leased from the class of landed  proprietors, became the 
generalised form of agricultural commodity production. This new social relation 
of production gave rise to pressing political problems such as the rising price of 
agricultural goods in the face of new pressures driving increases in demand. 
While the Physiocrats had opened a line of theoretical inquiry that questioned 
the social utility of what they called the ‘sterile class’, the Classical political 
economists pursued with rigour the theoretical justification for eroding the 
economic and political power of the landed interest in favour of the emergent 
industrial bourgeoisie. 
	
	
	
The self-expansion of capital throughout the period of what is generally 
referred to as the industrial revolution confronted a barrier in the form of the 
system of land ownership in the UK. The social demand for agricultural goods 
necessitated  a  reorganisation,  or,  rather,  rationalisation,  of  agricultural 
production. Large scale manufacturing like the sort that emerged at this time in 
 	
places like Manchester required a large class of waged-labour. This new class of 
industrial proletariat, working under new and dynamic production processes, 
affected the demand conditions for agricultural commodities to the point that 
class antagonisms inherent to the organisation of agricultural industry became 
critical political issues. 
	
	
	
This process of rationalisation required the removal of the barrier, which 
landed property represented, to the flow of capital onto land. The historical 
manifestation of this confrontation was the class struggle underwriting the 
debates around the Corn Laws. The Physiocrats bore witness to pivotal stages of 
the emergence of the capitalist mode of production in Europe. Their inquiries 
into the source of wealth and its consequences paved the way for the 
construction of a theory of value within a mature industrial capitalism. The 
Classical school, through their reconceptualisation of class relations, grappled 
with the problems inherent to a social formation dominated by the capitalist 
mode of production. It is to this body of economic thought that the discussion 
now turns. These seminal developments in rent theory will be examined within 
the context of the material changes in the relations of production that gave rise 
to them. 
	
	
	
The first significant development in rent theory after the Physiocrats can be 
seen in the work of Adam Smith. The progress of English economic thought 
from the late Mercantilist period and the substance of the school of Physiocracy 
were brought together in the important contributions Smith made to economic 
 	
theory at the height of the Scottish Enlightenment.17 The significance of Smith’s 
theory of rent in the context of the current discussion is that he provided a 
bridge between Physiocratic notions and Ricardian principles which reflected 
the nature of the class antagonism between capital and landed property of his 
time. More importantly, Smith correctly emphasises the role of landed property 
in his theory of rent. Ricardo later expunges this important function. What has 
been understood as confusion within Smith’s rent theory regarding the 
causality between rent and price was actually the articulation of a complex 
problem that expressed a conjunctural class antagonism. This problem will now 
be elaborated by examining the Physiocratic elements and Ricardian 
propositions in Smith’s theory of rent. 
	
	
	
It is not surprising that the Physiocrats influenced Smith. Smith had visited 
France a decade before the publication of Wealth of Nations and was in direct 
correspondence with important members of the school of Physiocracy such as 
Mercier de la Riviére, Nicolas Baudeau and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot. It is 
likely though, as Meek claims, that Smith’s dependence on the Physiocrats for 
his own ideas has been exaggerated and that they learned as much from him as 
he apparently incorporated into his own theories.18 One area of Smith’s thought 
that does retain a significant element of Physiocratic thinking is his theory of 
rent. 
	
	
	
	
	
17 Op. Cit., Roll, History of Economic Thought, 1992, p. 72; p. 111. 
18 R.L. Meek, Studies in the Labor Theory of Value, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1956, pp. 
55-57. 
 	
As noted above, the Physiocratic system was based on the claim that the source 
of value was nature. This fundamental premise meant that their entire system of 
thought posed agricultural labour against non-agricultural labour. This was the 
key organizing principle in Physiocratic thought. On this basis, the Physiocrats 
conflated profits and wages because, while they may have been separate 
categories, they were considered together as against rent. It is this element of 
Physiocracy, of the primacy given to land, over labour and capital taken 
together, which appears in Smith’s theory of rent. This excerpt from the Wealth 
of Nations demonstrates this point: 
It is the work of nature which remains after deducting or compensating 
every thing which can be regarded as the work of man. It is seldom less than 
a fourth, and frequently more than a third of the whole produce. No equal 
quantity of productive labour employed in manufactures can ever occasion 
so great a reproduction. In them nature does nothing; man does all; and the 
reproduction must always be in proportion to the strength of the agents 
that occasion it.19 
	
The implication that in agriculture, there is some element of the surplus, which 
does not owe to labour, but rather to nature, is a Physiocratic notion. While 
Smith is rightly regarded as a pioneer of the labour theories of value associated 
with the Classical school, his thought in this regard is clearly imbued with an 
important aspect of Physiocracy. What is the significance of this for Smith’s 
theory of rent? 
	
	
	
As land, according to the Physiocrats, was the source of value, rent was the form 
of surplus-value, which was then distributed as other forms of revenue such as 
wages and profits. For this reason, the theories of rent according to both the 
Physiocrats  and  Smith  required  a  theory  of  landed  property.  Such  was  the 
	
19 Smith quoted in Marx, TSV I, p. 61. 
 	
political power of the landed interest in this time that Smith could not ignore 
the economic significance of this barrier to the flow of capital into agriculture 
and mining. As the forces of social change began to accelerate into the 
nineteenth century, the power and influence of landed property became a 
barrier to the rational development of agriculture and mining. By the time 
Ricardo began to develop his own theory of rent, the need for a theory of landed 
property was being questioned in accordance with pressing political 
considerations. This theme is most notably borne out in the debates over the 
Corn Laws. 
	
	
	
The debates over the Corn Laws in England provide an insight to the class 
struggle between capital and landed property at the exact historical conjuncture 
when the capitalist mode of production emerged as dominant. This is how a 
commentator sympathetic to the landed interest described the general flavour 
of the discourse: 
To those, therefore, who are in search of arguments for the purpose of 
supporting the partial views of either side, which  have  hitherto prevailed, 
I can hold out no encouragement to take the trouble of perusing the 
following pages: they will not find one single word declaiming the 
landowners as selfish, monopolizing law-makers, or the manufacturers as 
sordid, avaricious beings, grasping at the riches of the great, and treading 
on the rights of the poor: the subject has already been handled too 
much in this way.20 
	
Whatever Wilson’s own motives it is clear that the Corn Laws were at least 
perceived as a class struggle between an emergent industrial bourgeoisie and 
the established, albeit decaying, ruling strata of landed proprietors. Hindsight 
has  taken  the  political  edge  off  these  debates  and  they  are  seen  in  the 
	
20 J. Wilson, Influences of the Corn Laws, as Affecting all the Classes of the Community, and 
Particularly the Landed Interests, Second Edition, Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 
London, 1840, p. iv. 
 	
contemporary period as the basis upon which important foundations of modern 
liberal trade theory were settled. Salvadori and Signorino, for example, argue 
that Ricardo’s contributions to these debates provided a calculating rationality 
to offset the false dichotomy between ‘defense and opulence’ forwarded by 
defenders of landed property such as Malthus. 21 The ramifications of the debates 
aside, class tensions between capital and landed property were clearly central to 
the issue of the corn tariff. The discussion will now turn to a brief and selective 
survey of the theories of rent forwarded by Ricardo, Malthus and Mill. The 
purpose of this survey is to identify the key elements Classical rent theory 
developed in response to the class tensions that found expression in the Corn 
Law debates. 
	
	
	
Ricardo defined rent as ‘that portion of the produce of the earth which is paid to 
the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil’.22 
In relation to mining, Ricardo goes on to explain that ‘Mines, as well as land, 
generally pay a rent to their owner; and this rent, as well as the rent of the land, 
is the effect and never the cause of the high value of their produce’.23 Ricardo 
explains that rent in relation to mining is inherently a matter of comparative 
efficiency or advantage. He states that if ‘there were an abundance of fertile 
mines, which any one might appropriate, they could yield no rent; the value of 
	
	
	
	
	
	
21 N. Salvadori and R. Signorino, ‘Defense versus Opulence? An Appraisal of the Malthus-Ricardo 
1815 Controversy on the Corn Laws’, History of Political Economy, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2015, p. 182.    
22 D. Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Dent, London, 1973, p. 33. 
23 Ibid, p. 46. 
 	
their produce would depend on the quantity of labour necessary to extract the 
metal from the mine and bring it to market’.24 
	
	
	
At this point Ricardo has presented three critical elements of the Classical 
concept of rent. First, rent is that portion of the gains from the productive 
process that a mining firm pays to the owner of the land being mined for the 
right to extract whatever mineral is in the soil. This is a critical distinction for 
Ricardo as he explicitly states, ‘It [i.e. rent] is often, however, confounded with 
the interest and profit of capital’.25 The second critical element of rent Ricardo 
identifies is that rent is the effect rather than the cause of the value of produce. 
In other words, rent does not create value but is rather created only through the 
productive process that is inherently driven by human labour. That is, in 
accordance with Ricardo’s labour theory of value, ‘the value of a commodity, or 
the quantity of any other commodity for which it will exchange, depends on the 
relative quantity of labour which is necessary for its production, and not on the 
greater or lesser compensation which is paid for that labour’.26 This notion 
brings Ricardo to his third critical element of rent: the value of commodities 
extracted from  mines is  inherently determined by the quantity of  labour 
required to produce these commodities and rent is in fact a component factor of 
this final value realised in the exchange of commodities in the market. 
Essentially, rent must be conceived as that unique element of the surplus value 
	
	
	
	
	
24 Ibid, p. 46. 
25 Ibid, p. 33. 
26 Ibid, p. 5. 
 	
of commodities gleaned from the exploitation of nature but is still constituted 
by the application of human labour. 
	
	
	
Thomas Robert Malthus was another pioneer of Classical political economy and 
one of Ricardo’s contemporaries. Malthus defined rent to be, 
	
	
	
That portion of the value of the whole produce which remains to the owner 
of the land, after all the outgoings belonging to its cultivation, of whatever 
kind, have been paid, including the profits of the capital employed, estimated 
according to the usual and ordinary rate of the profits of agricultural capital 
at the time being.27 
	
Here, like Ricardo, Malthus distinguishes rent from profits of capital and all 
other outgoing costs associated with the cultivation or production of the 
commodities. Examples of other outgoing costs of production are things like 
labour, machinery and materials such as fertilisers or infrastructure. Both 
Malthus and Ricardo emphasise the distinction between such costs outlaid in 
the production process, the profits realised from the sale of goods produced and 
the rent paid to the landowner for the right to exploit a finite resource, being 
fertile land or mineral deposits. Rent is, thus, a component factor of the value of 
a particular commodity whose production is contingent upon the exploitation of 
specific areas of land. In this sense, the notion of rent is applicable only to those 
sectors of industry where such commodities are produced, namely in 
agriculture and mining. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
27 T.R. Malthus, Principles of Political Economy, Fairfield, NJ, Augustus M. Kelley, 1986, p. 136. 
 	
John Stuart Mill referred to the so-called law of Ricardian rent as the pons 
asinorum of economics. 28 . Whilst alive when Ricardo and Malthus were 
expounding their principles of political economy, Mill reached his intellectual 
maturity after the deaths of Ricardo and Malthus in 1823 and 1834 respectively. 
Whilst heavily influenced by their work, Mill was not privy to the 
contemporaneous engagement enjoyed by Ricardo and Malthus in their 
lifetimes. In Mill’s estimation, ‘the requisites of production being labour, capital, 
and natural agents; the only person, besides the labourer and the capitalist, 
whose consent is necessary to production, and who can claim a share of the 
produce as the price of that consent, is the person who, by the arrangements of 
society, possesses exclusive power over some natural agent’.29 Here, as seen 
before with Ricardo and Malthus, Mill distinguishes the landowner from the 
labourer and the capitalist as that person with ownership of some natural agent. 
	
	
	
Importantly though, Mill immediately explains that the natural agent, whilst a 
unique component, is nevertheless a component of the broader process of 
production. Mill goes on to explain that ‘land is the principal of the natural 
agents which are capable of being appropriated, and the consideration paid for 
its use is called rent’.30 After supplying this definition of rent, Mill introduces a 
critical point regarding landowners and the coveted land they possess. The class 
	
	
28 The meaning of pons asinorum is literally the bridge of donkeys. Mill is here praising Ricardo’s 
law of rent as synonymous with Euclid’s maxim in geometry which states that the angles 
opposite the equal sides in an isosceles triangle are themselves equal. 
H.D. Macleod, The Elements of Economics, Volume II, Part I, Completing Pure Economics, D. 
Appleton and Company, New York, 1886, p. 96. 
29 J.S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy: With Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy, 
London, Longmans & Green, 1909, p. 422. 
30 Ibid, p. 422. 
 
 
 
	
of landed proprietors, according to Mill, is unique in the sense that they alone 
have a claim to a share of the surplus realised in the distribution of the produce, 
‘through ownership of something which neither they nor anyone else have 
produced’.31 Thus, whilst a capitalist contributes capital and labourers supply 
labour to the production process, both requisites of production sharing a genesis 
in human labour; the landed proprietor invests only the right to exploit natural 
agents, devoid of intrinsic value by virtue of the lack of human labour invested 
in creating them. A thing that is limited in quantity, Mill explains, is a 
monopolised article regardless of whether its owners actively conspire to that 
end. However, even when monopolised, ‘a thing which is the gift of nature, and 
requires no labour or outlay as the conditions of its existence, will, if there be 
competition among the holders of it, command a price, only if it exists in less 
quantity than the demand’.32 In essence, natural agents as a requisite of 
production, despite being devoid of value in the sense that Ricardo has defined 
in terms of the labour theory of value, still command a price  when  social demand 
exceeds the available supply. 
	
	
	
Rent exists not because variations in nature exist but because landed property 
is able to control access to nature. Fertile land suitable for agriculture and 
mineral-rich lands are finite and relatively scarce when taken in contrast to 
barren land. Therefore, ownership of such land entitles the landowner to 
impose a cost upon those who wish to exploit such scarce resources for the 
production of commodities. Moreover, even fertile or mineral-rich lands are 
 
 
 
	
qualitatively different depending upon such factors as soil quality and grades of 
mineral ores. In this sense, according to Malthus, the land itself is possessed of 
the power to yield rent by virtue of its ability to produce a surplus. He explains 
that ‘the power of such land to yield rent is exactly proportioned to its natural or 
acquired fertility, or to the general surplus which it can be made to produce 
beyond what is strictly necessary to support the labour and keep up the capital 
employed upon it’.33 
	
	
	
In other words, when the land exceeds a certain measure of fertility, whereby 
the firm exploiting it is able to appropriate profit from the sale of its 
commodities over and above the initial outlay of capital and labour, it generates 
rents. In fact, according to Malthus, it is the ability to produce this surplus that 
underpins the very notion of rent. He states that ‘if no rent can exist without this 
surplus, and if the power of particular soils to pay rent be proportioned to this 
surplus, it follows that this surplus from the land, arising from its fertility, must 
evidently be considered as the foundation or main cause of all rent’.34 Thus, for 
Malthus, rent arises out of the land itself rather than of the class relations 
controlling access to the land. 
	
	
	
The key distinction between Smith’s theory of rent and that of Ricardo, Malthus 
and Mill is the role played by landed property. Smith permits landed property to 
obstruct the flow of capital because of the existence of Physiocratic elements 
within his theory of value. Rent, for Smith, arises out of the obstacle posed by 
 	
landed property for the application of capital to land. For Ricardo, rent, arises 
from natural differences in the land itself. Rent is a product of the land rather 
than the class relation between landed property and capital. It is upon this basis 
that landed property is expunged from rent theory within the Classical school of 
political economy. The discussion will now turn to how this assumption of rent 
formation independent of the effects of the system of landownership was 
carried through the Marginalist and Formalist revolutions to inform the 
orthodoxy in rent theory ion the contemporary period. 
 	
The End of History for Rent Theory: Marginalists and Formalists 
	
	
	
	
	
The formalist revolution of the 1950s was, arguably, most notably marked by 
the appearance of a paper by the recipients of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel for the Economic Sciences, Arrow and Debreu, which 
provided a mathematical proof of Walrasian general equilibrium theory.35 
According to Blaug, the article is still regarded to this day as ‘a truly rigorous 
proof of the existence of general equilibrium in a market economy’ that fulfilled 
‘Walras’s dream eighty years later’.36 The Arrow-Debreu proof was praised for 
its innovative use of new mathematical techniques such as the replacement of 
differential calculus with convex analysis, the use of relatively new instruments 
like Nash equilibria and game theory, and the characterisation of equilibria by 
separation theorems rather than tangencies.37 
	
	
	
The article is also considered one of the ‘earliest dramatic uses in economics of 
the so-called “indirect, non-constructive proof method” of modern 
mathematics’, whereby Brouwer’s ‘fixed-point theorem’ is used to prove the 
existence of general equilibrium through logical implication by virtue of its 
axioms rather than by any reference to material reality.38 In effect, the Arrow- 
Debreu proof took the economic problem of the possibility of simultaneous 
	
	
35 K.J. Arrow and G. Debreu, ‘Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy’, 
Econometrica, Vol. 22, No. 3, July 1954, pp. 265-290. 
36 M. Blaug, ‘The Formalist Revolution of the 1950s’, Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 
Vol. 25, No. 3, 2003, p. 146. 
37 E.R. Weintraub, Stabilizing Dynamics: Constructing Economic Knowledge, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 104-107. 
38 Op. Cit., Blaug, ‘The Formalist Revolution of the 1950s’, 2003, p. 147. 
 	
market equilibrium in a real economy and turned it into a mathematical problem 
about a virtual economy, which would be held to the standards of abstract 
mathematics rather than empirical economics.39 The burden of proof was 
reasonably rigorous and logical but the link to material reality had been severed 
in favour of logical consistency and axiomatic causation. Such developments 
in the techniques of economic theorising have been appropriately labelled 
‘formalism run riot’.40 Arrow and Debreu were therefore pioneers of modern 
economic method by virtue of the fact that they united the fundamentally 
important threads of general equilibrium theory and formalist techniques. This 
unity of Marginalist principles and Formalist methods is indicative of the 
orthodoxy in economic thinking in the contemporary period. 
	
	
	
The significance of the Arrow-Debreu proof for the theorisation of rent is twofold. 
First, this formalist proof of general equilibrium theory settled an argument that 
had been carried on within the Marginalist school since the turn of the century. 
On the one hand were supporters of Walrus and Jevons who applied the 
principles of Marginalism within the context of general equilibrium in opposition 
to those adherents of Marshall who worked within a framework of partial 
equilibrium.41 Second, the high tide of the Formalist revolution, the Arrow-
Debreu proof, signalled the ‘end of history’ for the methodology of orthodox 
economics. The technical apparatus and technical architecture of the 
	
	
39 D.A. Walker, Advances in General Equilibrium Theory, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham UK, 1997, pp. 
91-110. 
40 Op. Cit., Blaug, ‘The Formalist Revolution of the 1950s’, 2003, p. 147. 
41 N.O. Martins, ‘Interpreting the Capitalist Order before and after the Marginalist Revolution’, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2015, p. 1110. 
 	
economic sciences from this point on was apparently settled in favour of a unity 
between Marginalist principles and Formalist method. The theory of rent 
corresponding to this epistemological and ontological framework has been 
effectively uncontested within the orthodoxy to the present day. Each of these 
issues will now be considered in detail. 
	
	
	
It has been established above that the orthodox theory of mineral-rent is 
inadequate because it does not entail a theory of landed property in capitalism. 
This point can be taken further when it is considered alongside the technical 
aspects of Marginalist rent theory. The first issue to be raised is that a theory of 
rent needs to be distinguishable from a theory of profit or wages. Rent in the 
Classical schema was the factor income derived from the ownership of land. 
This distinction becomes a casualty of the Marginalist revolution from  the 1870s. 
Whether it be within the framework of general or partial equilibrium, rent 
cannot be distinguished from profits or wages because factor incomes are 
determined by factor prices. In the general equilibrium model all factor prices 
are determined simultaneously and rent is therefore a derivative of prices effected 
by supply and demand in each market. In the partial equilibrium model, the rest 
of the economy has to be exogenously fixed and a one good world assumed. 
This type of analysis must also be based on the assumption of a fixed and 
indestructible supply of land. In both cases, the specificity of rent as a distinct 
revenue is denied. 
 	
Chapter 4 
	
	
Karl Marx’s Theory of Ground-rent: An Epistemological 
Break? 
	
	
Corn is not high because a rent is paid, but a rent is paid because corn 
is high. 
David Ricardo (1817)1 
	
I have at last been able to sort out the shitty rent business…I had long 
harboured misgivings as to the absolute correctness of Ricardo’s 
theory, and have at length got to the bottom of the swindle. 
Karl Marx to Friedrich Engels (18 June 1862)2 
	
	
	
The previous chapter offered a historical narrative of the development of rent 
theory from the Physiocrats through to the contemporary period. It was 
suggested that the current orthodoxy in rent theory, exemplified by Garnaut and 
adopted in the Henry review, could be accurately characterised as a synthesis of 
Ricardian principles within a framework of general and partial equilibrium theory. 
This conception of rent, it was argued, is fundamentally flawed, not least of all 
because it severs the link between rent and land. Rent, by virtue of the 
methodological constraints of equilibrium theory, must eschew a theory of landed 
property because the specificity of factor revenues is not permitted in a 
framework where all factor prices are determined  simultaneously.  Orthodox rent 
theory, therefore, is necessarily bereft of a corresponding theory of landed 
property. By precluding the role of landed property, the orthodox theory of rent 
is blind to the effects this institution has on the formation and distribution of 
	
	
1 D. Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in P. Staffa and M.H. Dobb 
(eds.), The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 1981(1817), p. 74. 
2 K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Volume 41, Marx and Engels, 1860-1864, Lawrence and 
Wishart, London, 1975, pp. 380-381. 
 	
surplus in extractive industry in the contemporary period. This is why attempts 
to understand the inability of the state apparatus to exact mineral-rents from 
transnational mining companies within the context of the recent minerals boom 
in Australia have been ultimately unsatisfactory. This chapter will articulate a 
potential solution to this problem by elaborating and extending the theory of 
ground-rent developed by Marx. 
	
	
	
The first question that needs to be answered is, why Marx? Appeals have 
already been made in the introduction and first chapter of this dissertation to 
the advantages inherent to the dynamic methodology of historical materialism. 
The benefits of employing an interdisciplinary approach to a multifaceted 
social-scientific problem are obvious. The question at hand is what specifically 
about Marx’s theory of ground-rent makes it an appropriate point of departure 
for addressing the established inadequacies of orthodox rent theory: namely, 
the methodological denial of the role of landed property? The response to this 
question will inform the organisation of this chapter generally but it is worth 
noting for the moment that the crucial reason relates to Marx’s theory of 
ground-rent being contingent upon understanding the role of landed property 
within the capitalist mode of production. Indeed, as Marx noted at the beginning 
of his long elaboration in Capital, ground-rent is ‘the autonomous, specific 
economic form of landed property on the basis of the capitalist mode of 
production’.3 
	
	
	
	
	
3 Op cit, Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 3’, 1981, p. 762. 
 	
This chapter will not attempt to explicate Marx’s theory of ground-rent in its 
entirety. Marx himself struggled to do so in less than 600 pages and that was 
with the help of Engels and Kautsky editing his digressions after his death. 
Rather, this chapter will engage only the elements of Marx’s theory of ground- 
rent that are relevant to understanding the formation and distribution of mineral-
rent in the Australian social formation in the contemporary period. Of the 
various potential strands within Marx’s theory that could illuminate this issue, 
caution and selection must be shown again in addressing only those arguments 
that establish the need for a theory of landed property in capitalism. Much of 
the scholarship dealing with important tensions that arise in Marxist rent theory 
will therefore only be alluded to when necessary. The omissions, if significant, 
will be noted for potential future investigations at the end of the dissertation. 
	
	
	
For the sake of brevity, only the following themes will be explored in this 
chapter: the necessity of a theory of landed property in the construction of a 
socially significant theory of mineral-rent in Australia; the subsumption of 
landed property into capital in the contemporary period; and, the relevance of 
these developments for ground-rent as a determinant of patterns of capital 
accumulation rather than merely an issue of distribution of surplus value. Each 
theme will now be explored in detail before concluding remarks are made 
regarding the difficulties inherent to establishing a general theory of mining. 
 	
Landed Property and Ground-rent 
	
	
	
	
	
This sub-section will articulate the position, which is central to this study, that a 
socially significant theory of mineral-rent in the contemporary period 
necessarily requires a theory of landed property in capitalism. This will be done 
with reference to two principal claims: a theory of mineral-rent on the basis of 
the capitalist mode of production in the contemporary period is inextricably 
linked to a theory of landed property; and, mining is distinct from agriculture in 
relation to the theory of ground-rent and, subsequently, the theory of landed 
property. These claims could be construed as almost tautological iterations of 
the initial position but there are subtle nuances that have significant 
implications. The exploration of these distinctions will now inform the 
discussion. 
	
	
	
Before engaging critically with Marx’s writings on ground-rent it is necessary to 
establish their credibility as serious theoretical endeavours. This is so not 
merely because Marx is one of the most caricatured figures in the canons of 
political economy but also because those who have attempted to develop his 
thought within the Marxist tradition have been equally dismissive of his 
writings on ground-rent. Those who have grappled with the extensive sections 
of the third volume of Capital and second volume of Theories of Surplus Value 
that deal with ground-rent almost always begin with some kind of qualification 
that what Marx wrote on rent was fragmented, discursive and theoretically 
incoherent. Harvey began the chapter on rent in The Limits to Capital with the 
 	
claim that ‘Rent, it is fair to say, troubled Marx deeply’.4 He stressed that Marx’s 
‘writings on the subject, all of which were published posthumously, are for the 
most part tentative thoughts set down in the process of discovery’ which rendered 
the work ‘dogged by certain difficulties’ resulting in ‘a good deal of confusion 
and an immense and continuing controversy’.5 
	
	
	
Bryan prefaced his call for Marxist theory to divorce the concept of rent from 
land and attach it to a general conception of monopoly with the caveat that 
Marx’s writings on rent ‘were, after all, just notebook entries, some comprising 
just an isolated paragraph, assembled and edited by Engels after Marx’s death’.6 
Ramirez issued a more cautious warning with the statement that Marx’s writings 
‘were painstakingly assembled and, in some cases, extensively edited and 
published by F. Engels (Capital, Vol. III) and K. Kautsky (Theories of Surplus 
Value) after Marx’s death, so it is uncertain how Marx would have prepared 
them for publication had he lived one or two more decades’.7 
	
	
	
Each of these claims is somewhat accurate; Marx was troubled by rent, his 
writings have  caused  immense  confusion,  Engels and  Kautsky  did  bring 
together isolated notebook entries and we indeed cannot be certain about what 
Marx would have written about rent had he lived to the turn of the century. 
Perhaps, however, these claims have been taken too far to imply a degree of 
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5 Ibid, Harvey, The Limits to Capital, 1982, p. 330. 
6 D. Bryan, ‘“Natural” and “Improved” Land in Marx’s Theory of Rent’, Land Economics, Vol. 66, 
No. 2, May 1990, p. 176. 
7 M.D. Ramirez, ‘Marx’s Theory of Ground Rent: A Critical Assessment’, Contributions to Political 
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logical inconsistency and incoherence that obscure the important insights present 
in Marx’s work? 
	
	
	
In the introduction to the Penguin edition of Volume 3 of Capital, Mandel makes 
the claim that ‘Volume 3 is constructed with the same logical rigour as its 
predecessors’.8 Whereas volume I of Capital was concerned with determining 
the origin of the two basic categories of revenue, wages and profits, volume 3, 
Mandel claims, sought to show ‘how specific sectors of the ruling class 
participate in the distribution of the total mass of surplus-value produced by 
productive wage-labour, and how these specific economic categories are 
regulated’.9 Judged on this aim, Mandel contends that the ‘fundamental logic of 
Marx’s Capital unfolds in all its majesty once we integrate the structure of 
Volume 3 into that of Volumes 1 and 2’.10 The integral unity of the inherent logic 
of Marx’s argument across the entirety of Capital makes it difficult to appraise 
the sections on ground-rent in Volume 3 of Capital and in Volume 2 of Theories 
of Surplus Value as incongruous notations or incoherent musings. 
	
	
	
Engels appears to provide some evidence to substantiate the claim that aspects 
of Volume 3 of Capital were incoherent and undeveloped. The following excerpt 
from Engels’s preface is instructive and worth quoting at length: 
There was only one draft, and even this contained very major gaps. As 
a rule, the beginning of each section had been more or less carefully 
elaborated, and generally polished stylistically as well. But as the 
section in question went on, the draft would become ever more sketchy 
and fragmented, and contain ever more digressions on side 
	
8 E. Mandel, ‘Introduction’, in Op cit, K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 
Three, (1894) 1981, p. 11. 
9 Ibid, p. 12. 
10 Ibid, p. 13. 
 	
issues that had emerged in the course of the investigation, the proper 
place for these being left to be settled later. The sentences, too, in 
which thoughts written down in statu nascendi* (*just as they arose) 
found their expression, became ever longer and more intricate. At 
several points both handwriting and presentation betrayed only too 
clearly the onset and gradual progress of one of those bouts of illness, 
brought on by overwork, that made Marx’s original work more and 
more difficult and eventually, at times, quite impossible. 11 
	
This description of Marx’s original manuscript seems to give credence to the 
criticisms of his elaboration of the theory of ground-rent mentioned above. To 
what extent, though, do Engels’s observations warrant suspicions of logical 
incoherence to form the basis of valid criticisms of Marx’s theory of ground- 
rent? Part five, on the Division of Profit into Interest and Profit of Enterprise, 
was, according to Engels, ‘the most important subject in the entire book’ and the 
Part that ‘presented the major difficulty’.12 For this Part, in accordance with his 
general comments on the entire manuscript, Engels notes that there was no 
complete draft or even an outline, ‘but simply the beginning of an elaboration 
which petered out more than once in a disordered jumble of notes, comments 
and extract material’.13 
	
	
	
This, however, is not the case for Part six, on the Transformation of Surplus 
Profit into Ground-rent. This part of the manuscript, according to Engels, ‘had 
been far more completely elaborated, even if not at all arranged, as is already 
apparent from the fact that Marx found it necessary in Chapter 43…to 
recapitulate in brief the whole of this Part’.14 It would seem, therefore, that 
while Marx’s original manuscript had been generally discursive and incomplete, 
	
11 F. Engels, ‘Preface’, in Op. Cit., K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume Three, 
(1894) 1981, pp. 92-93. 
12 Ibid, p. 94. 
13 Ibid, pp. 94-95. 
14 Ibid, p. 96. 
 	
specific sections were more coherent than others. In particular, the section on 
ground-rent seemed to reflect more accurately Marx’s intentions in relation to 
the integral unity of the logic expounded throughout the entirety of Capital. 
This, of course, does not vitiate the substantive criticisms of Marx’s exposition of 
ground-rent. It is perhaps enough, though, to cast doubt upon the accusation 
that Marx’s theorisation of ground-rent was any less rigorous or coherent than 
more well-worn pastures of contention relating to the volumes of Capital which 
were published posthumously. 
	
	
	
If the theory of ground-rent expounded in Capital and Theories of Surplus Value 
was reasonably coherent, and, therefore, worth engaging, what then was the 
substance of this elaboration? This is a difficult question for at least two 
reasons. First, the vast gamut of discourse on rent theory scarcely mentions 
Marx’s theory of ground-rent. Second, those who do engage it have generally 
recycled familiar readings of Marx’s work in order to inadvertently support the 
positions they seek to critique. In support of the first claim, Ramirez has noted, 
‘it is still the norm for highly regarded textbooks in the history of economic 
thought to scarcely mention Marx’s own theory of differential rent, let alone 
absolute rent’.15 Fine explains, in relation to the second claim, that ‘whereas for 
Ricardo, (differential) rent is a physical property of the land for which 
ownership merely bestows the right to revenue with no further effects, for 
Marxist distributional rent theory, agency in landownership depends upon 
asserting an individual and class monopoly over access to a particular item of 
	
	
15 Op cit, Ramirez, ‘Marx’s Theory of Ground Rent: A Critical Assessment’, 2009, pp. 71-72. 
 	
the means of production’.16 The result of these tendencies has been to further 
consolidate the hegemony of orthodox rent theory in analysis of concrete 
situations in extractive industry. Non-Marxists dismiss the theory of ground- 
rent as irrelevant and Marxists have generally adopted an interpretation which, 
when extended to its logical conclusion, supports the Ricardian-Marginalist 
position that rent in capitalism is not specific to land and can be regarded as 
monopoly rent. 
	
	
	
It is imperative, despite these difficulties, to (re)discover the value of Marx’s 
contribution to rent theory in order to address the problems of mineral-rents in 
the contemporary Australian context. In order to begin this process, the key 
elements of the theory must be delineated. The central claim underpinning 
Marx’s theory of ground-rent is that capitalist landed property is capable of 
acting as a barrier to the entry of capital onto land. This means that the specific 
system of landed property under the conditions of capitalist production is in 
fact the key to understanding this class relation. In other words, rent is always a 
class relation and must be understood within the dynamic context of landed 
property vis-à-vis capital. This relation does not always need to be antagonistic 
but it is indeed always a social relation. Rent, therefore, is the economic 
expression of a class relation. 
	
	
	
Marx developed three categories to explain the dynamics of this social relation. 
There were, according to Marx, two types of differential ground-rent, which 
	
16 B. Fine, ‘Coal, Diamonds and Oil: Toward a Comparative Theory of Mining?’, Review of Political 
Economy, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 283. 
 	
were qualitatively distinct from the third category, absolute ground-rent. Each 
category was not only analytically distinct but also historically contingent. This 
historical specificity is, arguably, the most significant factor in terms of the 
subject matter of this dissertation and for considerations of ground-rent in the 
contemporary period. This will be elaborated further in the next sub-section, on 
Marx’s three classes in modern society. For now, it is necessary to provide a 
brief explanation of each of the three categories of ground-rent. 
	
	
	
Ground-rent, as defined by Marx in volume three of Capital and volume two of 
Theories of Surplus Value, is comprised of two primary components. These are 
differential ground rent, which is also made up of type one and type two, and 
absolute ground rent. As a general definition of ground-rent, Marx provides this 
broad  statement: 
The presuppositions for the capitalist mode of production are thus as follows: the 
actual cultivators are wage-labourers, employed by a capitalist, the farmer, who 
pursues agriculture simply as a particular field of exploitation of capital, as an 
investment of his capital in a particular sphere of production. At certain specified 
dates, e.g. annually, this farmer-capitalist pays the landowner, the proprietor of the 
land he exploits, a contractually fixed sum of money (just like the interest fixed for 
the borrower of money capital), for the permission to employ his capital in this 
particular field of production. This sum of money is known as ground-rent, 
irrespective of whether it is paid for agricultural land, building land, mines, fisheries, 
forests, etc. It is paid for the entire period for which the landowner has contractually 
rented the land to the farmer. Ground-rent is thus the form in which landed property 
is economically realized, valorized.17 
	
This definition, which precedes the lengthy discussion on both differential and 
absolute ground-rent, is important because it highlights some significant factors 
in relation to the notion of ground-rent in general. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
17 Op cit, Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume Three, 1981, pp. 755-756. 
 	
First, Marx reiterates that the presuppositions for the capitalist mode of 
production entail that wage-labourers are employed by a capitalist seeking to 
exploit a particular sphere of production. This is an important characteristic 
because it distinguishes the capitalist mode of agriculture (or mining) from that 
of previous modes of production, such as in feudalism. Second, Marx specifies 
what exactly constitutes ground-rent. It is defined as the ‘contractually fixed 
sum of money’ paid by the capitalist to the landowner ‘at certain specified dates’ 
for the permission to employ capital in that particular field of production and on 
that particular piece of land.18 Third, Marx states that ground-rent appears only 
within specific spheres of production. 
	
	
	
However, within these spheres, namely agriculture and mining, the laws that 
determine ground-rent are the same. Essentially, ground-rent becomes a factor 
of the circuit of production only within spheres of production that utilise an 
economic advantage manifested within specific areas of land. This aspect of 
ground-rent is more clearly defined in an earlier passage where Marx states: 
Our own reason for considering the modern form of landed property is simply that 
we need to consider all the specific relationships of production and exchange that 
arise from the investment of capital on the land. Without this, our analysis of 
capital would not be complete. We therefore confine ourselves exclusively to the 
investment of capital in agriculture proper, i.e. in the production of the main plant 
crops on which a population lives. We can take wheat, since this is the major means 
of sustenance for modern, capitalistically developed nations. (Instead of agriculture, 
we might equally well have taken mining, since the laws are the same.)19 
	
The fourth significant aspect of this statement relates to the concluding 
sentence, which reinforces the opening claim involving the presuppositions of 
the capitalist mode of production. To comprehend and apply the theory of 
	
18 Ibid, pp. 755-756. 
19 Ibid, p. 752. 
 
 
 
	
ground-rent, class relations must form the basis of the account and their 
historical specificity must be taken into consideration. 
	
	
	
The concept of absolute ground-rent is arguably the most significant aspect of 
Marx’s emergent theories of rent and landed property contained within Capital 
and the Theories of Surplus Value. The significance of this category for the 
current study relates more to absolute ground-rent as a signifier of the 
historical class relation between landed property and capital. The formal 
definition of the concept within the context of Marx’s theory of value is a 
secondary consideration and will not be elaborated in detail here. A brief 
overview of the concept and the attendant controversies will suffice. 
	
	
	
Whereas differential ground-rent of both types arises from the investment of 
capital onto land already under cultivation, absolute ground-rent derives from 
the movement of capital onto new land. This is why Marx defined it as 
‘independent of the differences in fertility between types of land or successive 
investments of capital on the same land’.20 The essence, according to Marx, of 
absolute ground-rent consists in the fact that ‘equally large capitals produce 
different amounts of surplus-value in different spheres of production according 
to their differing average composition, given an equal rate of surplus-value or 
equal exploitation of labour’.21 The factor that accounted for this difference in 
the organic composition of capital, or productivity of capital, was that of landed 
property itself. To use a hypothetical example relevant to the current study, a 
 
 
 
	
deposit of high-grade iron ore is not the reason rent is generated. It is, rather, 
that the system of private property in land does not permit the difference in 
fertility between iron ore mines to be equalised in the Ricardian sense. A tax 
proportional to differences in fertility (or advantages in transport etc.) would 
not equalise returns to capital because there is something else prohibiting this 
equalisation. Marx claimed that landed property, ‘whenever production needs 
land…blocks this equalization for the capitals invested on the land and captures 
a portion of surplus-value which would otherwise go into the equalization 
process, giving the general rate of profit’.22 
	
	
	
This is, however, all contingent upon certain conditions prevailing in land-based 
industry relative to non-land-based industry. Landed property retarded the 
rational development of land-based industry through its ability to exact rent. 
Capitalist farmers would not invest capital to increase the productivity of land if 
it meant having to bequeath the gains to the landowner once the lease expired. 
This mitigated the increase of constant capital relative to variable capital that 
was the tendency in non-land-based industry. It is, as Marx noted, only on the 
‘premise that the value of agricultural products can rise above their price of 
production; i.e. that the surplus-value produced in agriculture by a capital of a 
given size…by the surplus labour that it sets in motion and commands…is 
greater than for an equally large capital of the average social composition’.23 
When, Marx goes on to claim, this hypothesis is inapplicable, the form of rent 
 	
corresponding to it disappears’.24 In other words, if the ratio of constant to 
variable capital in land-based industry were to equal or exceed that of non-land- 
based industry, the basis for the formation of absolute ground-rent would 
disappear. If agriculture and mining were to become highly capital intensive, as 
they are in the contemporary period, absolute-ground rent would not exist. 
	
	
	
The disappearance of absolute ground-rent is, in the final analysis, contingent 
upon the social development of the relation between landed property and 
capital. Absolute ground-rent represented the ability of a feudal institution, 
feudal landed property, to mitigate the accumulation of capital across industries 
that entailed the exploitation of land. The landed aristocracies of feudal social 
formations were able, through their monopoly control of access to land, to exact 
a rental payment for the exploitation of land and its appurtenances. This is, in 
part, what Marx meant by the statement that ‘Landed property presupposes 
that certain persons enjoy the monopoly of disposing of particular portions of 
the globe as exclusive spheres of their private will to the exclusion of all 
others’.25 
	
	
	
While landed property, in its technical sense as a system of private property in 
land, remains, the feudal aristocracies of Marx’s time can no longer be said to 
exercise the class power they once did. Indeed, in the juridical, economic and 
political sense, this class no longer exists in any meaningful way throughout 
most of the advanced capitalist economies. This is particularly the case in 
	
24 Ibid, p. 894. 
25 Op cit, Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume Three, 1981, p. 752. 
 	
Australia, where the feudal mode of production did not unfold over centuries 
and did not have the opportunity to create entrenched class relations. The 
category of absolute ground-rent was a transitory phenomenon as was the class 
antagonism that it represented in economic form: the diminishing class power 
of the feudal aristocracy vis-à-vis the emerging industrial bourgeoisie. This is 
precisely why the concept is so important. 
	
	
	
As with all of Marx’s insights to the capitalist mode of production, the concept of 
absolute ground-rent is historically contingent. The barrier to accumulation that 
absolute ground-rent represented was a function of the class antagonism 
between landed property and the bourgeoisie at a specific historical 
conjuncture. Specifically, Marx based his emerging theory of landed property 
upon data gleaned from the various land reforms occurring in Russia 
throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. The impetus for this study related 
specifically to the debates surrounding the Importation Acts of 1815 and 1846, 
otherwise known as the Corn Laws. The struggle between landed property and 
an emergent industrial bourgeoisie over the tariff on grain was a concrete 
manifestation of the historical emergence of the capitalist mode of production 
as the motive force determining the character and structure of the social 
formations of Europe. 
	
	
	
In the context of his critique of political economy, absolute ground-rent 
functioned to dispel the notion that rents were price determined, as Ricardo, 
whose theory of value could only permit the existence of differential rent, had 
argued. Marx’s contribution proved that rents were in fact socially determined 
 	
in the sense that class power, and therefore a social relation, was the basis of 
rent, rather than inherent properties of the land. The notion of an absolute ground-
rent drew attention to the fact that the particular historical  form  of landed property 
in relation to capital was the primary consideration determining the nature, 
function and magnitude of rent. That is, the most significant aspect of absolute 
ground-rent is its insistence that the specific form of landed property at each 
distinct historical conjuncture is critical for understanding the nature of capital 
accumulation. Or, as Fine and Saad-Filho have aptly noted, the importance of 
Marx’s theory ‘lies less in its providing a determinate theory of rent and price 
and more in that it draws attention to the historically specific ways in which 
landed property influences the pace, rhythm and direction of capital 
accumulation’.26 
	
	
	
While Marx did not live to see extractive industry under conditions of mature 
capitalism, he did take the transient nature of his current context into 
consideration. His theoretical elaboration of absolute ground-rent explicitly 
acknowledged the conditions under which it would disappear. According to 
Marx, ‘Landed property operates as an absolute barrier only in as much as any 
permission to use land,  as a field of  investment for capital, enables the 
landowner to extract a tribute’, adding that, ‘once this permission had been 
given, the landowner can no longer place any absolute barrier to the 
quantitative level of capital investment on a given piece of land’.27 At this point 
of social development, ground-rent becomes a matter of differential nature 
	
26 Op cit, Fine and Saad-Filho, Marx’s Capital, 2010, p. 145. 
27 Op cit, Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume Three, 1981, p. 899. 
 	
because the barrier to entry for capital onto land as a sphere of investment has 
been overcome. 
	
	
	
This general explanation leads onto a more technical description, whereby ‘if 
the average composition of agricultural capital were the same as of the average 
social capital, or even higher than this, the result would be the disappearance of 
absolute rent in the sense developed above, namely a rent that is different both 
from differential rent and from rent depending on an actual monopoly price’.28 
Here we are able to glimpse some important aspects of Marx’s theory of ground- 
rent. First, the conditions of production prevailing in land-based industries in 
Marx’s time - agriculture and mining - were predominantly labour-intensive, 
hence the reason for the lower social productivity of labour in this sphere of 
production. 
	
	
	
Second, absolute ground-rent is distinct from both differential rent and of what 
can broadly be referred to as a ‘monopoly’ rent. While the technical reason for 
the absolute barrier to capital raised by landed property lies in the social 
productivity of land-based industries, it does not necessarily lie in the ability to 
monopolise land. This is an important point because much of the criticism 
surrounding the utility of the absolute ground-rent as an analytical category in 
contemporary analyses of land-based industries centres around the suggestion 
that  absolute  ground-rent  should  be  collapsed  into  a  broader  theory  of 
	
	
	
	
	
28 Ibid, p. 899. 
  
	
monopoly rent.29 However, conflating a category of rent specific to land with 
one that can arise across all economic spheres would run counter to the essence 
of Marx’s theory of ground-rent which sought to understand the function of 
landed property within the capitalist mode of production. Monopoly rent applies 
to all factors of production whereas the theory of ground-rent must be specific 
to the antagonistic and irreconcilably contradictory social relation between 
landed property, a feudal institution that is a fundamental aspect of capitalism, 
and capital, which presupposes private property rights. T h i s  a p p e a r s  
t a u t o l o g i c a l  b e c a u s e  c a p i t a l  i s  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  m e a n s  o f  t h e  
c a p i t a l i s t  m o d e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n .  T h e  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  
h i s t o r i c a l  a n d  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  i n t e r n a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  c l a s s  
a n t a g o n i s m  b e t w e e n  c a p i t a l  a n d  l a n d e d  p r o p e r t y  a t  a  s p e c i f i c  
h i s t o r i c a l  c o n j u n c t u r e .  T h i s  p r o c e s s  w i l l  b e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  
d e t a i l  b e l o w .  As long as private property underpins the capitalist mode of 
production, landed property will play a role in determining the patterns of capital 
accumulation. 
	
	
	
To this end, the problem of absolute ground-rent within the context of the 
contemporary global minerals industry is not simply one of identifying the 
monopolisation of mineral deposits but rather of specifying and explicating the 
relationship between landed property and the production of mineral 
commodities under conditions of capitalism currently prevailing. It is not so 
much a matter of proving or disproving the existence of absolute ground-rent 
but more about the potential for landed property to extract absolute ground- 
  
	
rent within a historically contingent class relation to capital. If landed property 
must exist in the contemporary period, by virtue of it simply expressing the 
nature of the relationship of ownership between humans and land, then the task 
becomes one of reconceptualising the essence of absolute ground-rent within a 
new historical context. The question then becomes, what is the nature of landed 
 	
property in the modern, purely capitalist, mode of production. Moreover, what 
is the exact nature of that mode of production within which landed property 
continues to condition the ‘pace, rhythm and direction of  capital accumulation’?30 
Marx clearly saw the forces of history moving toward the extinction of the rentier 
class. How can the dynamics of extractive industry under modern conditions 
be understood when a landed aristocracy no longer exists in the Feudal sense 
but the ability to mitigate the flow of capital onto land is still the function of a 
social group? This makes the analysis of landed property within the contemporary 
context a pressing consideration for moving toward a more accurate 
understanding of the capitalist mode of accumulation more broadly and the 
sphere of extractive industry specifically. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
30 Op cit, Fine and Saad-Filho, Marx’s Capital, 2010, p. 145. 
 	
Three Classes? 
	
	
	
	
	
This sub-section will articulate the following position: modern landed property 
is no longer a class in opposition to capital and labour; it has become subsumed 
into capital and now constitutes a fraction of that class; the historical process by 
which this subsumption was affected began in 1861 with the culmination of the 
land reform movements in the colonies manifested by the Robertson and Duffy 
land Acts. The discussion of analytical categories within Marx’s theory of 
ground-rent in the previous sub-section emphasised the historical specificity of 
both differential and absolute ground-rent. It is argued below that the above 
position can be understood as the historical disappearance of absolute ground- 
rent in accordance with the development of the social relation between landed 
property and capital. The subsumption of landed property into capital means 
that a division of labour between ownership and control constitutes the 
contemporary form of landed property. The control function of contemporary 
landed property is vested in the neocomprador fraction of the bourgeoisie while 
the state, in conjunction with indigenous landowners, constitutes the ownership 
function. The discussion will now elaborate these claims. 
	
	
	
The extent to which Marx neglected to elaborate a theory of class is well known. 
As has already been noted in the discussion on methodology in the first chapter 
of this dissertation, Marx’s  discussion of classes in chapter 52 of the  third volume 
of Capital ran five paragraphs over two pages before, as Engels lamented,  the  
manuscript  broke  off.  Marx’s  introduction  to  this  unfinished 
 	
chapter serves well, though, as a point of departure for establishing the 
connection between landed property and ground-rent in his work. According to 
Marx, 
The owners of mere labour-power, the owners of capital and the 
landowners, whose respective sources of income are wages, profit and 
ground-rent – in other words wage-labourers, capitalists and landowners – 
form the three great classes of modern society based on the capitalist mode 
of production.31 
	
Landowners, as a class separate from capital and labour, draw ground-rent as 
revenue by virtue of their ability to act as a barrier to the flow of capital onto 
land. Landed property is presented as outside of the dichotomous class relations 
usually associated with Marx’s schema. In approaching a working definition of 
ground-rent Marx claims that ‘we have together here, moreover, and confronting 
one another, all three classes that make up the framework of modern society – 
wage-labourer, industrial capitalist, landowner’.32 
	
	
	
This claim has been used to substantiate criticisms of Marx’s theory of ground- 
rent being irrelevant to the contemporary capitalist mode of production. It is 
considered proof that Marx was concerned with a transitory mode of 
production which entailed vestiges of feudalism. The theory of ground-rent, 
therefore, does not apply to contemporary, purely capitalist, conditions. This 
reasoning underpins much of the Marxist scholarship critical of Marx’s theory of 
ground-rent identified previously. It is also central to the dyadic class structure 
generally associated with Marxist theory as expressed by Laclau who viewed 
classes as opposing ‘poles of antagonistic production relations’.33 Indeed, Neo- 
	
31 Op cit, Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 3, 1981, p. 1025. 
32 Ibid, p. 765. 
33 E. Laclau, Capitalism and Ideology in Marxist Theory, New Left Books, London, 1977, p. 159. 
 	
Marxist investigations of the most recent minerals boom in Australia adhere to 
this binary view of class.34 
	
	
	
This view of class is not misguided. A separate class of landed proprietors 
whose interests do not coincide with capital does not exist in the contemporary 
Australian social formation. Rather, the potential antagonism represented by 
landed property vis-à-vis capital has now been internalised. Landed property is 
now a fraction of capital. Its interests as a fraction may be antagonistic to other 
fractions but, in the final analysis, landed property as a definite group of people 
are invested in the reproduction of capitalist social relations and, as such, 
committed to the capitalist class as a whole. 
	
	
	
The historical details of this internalisation, or subsumption, constitute the 
discussion in chapter 6. The remainder of this sub-section will be concerned 
with expounding the contours of this process in terms of analytical categories. 
This will serve to link the key themes explored in the theoretical discussion thus 
far together so as to inform the empirical investigation in the remainder of the 
dissertation. 
	
	
	
Marx stated in the Grundrisse that ‘capital is the creator of modern landed 
property, of ground rent; just as its action therefore appears also as the 
dissolution of the old form of property in land’.35 This is in reference to the self- 
	
34 C. Howlett, ‘Flogging a Dead Horse? Neo-Marxism and Indigenous Mining Negotiations’, 
Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2010, p. 471. 
35 K. Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, Penguin, London, (1858) 
1973, p. 276. 
 	
expansion of capital creating the class antagonisms that will delineate  the classes 
of modern society. Capital created wage-labour through expropriating the 
peasantry and it simultaneously created modern landed property, as a class within 
itself, by removing it from the production of land-based commodities.36 The 
separation of landed property from land-based production was what Marx 
alluded to when he wrote that the landed proprietor can spend his entire life in 
Constantinople, while his landed property remains in Scotland’.37 Marx praised 
capitalism for facilitating the ‘rationalization of agriculture, which enables this 
to be pursued for the first time on a social scale, and the reduction of landed 
property to an absurdity’, stating that these ‘are the great services of the capitalist 
mode of production’.38 It is this very act of creation, though, that forms the basis 
of a class antagonism. Capital vested capitalist landed property with the ability 
to act as a barrier to the application of capital to land through its ownership 
function. 
	
	
	
It is this class antagonism that capital attempts to overcome from the moment it 
creates capitalist landed property. While landed property exists as a class 
outside of capital, it acts as an effective barrier to the penetration of capital onto 
land. The removal of this barrier requires the abolition of capitalist landed 
property. This represents a serious problem though for capital, because, as has 
been noted, ‘landed property is a historical precondition for the capitalist mode 
	
	
	
	
36 M. Neocosmos, ‘Marx’s Third Class: Capitalist Landed Property and Capitalist Development’, 
Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1986, p. 13. 
37 Op cit, Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 3, 1981, p. 755. 
38 Ibid, p. 755. 
 	
of production and remains its permanent foundation’.39 To abolish capitalist landed 
property would therefore mean abolishing capitalism itself.  The alternative means 
to remove the barrier posed by landed property, while retaining capitalist social 
relations, is through what Marx termed a ‘de facto abolition of landed 
property’.40 
	
	
	
The first case would entail the landowner and capitalist becoming the  one person. 
Or, as Marx noted, if the ‘landowner is himself a capitalist or the capitalist a 
landowner…this hypothetical…barrier that landed property places to the 
investment of capital immediately disappears’. 41 The other way is through the 
nationalisation of land whereby the state dispossesses the class of landowners 
through juridical means. This is, however, according to Marx, ‘the abolition of 
landed property in the Ricardian sense, that is, its conversion into state property 
so that rent is paid to the State instead of to the landlord, is the ideal, the 
heart’s desire, which springs from the deepest, inmost essence of capital’.42 
Although, as Neocosmos argues, ‘if the state does not realise this rent it ceases 
to act as a barrier to capital’ and landed property, as a class outside of capital, 
disappears.43 The de facto abolition of landed property has the effect of 
subsuming it into capital itself. Landed property can then be considered a fraction 
of capital rather than a class outside of and in opposition to it. This is what has 
transpired in the historical development of landed property in the 
	
39 Ibid, p. 754. 
40 K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Volume 41, Marx and Engels, 1860-1864, Lawrence and 
Wishart, London, 1975, p. 738. 
41 Op cit, Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 3, 1981, p. 885. 
42 K. Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part III, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971, p. 472. 
43 Op cit, Neocosmos, ‘Marx’s Third Class: Capitalist Landed Property and Capitalist 
Development’, 1986, p. 31. 
 	
Australian context. The detail of this analytical sketch will be explored in 
chapter 6. The discussion will now turn to suggesting avenues to develop the 
somewhat stagnant discourse on Marxist rent theory by moving beyond rent as 
a distributional consideration and viewing it as an important determinant of 
patterns of capital accumulation. 
 	
Beyond Distributional Debates 
	
	
	
	
	
The various debates concerning Marx’s theory of ground-rent can be usefully 
distinguished according to their interpretation of what Marx wrote over some 
600 pages mostly to be found in the third volume of Capital and the second 
volume of the Theories of Surplus Value. On the one hand, there are those who 
perceive ground-rent as a distributional issue. Landed property is seen as 
significant in these accounts to the extent that it can mitigate the flow of capital 
onto land. This barrier to capital accumulation generates rent owing to the 
difference in the organic composition of capital between land-based and non- 
land-based industry. 
	
	
	
This absolute ground-rent, as discussed above, appears only under certain 
conditions and disappears once the organic composition of capital in land-based 
industry equals or exceeds that in non-land-based industry. Once land-based 
industry becomes capital intensive, absolute ground-rent is no longer relevant 
as an explanatory category. Rent, from this point onwards, accords with the 
Ricardian-Marginalist position, which severs the link between land and rent. 
Differential rent, in terms of differing fertilities of land and varying applications 
of capital to land, explains the formation and distribution of rent while 
monopoly rent replaces the category of absolute rent. Within this scholarship, 
as Fine has noted, there has been a ‘tendency to conflate monopolisation over 
the  supply  of  a  particular  commodity  with  the  ownership  of  the  particular 
 	
pieces of land from which it is produced, although the two sources of monopoly 
are conceptually and, often in practice, practically distinct’.44 
	
	
	
The defining characteristic of Marxist distributional rent theory has been the 
preoccupation with the effects of rent as opposed to its causes and implications. 
The rent relation is seen as historically specific, which distinguishes this type of 
analysis from the Ricardian and Marginalist approaches. Marxist rent theory is 
delineated, in the first instance, by its historically contingent approach. As Marx 
observes, ‘Ricardo, after postulating bourgeois production as necessary for 
determining rent, applies the conception of rent, nevertheless, to the landed 
property of all ages and countries’, which is ‘an error common to all economists, 
who represent the bourgeois relations of production as eternal categories’.45 
	
	
	
Marxist distributional rent theory, however, adopts a static approach rather 
than viewing rent within the context of the dynamics of capital accumulation. 
There is an alternative approach that emphasises patterns of accumulation and 
perceives the formation and distribution of rent as historically contingent and 
determined by the dynamic role of landed property within the capitalist mode 
of production. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
44 Op cit, Fine, ‘Coal, Diamonds and Oil: Toward a Comparative Theory of Mining’, 1994, p. 283.   
45 K. Marx, ‘The Poverty of Philosophy’, in K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, Volume 6, Marx 
and Engels, 1845-1848, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1975, p. 202. 
 	
This approach, which can be traced to the debate between Ball and Fine46, 
‘concerns the conditions under which capital has access to the land for the 
purposes of production and accumulation’.47 In other words, capitalist landed 
property is seen as a dynamic factor that determines the character of ground- 
rent at a given historical conjuncture. This theory of ground-rent is dynamic, as 
opposed to static distributional approaches, because its point of departure is 
identifying the role and function of landed property in a given historical context 
as the basis for rent. 
	
	
	
The advantages of adopting a patterns of accumulation approach are that it 
permits the examination, in conjunction with the rent relation, of the 
contributing factors to determining broader patterns of capital accumulation. 
To draw on Fine again, at length, a dynamic approach to rent: 
concerns the conditions under which capital has access to land for the purposes of 
production and accumulation. This goes far beyond the payment of rent for 
differential fertility or for monopoly control. It potentially depends upon a whole 
host of factors over and above the distribution of ownership and (legal) control of 
land to incorporate access to credit, markets, labour, etc, any one of which may 
play a decisive role in mediating the rent relation. Often these factors, conflicts 
over them, and the balance of economic and political power are reflected in the 
form taken by leases - what is their customary length, rights of renewal, 
arrangements over ownership of fixed capital or improvements in the event of 
non-renewal, etc.48 
	
	
	
	
46 This debate centred around the first article listed below contributed by Ben Fine which 
argued that Marx’s theory of differential rent type 2 was linked to absolute ground-rent. The 
details of the debate are not central to the current study but it is worth noting that this 
interaction forms the basis for all subsequent ‘patterns of accumulation’ approaches to Marxist 
rent theory: 
B. Fine, ‘On Marx’s Theory of Agricultural Rent’, Economy & Society, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1979, pp. 241- 
278. 
M. Ball, ‘On Marx’s Theory of Agricultural Rent: A Reply to Ben Fine’, Economy & Society, Vol. 9, 
No. 3, 1980, pp. 304-326. 
B. Fine, ‘On Marx’s Theory of Agricultural Rent: A Rejoinder’, Economy & Society, Vol. 9, No. 3, 
1980, pp. 327-331. 
47 Op cit, Fine, ‘Coal, Diamonds and Oil: Toward a Comparative Theory of Mining’, 1994, p. 284. 
48 Ibid, p. 284. 
 	
This approach permits the investigation of not just how rent is distributed 
among competing interests but why this process occurs. It is, therefore, more 
appropriate to the task of explicating the social signification of rental payments 
for then use of land and its appurtenances. Key elements of this approach as 
they relate to the current study will be explored in the next chapter before 
moving onto a discussion of the historical development of landed property in 
Australia. 
 	
Chapter 5 
	
	
Confronting the Orthodox Theory of Mineral-rent 
	
	
	
	
The discussion thus far has suggested that the orthodox conception of mineral- 
rent in the contemporary period is flawed because it has evolved within a long 
line of economic thinking that is primarily concerned with facilitating the 
reproduction of specific social relations of production. It has been argued that 
the ontological and epistemological foundations of the orthodox conception of 
mineral-rents were firmly rooted within the historical realities they attempted 
to explain; this reality was politically determined and as such must be explained 
with reference to the political forces that reflexively determined economic 
outcomes. The relations between mining firms and governments reflect social 
interests and the theories determining the scope of these ‘bargains’ must 
contain normative considerations. The social interests vying for economic 
outcomes must be taken to account in order to account for the social interest. 
	
	
	
Through an examination of the theoretical heritage of the current conception of 
mineral-rents it has been suggested that the role and function of the institution 
of landed property could not have been effectively understood until the 
productive forces of the capitalist mode of production reached a more mature 
stage. While the pioneers of the Classical, Marxist and Neoclassical traditions 
were able to identify the broad parameters of the problem of mineral-rents, 
these insights need to be extended in order to arrive at a contemporarily 
relevant approach. To this end, it is suggested in this section that the way 
 	
forward in this regard is through a confrontation of the Marxist tradition with 
the Neoclassical tradition. 
	
	
	
The discussion below traces three key developments in Marxist rent theory. 
Contributions from Nwoke, Harvey and Fine are central themes used to 
illuminate the trajectories of key debates. At issue here, for the current study, 
are three things: the global character of extractive industry in the contemporary 
period; the rent relation as both a signifier of class revenue and as a form of 
capital, thereby articulating two concepts simultaneously; the struggle to 
appropriate rent as involving more than static ‘bargains’ and, therefore, 
determining broader patterns of capital accumulation. 
	
	
	
Each theme will now be explored in conjunction with the relevant debates in 
Marxist rent theory. The issues considered prompt consideration of rent as a 
class relation and place it within a broader context of time and space which alter 
its social significance. This scope is not permitted when rent is seen purely as a 
mechanism for allocating investment according to varying levels of productivity. 
 	
World Mining Rents 
	
	
	
	
	
Nwoke posed a crucial question in the 1980s that led him to reveal several 
insights and developments to the theory of ground-rent Marx hypothesised. 
Nwoke asked why the resource rich nation-states of the global periphery did 
not reap the benefits of their natural economic endowments? His answer was 
that absolute ground-rent was unable to be appropriated and differential rent of 
both types now accrued to capital rather than the landowners. In Nwoke’s 
schema, multinational mining companies represented capital and the Third 
World host governments represented landed property. The following is a long 
excerpt that succinctly outlines Nwoke’s core thesis and distinguishes it from 
Marx’s theory: 
Briefly summarized, it argues that in today’s world mining business, unlike the 
19th-Century agriculture on which Marx based his rent theory, there are no bases 
for (1) the creation or exaction of absolute rent, (2) the full appropriation of 
differential rent I, or (3) the formation and appropriation of differential rent II by 
Third World landlord governments, owners of the world’s richest mines. This is so, 
the study maintains, because of the unique circumstances which apply to the present, 
and which had not, therefore, influenced Marx’s theory. First, with respect to the 
mechanism of absolute rent, which is of a monopoly nature, while Marx conceived 
of landowners with absolute monopoly over land or natural resources, today’s 
landowners, that is, Third World governments of minerals-exporting economies, do 
not have such an absolute monopoly over minerals and are not even organized in 
systematic and concerted action vis-à-vis capitalist mining entrepreneurs. Second, 
with respect to differential rent I, while the basis for the formation of this form 
of surplus profits exists in today’s world mining sector, the competition between 
capitalist entrepreneurs envisaged by Marx does not apply in today’s monopoly 
capitalism. Third, with respect to differential rent II, Marx’s notion of the ‘greater 
power’ of landlords, which would allow them to impose short and frequently 
changed leases on capitalist entrepreneurs, is inapplicable in today’s world mining 
sphere where Third World governments have been known to offer exploitation rights 
for up to 105 years.1 
	
There are various contentious issues within Nwoke’s thesis. The most obvious 
point of debate is that concerning the existence of absolute ground-rent within 
	
	
1 Op cit, Nwoke, Third World Minerals and Global Pricing, 1987, p. 9. 
 	
the contemporary mining industry. Fine suggests ‘the rejection of a correct 
interpretation of Marx's rent theory requires a rejection of Marx's theory of 
capital in the absence of rent, at least in some of his aspects. Whilst it is true that 
many revisers of Marx's rent theory also revise his theory of capital (whilst 
misinterpreting both), there are others who believe that Marx's theory of rent 
needs to be revised to be consistent with his theory of capital’.2 
	
	
	
Fine argues that the theory of ground-rent cannot simply be incorporated into 
the broader theory of monopoly rent because for the latter, the organic 
composition of capital in agriculture (or mining) is irrelevant for the determination 
of rent. Bryan, on the other hand, contends ‘the application of Marxist value 
theory to land does not need a distinct theory of ground-rent’.3 According to 
Bryan, ‘If we subsume land ownership into capital, the need to differentiate 
rent from interest disappears, as does Marx's theoretical dilemma addressed 
above. Put simply, Marx's theory of rent is attempting to include a pre-capitalist 
conception of land into a theory of capitalist calculation (i.e., the law of value). 
It should not be surprising that it does not work’.4 Both Fine and Bryan are 
correct, in a sense. There is no technical basis for the existence of absolute 
ground-rent as Marx characterised it according to nineteenth century conditions. 
However, this does not mean that the theory of absolute ground- rent should 
be subsumed into the broader theory of monopoly rent. 
	
	
	
	
	
2 Op cit, Fine, ‘On Marx’s Theory of Agricultural Rent’, 1979, p. 264. 
3 Op cit, Bryan, ‘”Natural” and “Improved” land in Marx’s Theory of Rent’, 1990, p. 180. 
4 Ibid, p. 180. 
 	
The key point in relation to the current analysis is that Nwoke’s framework does 
not permit scope for an analysis of the material conditions within the semi- 
peripheral Australian social formation and the operations and consequences of 
transnational mining capital within its bounds. The material structures of 
extractive industry within the bounds of the Australian state are somewhat 
problematic for the framework he espoused. The first problem is that Nwoke’s 
international division of labour did not permit scope for analysis of semi- 
peripheral economies. Australia is referred to as an ‘advanced’ country, grouped 
among those in the ‘core’ of the global political economy.5 Moreover, one of the 
fundamental assumptions underpinning Nwoke’s theoretical framework is that 
‘for the advanced countries, the era of cheap mineral discoveries has ended’.6 
This is what drives the struggle to appropriate rents from Third World host 
governments, according to Nwoke; advanced economies are reliant upon the 
high grade ores found in Third World countries to facilitate their continued 
industrialisation. 
	
	
	
The Australian social formation does not fit within this generalised model. 
Wallerstein noted in 1976 that Australia was part of that ‘old white 
Commonwealth’ of the global semi-periphery.7 Stephen Bell claimed in 1997 
that the Australian export profile looked more like ‘that of a Third World 
staples/resort economy than that of an advanced industrial economy, whose 
export profile is weighted much more towards high value-added manufacture 
	
5 Op cit, Nwoke, Third World Minerals and Global Pricing, 1987, p. 105. 
6 Ibid, p. 7. 
7 I. Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1976, p. 
465. 
  
	
exports’.8 During the long post-War boom, the contribution of manufacturing to 
GDP in Australia did not exceed by far 20%. Whereas Germany and Japan had 
contributions to GDP by manufacturing at 29% and 26% respectively in 1987, 
the year Nwoke published his seminal contribution to rent theory.9 Australia 
poses an exceptional case in terms of the Nwoke’s typology and prompts 
consideration of the significant distinguishing factors. 
	
	
	
The methodological approach Nwoke advocates entails a global analytical scope 
in which multinational mining firms are involved in an antagonistic relationship 
with the governments of developing nations endowed with mineral wealth. 
Nwoke disavows the neoclassical ‘bargaining model’ which posits that trade 
contracts between multinational mining firms and host governments should 
favour the former until such times that the latter develops mechanisms to 
diminish investment risk. Following this, the host government achieves a better 
relative bargaining position for the renegotiation process and is then in a 
position to maximise their comparative advantage. According to ‘bargaining 
model’ theorists, the governments of developing nations with vast mineral 
endowments were expected to steadily improve their bargaining power due to 
the growing demand for industrial raw materials in the developed economies 
and by facilitating low-risk investment environments for mining firms. 
Evidently, the history of the global south from as early as the 1960s 
demonstrates  the  inadequacy  of  a  model  that  assumes  under-resourced 
	
	
8 S. Bell, Ungoverning the Economy: The Political Economy of Australian Economic Policy, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 1997, p. 82. 
9 World Bank, ‘Manufacturing, Value-added (% of GDP)’, 
 	
governments of developing nations are on equal bargaining terms with 
multinational mining firms. In Nwoke’s estimation, an extension of Marx’s theory 
of ground-rent into the mining sector and encompassing the global political 
economy can address these shortcomings. 
	
	
	
There are several issues that arise when Nwoke’s framework is considered 
alongside the Australian context. First, the strict binary perception of the global 
division of labour does not permit scope for an examination of the Australian 
political economy because it does not belong to either the centre or periphery. 
Second, one of the two monopoly mining firms, BHP Billiton, is considered an 
Australian institution yet is majority foreign owned. Third, Australia’s 
dependence upon its mineral exports places it in direct competition with 
developing minerals producing nations to attract investment. Fourth, Nwoke’s 
framework rests upon the assumption that advanced capitalist economies seek 
to exploit third world minerals producing nations in order to secure raw 
industrial materials to fuel domestic industrial growth. Australia has hardly any 
domestic industrial sector with its manufacturing sector contributing 6.8% 
measured by gross value added (GVA) to its national accounts in 2014.10 The 
labour statistics for the same period show that 77.7% of the Australian labour 
force is employed in the services sector.11 Both these figures, representing de- 
	
	
10 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian System of National Accounts, 2013-2014, ‘Table 5. 
Gross value added (GVA) by industry’, Cat. No. 5204.0, ABS Ausstats, viewed 28/4/15, 
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November 2013’, Cat. No. 6105.0, ABS Ausstats, viewed 28/4/15, 
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labourisation and industrial atrophy, have become features of most of the 
advanced capitalist economies. However, the industrial centres of the 
contemporary global capitalist political economy are still considered emerging 
economies and situated firmly in the global south. Thus it seems that in the 
three decades since Nwoke formulated his view, multinational mining firms 
have begun to reroute the minerals back to the global south whilst holding onto 
the profits these practices yield. Each of these issues associated with Nwoke’s 
mineral rent theory must be reconciled within the current investigation of the 
Australian political economy. 
	
	
	
The following excerpt highlights a key issue with Nwoke’s theory of mineral 
rents, 
The limited mineral deposits at issue today are the low-cost, high-grade mines 
located mostly in the Third World. Because of the more rapid industrialization of 
advanced countries, their own high-ore grades have been more rapidly exhausted, 
compared to those located in Third World areas, that is, those in the periphery of 
the world capitalist system. For the advanced countries, the era of cheap minerals 
discoveries has ended; most of their new mines, apart from those in Third World 
areas, are in remote and difficult areas like Alaska, the North Sea, Siberia, and other 
off-shore areas.12 
	
The significant points here relate to the aggravated depletion of mineral 
resources in advanced countries owing to greater relative industrialisation and 
also to the claim that the era of cheap mineral discoveries has ended in 
advanced capitalist countries. These claims do not hold true for Australia. First 
and foremost, there is little to suggest that the industrialisation that occurred in 
Australia throughout the long post-war boom significantly depleted the vast 
deposits of high grade ores discovered since 1945. Since the mid-1970s there 
has been a marked decline in the domestic manufacturing sector which has 
	
12 Op cit, Nwoke, Third World Minerals and Global Pricing: A New Theory, 1987, p. 27. 
 	
virtually negated demand for raw minerals. The Australian mining industry has 
been primarily geared toward export markets throughout the entirety of this 
period. Moreover, discoveries of new ore bodies, in conjunction with 
technological innovations that permit the profitable extraction of previously 
uneconomic deposits, continue to expand the scope of the export-oriented 
extractive sector. The destinations for Australian mineral exports are primarily 
located within the rapidly industrialising global south, or what Nwoke refers to 
as the periphery of the world capitalist system. There are certain incompatible 
aspects of Nwoke’s theory in relation to the Australian context within the 
contemporary historical period. 
	
	
	
This is unsurprising. Nwoke based his theory upon evidence from the global 
periphery in a historical period that could be characterised as the initial years of 
the long post-war boom. The industrial centres of the global economy were 
indeed situated within the advanced capitalist countries throughout this period 
and raw materials were supplied primarily by peripheral states. Since the end of 
the long boom, there has been somewhat of a gradual reversal in relation to 
industrialisation and the flow of raw materials. This is not to say that advanced 
states devolved  and began relying  upon primary  resource  exports to the 
emerging economies. Rather, in Australia’s case, there has been a sense of 
continuity in regards to  a reliance upon primary  resource exports. What 
changed for Australia was the domestic consumption of its raw materials owing 
to a protracted structural adjustment which facilitated the contraction of its 
industrial sectors. 
 	
However, it was the changes to the global capitalist economy that most 
significantly affect the development of Nwoke’s theory. The global periphery 
has, since the end of the post-war boom, become the site of rapid 
insustrialisation and the primary source of demand for raw industrial materials. 
This development poses various issues for Nwoke’s framework. For the 
purposes of the current study, however, the analytical and theoretical focus will 
be upon the Australian context and its place within this new dynamic of global 
capitalist accumulation. 
 	
Revenues and Capital 
	
	
	
	
	
This section draws on the work of David Harvey on ground-rent and specifically, 
his critique of Pierre-Phillipe Rey’s contribution to this discourse. Harvey 
disavowed Rey’s claim that ground-rent had no real basis within a purely capitalist 
mode of production and that it could be ‘interpreted only as a relation of 
distribution which reflects a relation of production of pre-capitalist modes of 
production (e.g. Feudalism) with which capitalism is “articulated”’.13 While 
Harvey accepts that ground-rent is a relation of distribution, he argues, contrary 
to Rey, that ‘the appropriation of rent forms the  basis  for  important coordinating 
functions, in particular the shaping of land uses and spatial configurations to 
the requirements of accumulation of capital and class reproduction’.14 
	
	
	
Harvey argues that ground-rent and the struggle to appropriate it is an 
important aspect of the capitalist mode of production in the sense that it 
mediates the relationship between land and capital. Moreover, ground-rent 
becomes an important category for the study of how patterns of accumulation 
are instituted and how the mode of production is reproduced. Therefore, 
mineral rents, which are one expression of this category, take on a 
fundamentally important role in determining the character and composition of 
	
	
	
	
13 Op cit, Harvey, ‘Land Rent and the Transition to the Capitalist Mode of Production’, 1982, p. 
17. 
14 Ibid, p. 17. 
 	
the Australian social formation and do not merely represent an allocative 
mechanism for investment as the orthodox view would contend. 
	
	
	
This argument, while important for understanding the debate with Rey, is not 
the most significant aspect of Harvey’s theory for the current discussion. Rather, 
it is a particular aspect of Harvey’s argument relating to the distinction between 
revenue and capital that concerns us here. This distinction was made by Marx in 
various writings but explicated most clearly throughout Capital. At its most 
basic, the distinction entails conceiving of different levels of abstraction. 
Revenue is a form of capital in that it is the form in which surplus value is 
expressed at certain points along the loci of circulation within processes of 
capital accumulation. A simple example would be wages: the wages bill for an 
individual capital represents variable capital upon payment; however, the same 
wages once received by workers can circulate as revenues when workers employ 
other sections of the working class to undertake household labour such as child 
care or gardening services. In this sense, the revenues are circulating within the 
working class while, strictly speaking, not taking on different forms of capital. 
	
	
	
Marx sought to define revenues and capital in various ways. For example, in the 
Grundrisse, published ten years before the first volume of Capital, revenue was 
characterised as the ‘part of surplus-value destined for immediate consumption’.15 
In the third volume of Capital, published by Engels after Marx 
	
	
15 Op cit, Marx, Grundrisse, (1857)1974, p. 733. 
 	
had died, revenue is designated as ‘a portion of the value of commodity capital 
that is transformed into money’ which is ‘therefore the expression and result of 
genuine accumulation, though not productive capital itself’.16 Although, the 
most substantive characterisation, and the one most polished by Marx in his 
mature work, is the one to be found in the first volume of Capital. Here, Marx 
explicates the function of surplus value as both ‘a fund for satisfying the 
capitalist’s individual consumption requirements’ as well as ‘a fund for 
accumulation’.17 Whereby, ‘one part of the surplus-value is consumed by the 
capitalist as revenue, the other part is employed as capital, i.e. it is 
accumulated’.18 A footnote to the word revenue explains that the word is used 
‘in a double sense: first, to designate surplus-value, as the fruit periodically 
yielded by capital; and second, to designate a part of that fruit which is 
periodically consumed by the capitalist, or added to his private consumption 
fund’.19 Revenue, then, is distinct from capital in that it is not productive of 
capital, or, simply, does not self-expand in the process of accumulation. 
Moreover, it should be understood that the circulation of revenues is distinct 
but not separate from the circulation of capital. That is, revenue forms an 
integral unity with capital in the sense that it is a portion of surplus-value but 
functions in opposition to it only in the strict sense that it is not productive of 
capital in and of itself. As Harvey’s argument demonstrates the circulation of 
revenue is not only necessary for capital accumulation, it actively facilitates it. 
	
	
	
16 Op cit, Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume Three, 1981, p. 636. 
17 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, Penguin, London, 1976, p. 738. 
18 Ibid, p. 738. 
19 Ibid, fn., p. 738. 
 	
This much is relatively easy to understand and is not problematic in regards to 
the appropriation of rent. Harvey introduces the difficulty when he identifies 
that, ‘once distributed, revenues are free to circulate in a variety  of  ways thereby 
creating opportunities for various secondary forms of exploitation, including 
rental appropriation’.20 This means that ‘rents can, therefore, just as easily be 
appropriated from the circulation of revenues as from the circulation of capital 
itself’. 21 The problem then arises in relation to analysing the production and 
appropriation of rent because the dynamics of the rent relation are framed in 
terms of capital but not in terms of revenue. This means that what may seem to 
indicate the movement of capital in the form of rent is actually on the plane of 
the circulation of revenues. The difficulty then is in determining how exactly a 
mineral rent in a particular period functions relative  to  the process of 
accumulation i.e. is the mineral rent at a given point in time and in a specific 
place capital or revenue? However, this is still not the most pressing issue. 
	
	
	
The problem that Harvey identifies is that Marx’s theory of ground-rent relates 
specifically to the circulation of capital and not to revenues. Therefore, Harvey 
notes that while the circulation of revenues is ‘intricate in its detail’, ‘massive in 
scale’ and ‘much of the detail of what happens in bourgeois society has to be 
understood in relation to it’, it would be a serious error to ‘seek to explain that 
detail  by  reference  to  Marx’s  theory  of  the  dynamics  of  the  circulation  of 
	
	
20 Op cit, Harvey, ‘Land Rent and the Transition to the Capitalist Mode of Production’, 1982, p. 
22. 
21 Ibid, p. 22. 
 
 
 
	
capital’.22 As Marx sought to explicate the dynamics of capital accumulation 
within a frame of reference that took as its object of analysis the totality of the 
capitalist mode of production, it would be erroneous to apply this holistic 
methodology to the analysis of specific instances within that totality. The frame 
of reference required for such analyses is that of the circulation of revenues in 
relation to the circulation of capital. 
	
	
	
This point is the key to Harvey’s contribution to practical applications of Marx’s 
theory of ground-rent. It rests upon the observation that the theory of rent 
expounded in Capital takes capital as its object of analysis and seeks to explicate 
the logic of capital accumulation. Marx’s findings are therefore consistent with 
his aims but in order to extend the theory to an analysis of concrete situations, 
the frame of reference must accord with the scope of the theory. That is, the 
‘detail’ must be explained through the circulation of revenues in relation to the 
circulation of capital. Or, in other words, ‘Marx’s theory of rent is partial because 
it deals solely with the circulation of capital and excludes any direct analysis of 
the circulation of revenues’.23 
	
	
	
Consequently, the way forward, in terms of conceptual development and 
analysis of concrete problems, is to think ‘of the ratio between two flows - of 
revenue and capital – and try to situate rent as a social relation of momentary 
appropriation from both flows (both capital and revenue) based on the mere 
 
 
 
	
fact of land and property ownership’.24 This is how, Harvey suggests, the social 
significance of rent, which is ‘simply a money payment for the use of land and its 
appurtenances’, can be explained by establishing ‘the underlying forces that 
give social meaning to and fix the level of the rental payment’ within a purely 
capitalist mode of production where ‘these forces merit  disaggregation  into those 
which attach to the circulation of capital and those which relate to the 
circulation of revenues (while recognizing that the two circulation processes are 
dependent upon each other)’.25 
 	
Systems of Provision 
	
	
	
	
	
It has been suggested thus far that in order to advance the tautological theory of 
rent found in orthodox economics there must be a development of the theory 
which engages with the social function of rent beyond simply an allocative 
mechanism for investment. Nwoke’s theory of world mining rents was 
examined to suggest the flows of rent across the global minerals industry may 
be best explained within the context of the dynamics of capital accumulation 
where the negotiations between multinational mining firms and host 
governments are determined by the struggle to appropriate mineral rents. 
Following this, Harvey’s critique of Rey was discussed to highlight the need to 
incorporate an analysis of the flows of revenues as distinct from, though in 
relation to, the flows of capital. The research gap evident in orthodox rent 
theory relates to its use as a purely allocative mechanism determining 
investment of capital without considerations of social function or benefit. 
	
	
	
This can be addressed by broadening the scope of the analysis to include the 
global flow of mineral rents as mediated by the class struggle to appropriate 
surplus value in the form of mineral rents evident in the negotiations between 
multinational mining firms and host governments. The contours of this struggle 
are borne out in the circulation of revenues in relation to the circulation of 
capital. The question still remains though of how such an analysis can be carried 
out. Here the work of Ben Fine in relation to systems of provision offers some 
suggestions. 
 	
	
	
An important observation made by Harvey in the previous section related to an 
analogy between urban housing rents and differential  rents  on  capital. According 
to Harvey, ‘properly structured rents on working class housing could then have 
the effect of equalizing the real wage to workers at different locations (the analogy 
with differential rent on capital is exact)’ which would mean that the 
‘relationships  between  land  and  property  rent,  transport  availability and cost, 
then come into play’.26 Due to the nature of Harvey’s specific critique of Rey, 
he did not venture any views on the type of analytical devices that could be used 
to explore these subsequent questions. It is suggested here that the work of Fine 
on ‘systems of provision’ is well suited to this task. 
	
	
	
In his attempt to move toward a general theory of mining, Fine argues that there 
is a need to distinguish between what are termed ‘systems of provision’ in the 
analysis of determinants of consumption.27 These systems of provision are 
‘distinct structures and processes connecting production to consumption [to] 
form an integral unity, linked by the intermediate activities such as distribution, 
retailing, design, and preference formation through material culture’.28 The break 
Fine makes with orthodox theories that attempt to explain production and 
consumption is the emphasis on vertical rather than horizontal integration. As 
Fine notes, ‘most of the theories to be found across the social sciences…tend to 
seek general explanations of production or consumption, etc which apply 
	
	
26 Ibid, p. 24. 
27 Op cit, Fine, ‘Coal, Diamonds and Oil: Toward a Comparative Theory of Mining?’, 1994, p. 279. 
28 Ibid, p. 279. 
 	
across a range of, if not all, sectors of the economy without recognizing how 
each is differentially attached to specific systems of production’.29 Therefore, to 
construct a general theory of mining in accordance with the approach based on 
systems of provision entailing an emphasis on the vertical integration of 
determinants of production and consumption, ‘it would be necessary to 
consider mining in the context of the upstream activities to which it is 
attached’.30 
	
	
	
It is through utilising this approach that Fine concludes that ‘cartelization through 
distribution and/or marketing is  associated  with  a  vertical displacement of the 
rent relation – common, for example, in access to credit in some forms of 
agriculture’.31 This effectively means that land owners are no longer the ones 
able to appropriate surplus profitability, or mineral rents, ‘associated with capital 
intensive accumulation’ because ‘this accrues to the cartel through its 
command over producers because of its exclusive access to markets’.32 This 
finding poses considerable problems for both the orthodox and heterodox theories 
of rent as it implies a movement of the rent relation along a vertical axis of 
integration. That is, if the theory of mineral rents is to be developed to explain 
contemporary contexts, it must take into account the vertical displacement of the 
rent relation within the systems of provision as outlined by Fine. 
	
	
	
29 Ibid, p. 279. 
30 Ibid, p. 280. 
31 Ibid, p. 299. 
32 Ibid, p. 299. 
 	
This chapter has posed a critique of orthodox accounts of mineral-rent which 
suggest that the concept is useful only in the sense that it acts as an allocative 
mechanism for investment. This view accords with the Classical and 
Neoclassical theories of rent, namely the theory of differential ground-rent 
developed by Ricardo, and also with the Neoclassical methodology concerned 
with optimising efficiency under the auspices of the scarcity postulate. It has 
been argued that the current dominant expression of this line of thought can be 
positively developed by way of critique through the broad school of historical 
materialism and specifically through a synthesis of the approaches forwarded 
by Nwoke, Harvey and Fine. Nwoke’s extension of Marx’s theory of ground-rent 
to analyse global flows of mining rents as expressed in the negotiations between 
multinational mining firms and host governments permits the integration of an 
analysis of the Australian context into the global circuits of capital 
accumulation. Within this totality, Harvey’s emphasis upon the need to examine 
revenues as distinct albeit in relation to capital opens up the field of analysis 
within which to ground the study of mineral rent expressed as a form of capital. 
Finally, the work of Fine on vertically integrated systems of provision displacing 
the rent relation into upstream activities provides the analytical device to unify 
the global and the domestic, the abstract and concrete. 
 	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Part III 
	
	
	
	
Transnational Mining Capital, 
the Neocomprador Fraction of 
the Bourgeoisie and the State 
 	
Chapter 6 
	
	
The Historical Development of Landed Property in 
Australia 
	
	
This chapter will examine the development of the form of landed property on 
the Australian continent in historical perspective. Such a task is a necessary step 
toward the construction of a modern theory of mineral-rent that is able to explicate 
the social signification of rental payments for the use of mineral-lands. As Fine 
has aptly noted, ‘a prerequisite for the development of a theory of mining 
and the revenues that it generates is an examination of the empirical form of 
landed property that it confronts’.1 
	
	
	
This is so because rent is the economic expression of a class antagonism, one 
which acts as a barrier to the accumulation of capital across particular spheres 
of industry. In order to accurately identify the character and function of landed 
property within the contemporary Australian social formation, its historical 
development needs to be explored within the context of the evolution of the 
capitalist mode of production globally. This is important because the form of 
landed property in the contemporary period and its relationship to capitalist 
production is what determines the creation and distribution of mineral-rents as 
well as broader patterns of capital accumulation. The following discussion will 
briefly examine the form of landed property prior to the European invasion 
beginning in 1788. It is this transition from the communal ownership of land to 
	
	
	
1 B. Fine, ‘Landed Property and the Distinction between Royalty and Rent’, Land Economics, Vol. 
58, No. 3, August 1982, p. 349. 
 	
that of landed property which sets the basis of all future forms of land 
ownership. 
	
Ground rent is the ‘autonomous, specific economic form of landed property on 
the basis of the capitalist mode of production’.2 It is a money payment that 
conceals the  social  relations  underpinning  it. Moreover, it  represents  the 
relationship between landed property and the other classes of a given social 
formation. The form of landed property has evolved in Australia along with the 
development of the primary mode of production. Prior to the European 
invasion, the indigenous population lived according to conditions determined 
by what has been described as the ‘Aboriginal mode of production’.3 
	
	
	
Two features that are of particular significance for the current study marked 
this traditional mode of production. First, as Rose has noted, the ‘outstanding 
feature of the traditional mode of production of the Aborigines was its basic 
uniformity throughout the continent’.4 Second, the system of property in land, 
landed property, was characterised by communal ownership and also, 
importantly, by  an  owner/manager  division.  The  conceptual  unit  used  to 
describe this system of landed property is that of the ‘patrilineal, land-owning 
local group’.5 The concept has its limitations but is sufficient as a descriptor of 
the most salient features of this system of landed property. To quote Rose again, 
‘The omnibus term used here is quite clumsy, but it is retained as the group’s 
	
2 Op cit, Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume Three, 1981, p. 762. 
3 F.G.G. Rose, The Traditional Mode of Production of the Australian Aborigines, Angus & 
Robertson, Sydney, 1987, p. xiv. 
4 Ibid, p. 191. 
5 Ibid, pp. 129-151. 
 	
patrilineal nature, its land-owning characteristic, and its territorial limitations 
or finiteness (its estate) are to be stressed’.6 
	
	
	
These two features, of uniformity of production relations throughout the 
continent along with an owner/manager division within a framework of 
communal landed property, distinguished the traditional mode of production 
from those which emerged after 1788. Of particular significance for the current 
examination is the division of the owner and manager functions of traditional 
landed property. An insightful description of how this division worked in 
practice with regard to rituals is found in the observations of the Dalabon 
Aboriginal group by Maddock, who noted that the group spoke of: 
a relation between gidjan and djunggaiji. It is convenient to follow the 
Aboriginal English use of ‘owner’ and ‘manager’ for these terms…In the 
religious cults, of which the Gunabibi and Jabuduruwa are the most often 
performed, men wear designs and execute dances associated with a place 
visited by a power who crossed their clan estate. This place is symbolically 
the location of the performance, and the dancer is said to be ‘sitting down’ 
there, even when, as is usual, he is far away. To wear a design, perform a 
dance and ‘sit down’ at a place require the permission of a manager. He 
decides upon the place, selects a design and paints its outline on the owner’s 
body, and stipulates the dance to be executed, if need be instructing the 
owner in the steps. 
A man enjoys managerial rights over a place, and hence over the 
associated designs and dances, if his mother or father’s mother belonged to 
the clan within whose estate it is located. He calls the place ‘mother’ or 
‘father’s mother’. Exogamy and other marriage rules work to prevent a man 
from belonging to a clan whose places he manages, or from belonging to the 
same [totem] species. He is of the species of the clan into which his mother 
or father’s mother married. The significance of the owner and manager 
relation may be appreciated from the fact that as the religious cults must 
include a large number of clan rites, they can be held only if a sufficient 
number of managers authorise a sufficient number of owners. The authority 
exercised by managers has not given rise to a social hierarchy, because 
every man is an owner in some contexts and a manager in others. Thus 
owners in the Gunabibi are managers in the Jabuduruwa and owners in the 
Jabaduruwa are owners in the Gunabibi.7 
	
	
	
	
6 Ibid, p. 133. 
7 K. Maddock, The Australian Aborigines: A Portrait of their Society, Allen Lane, London, 1972, p. 
36. 
 	
There exists a definite division of labour with regards to the system of landed 
property here which solves the problem of antagonistic relations developing, 
owing to the fact of ownership of land. More importantly though, for the purposes 
of the current discussion, this system of landed property highlights the division 
of labour inherent to the notion of landed property itself. Thomson gives another 
example of this division in practice, this time in relation to the concrete 
productive activity of burning grass as part of a communal hunt: 
The actual burning of the grass is directed by the old men of the clan, or by 
others who have an hereditary right, especially by men of other clans who 
stand, under the kinship system, in the relationship of wäkku (son, woman 
speaking; sister’s son, man speaking) that is, men to whom the clan is 
yindipulo [that is, the mother’s clan]. Such men are necessarily members of 
the opposite [patrilineal] moiety, and to those unfamiliar with the people, 
they appear to usurp the authority, to dominate the affairs, of clans to which 
they do not belong. But it is part of the traditional behaviour in this area, 
that certain people of dua moiety carry out some of the ritual tasks for 
members of certain clans of yiritja to reciprocate for dua. The foregoing 
account applies to the organisation of most communal enterprises such as 
large scale fishing drives, where the technique is related to local conditions, 
and therefore has a localised background. In such cases the practice is 
regarded as traditional, as a part of the pattern or heritage which has been 
passed to the clan by its founders, the totemic ancestor or ancestors, and 
which is therefore the special right or privilege of its members. Such 
traditional rights are invariably recognised and respected by other clans 
and are rigidly enforced, so that any violation may lead to punitive 
measures and even result in an inter-clan feud. And since the procedure is 
well understood by all participants, differences or disputes rarely, if ever, 
arise, and control or authority is not apparent. Most of these enterprises run 
so smoothly that only those who know the people and understand the social 
organisation would be aware of the identity of the man in authority.8 
	
Ownership of land does not necessarily mean control over its use. It is this 
division inherent to landed property that provides the basis for a distribution of 
rents beyond one party. As such, this theme of ownership and control, of owner 
and manager, will inform the examination of the form of landed property which 
evolved after 1788. 
	
	
	
	
8 D.F. Thomson, Economic Structure and the Ceremonial Exchange Cycle in Arnhem Land, 
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The owner/manager division of labour in the system of landed property was 
complementary in the traditional mode of production. This complementarity 
enabled the Aborigines to circumvent the potential antagonism stemming from 
the ownership of land to the exclusion of others. This antagonism arises in 
modes of production which enable the production of a surplus. From 1788, the 
emergence of the capitalist mode of production, which is dependent upon the 
continuous self-expansion of capital, would determine the nature of this 
antagonism. The contemporary form of landed property entails a division of 
labour in which the state, along with indigenous landowners, constitute the 
owners while neocomprador capitals constitute the managers. The relation 
between these groups is still one of symbiosis, in the sense that each cannot 
exist without the other. However, as they now function within a mode of 
production which not only produces a surplus, but relies upon this constant 
production of surplus-value for its existence, the owners and managers are also 
engaged in an antagonistic relation competing for shares of rent. 
	
	
	
This system was usurped by an ad hoc and transitory system of class relations 
which reflected the changing nature of the social formation from which it came. 
The British penal colony of the early colonial period grafted forms of slavery, 
feudal indentured servitude and the emerging capitalist mode of production as 
it appeared in northern Europe at the time. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, the social formations within the Australian colonies were primarily 
driven by a capitalist mode of production. Indeed, by 1890, Victoria and New 
South Wales could have been characterised as operating under a purely 
capitalist mode of production with its attendant class relations. That is, a 
 	
proletarian class existed in opposition to a colonial bourgeoisie, with a petty- 
bourgeoisie alongside it. Moreover, the capitalist class was able to be 
differentiated according to fractions, such as manufacturing, rural and financial, 
and categories, such as national, comprador and imperialist sectors.9 As it is the 
complex interactions between these classes, their attendant fractions and 
categories that determine the form of landed property, the analysis of ground 
rent in its historical context must begin with the analysis of class formation and 
reproduction as generated by the accumulation of capital. 
	
	
	
Landed property is simply the prevailing social form of ownership as it relates 
to land. Whatever the generalised relation is between humans and things within 
a given society as specific to the relation between humans, land and its 
appurtenances. In Australia, we can distinguish three general periods which 
entailed a unique form of landed property in accordance with the prevailing 
mode of production. The first and longest period was that of primitive 
communism where the indigenous peoples were custodians of the land. Second 
came the period of semi-feudal and slave-based modes of production which 
marked the initial era of European occupation after 1788. Finally, after 1890, 
the form of landed property would accord with the purely capitalist mode of 
production that dominated the social formations emerging within and across 
the colonies. 
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There is some disagreement regarding the distinction between the final two 
periods. It has been argued that the capitalist mode of production prevailed 
from the moment the British occupation began in 1788. A compelling example 
of this argument is presented by Humphrys. This considered position posits the 
existence and dominance of the capitalist mode of production within the 
colonies from the landing of the first fleet because of the direct links to the 
emerging, although fully capitalist, mode of production in England at the time. 
As Humphrys states, the colonies ‘were capitalist from the start because they 
were part of British capitalism and the world market through the web of social 
relations comprising the penal state and imposed by it’.10 This logic, while 
convincing, denies the historical specificity of the capitalist mode of production 
and therefore reifies a concept which was yet to cohere. 
	
	
	
The capitalist mode of production, arguably, is denoted, in the final analysis, by 
the self-expansion of capital. Upon this fundamental prerequisite are the huge 
and complex processes that facilitate the creation and appropriation of surplus 
value in the production of commodities. Capital was certainly present in the 
colonies from 1788. It lay dormant in the tools, machines, seeds and muscles of 
the soldiers, convicts and settlers. It may have even begun to self-expand once 
aspects of the capitalist mode of production such as waged-labour, 
landownership and credit coalesced in commodity production after convict 
labour became waged post-1840, or during the 1850s gold rush or even once 
the railway rush had facilitated capital and labour mobility from the 1860s. But 
	
10 E. Humphrys, ‘The Birth of Australia: Non-capitalist social relations in a capitalist mode of 
production?’, Journal of Australian Political Economy, No. 70, Summer 2012/13, p. 127. 
 	
it did not become the prevailing mode of production, determining the primitive 
communist, feudal and slave-based modes of production existing alongside it, 
until at least 1890. To argue that capitalism emanated from Arthur Phillip’s left 
boot is to remove the historical from the materialist. 
	
	
	
This debate is important for considerations of the form of landed property 
throughout Australian history. To assert that the capitalist mode of production 
prevailed from 1788 means that the social relation concealed beneath the rental 
payment for land has fundamentally been the same throughout the entirety of 
European-Australian history. This is a problematic position. The form of landed 
property has undergone qualitative changes in accordance with key ructions in 
the juridical, economic and class structures of the Australian social formation 
within the context of the global capitalist mode of production. 
	
	
	
It is to these events that the discussion will now turn. This debate has 
ramifications for the formation and distribution of ground-rent, and mineral- 
rents in particular, throughout the history of the Australian social formation 
since 1788. To claim that the capitalist mode of production prevailed from the 
outset is to deny the existence of absolute rent as a manifestation of the class 
conflict between capital and landed property. That is, absolute ground-rent 
would never have existed in the Australian colonies if the capitalist mode of 
production prevailed from the beginning rather than emerging from a slave- 
based and feudal mode. This issue will be broached in relation to the class 
conflicts surrounding the land reform movement culminating in the Robertson 
Land Acts of 1861 in NSW. 
 	
	
	
The first significant episode to craft the form of landed property in Australia 
was the European invasion. This event dislocated the  relatively harmonious 
relation between the people who occupied the country and the land. After this, 
the passing of the Robertson Land Acts fundamentally altered the emerging 
form of landed property developing alongside the capitalist mode of production. 
Federation, Native Title and Wik altered the juridical structure of landed property 
albeit within definite economic relations. 
	
	
	
The form of landed property prevailing on the Australian continent prior to 
1788 was one of primitive communalism. The indigenous population did not 
have a system of private property and were therefore not afflicted by the class 
antagonism inherent to the feudal, slave-based and capitalist modes of 
production which would come to dominate their social formation. Although 
early colonial history was one of invasion and progressive domination, the 
contingency of this outcome must be emphasised. There was no linear 
progression from the primitive communalism of the traditional mode of 
production to the purely capitalist mode of production seeking out spaces for 
expansion from abroad. One index of this contingency is the nature by which 
‘native title’ was seen to be extinguished. Justice Brennan of the High Court of 
Australia handed down the following deliberation in the 1992 Mabo case, 
As the Governments of the Australian Colonies and, latterly, the Government 
of the Commonwealth, States and Territories have alienated or appropriated 
to their own purposes most of the land in this country during the last 200 
years, the Australian Aboriginal peoples have  been  substantially dispossessed 
of their traditional lands. They were dispossessed by the Crown's exercise of 
its sovereign powers to grant land to whom it chose and to appropriate to 
itself the beneficial ownership of parcels of land for the Crown's purposes. 
Aboriginal rights and interests were not stripped away by operation of the 
common law on first settlement by British colonists, but by 
 	
the exercise of a sovereign authority over land exercised recurrently by 
Governments. To treat the dispossession of the Australian Aborigines as the 
working out of their Crown's acquisition of ownership of all land on first 
settlement is contrary to history. Aborigines were dispossessed of their land 
parcel by parcel, to make way for expanding colonial settlement. Their 
dispossession underwrote the development of the nation.11 
	
Terra nullius was discovered and imposed, not received. The evolution of the 
prevailing form of landed property on the Australian continent was not a 
technical fact but a complex historical process tempered by fortuitous 
circumstance and ambivalence reconciled at spear and gun-point. Had the 
dispossession of arable land at Parramatta not proven fruitful, Arthur Phillip’s 
army of slaves may not have been fit to begin the expansion of the penal colony 
of NSW. 
	
	
The next significant episode in the development of landed property on the 
Australian continent occurred after the gold rushes of the 1850s. Primitive 
accumulation of capital was facilitated by land-based export-oriented 
commodity production and this paved the way for the mobilisation of an 
antipodean bourgeoisie. The following ballad from the 1860s provides a salient 
description: 
Ye sons of industry, to you I belong…Now the Land Bill has passed and the good 
time has come…Now the land is unfettered, and we may reside In a home of our 
own by some clear waterside…Where industry will flourish and content will 
smile…We will plant our garden and sow our own field, And eat from the fruits 
which industry will yield…Though those that have ruled us the right long denied. 12 
	
The land reform movement, which culminated in the passing of the Robertson 
Land Acts, was a watershed moment in the development of the form of landed 
	
	
11 F.G. Brennan, Mabo (and others) v The State of Queensland, no. 2, 1992, High Court of Australia 
23, 175 Commonwealth Law Reports 1, S. 82, viewed 6/7/2015,       
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi- 
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/high_ct/175clr1.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=~mabo 
12 Anonymous, ‘The Free Selector: A Song of 1861’, in B. Wannan, The Australian, Melbourne, 
1954 (1861), p. 221. 
 	
property in Australia. This legislative reform signified a shift in the balance of 
class forces within the colonies. The social formation existing within the bounds 
of the Australian continent is, from this conjuncture, determined primarily by 
the capitalist mode of production. 
	
	
	
The land reform movements in Victoria and NSW in the early 1860s has been 
explained in terms of an initiative by the colonial state to create a class of small 
landed proprietors, or petit-bourgeoisie. This view certainly pervades much of 
the scholarship concerned with this episode. 13 Such a view, however, is 
misguided because it does not accord with the historical evidence. The land 
reforms were in fact a measure affected by an emergent class of industrialists 
gaining strength in the cities of Sydney and Melbourne who were manifestations 
of the self-expansion of capital after the gold rushes in the 1850s. The aim of the 
reforms was not to revert to some plantation style  yeomanry  situation  but rather 
to break the monopoly on land held by the class of squatters in order to permit 
the entry of capital to land as a sphere of capitalist production. As Baker argues, 
the Robertson Acts ‘were not a piece of social engineering designed to put small 
settlers on the land; but rather, that they were designed to attack the privileges 
of the squatters in accordance with the liberal ideas of laissez-faire and  equality  
of  opportunity’.14 The  details  of  this  historical  episode  are  not 
	
	
13 See, for example: 
T.A. Coghlan and T.T. Ewing, The Progress of Australasia in the 19th Century, Linscott Publishing 
Co., Toronto, 1903, pp. 55-56; E. Scott, A Short History of Australia, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1937, p. 221; R.M. Crawford, Australia, Hutchinson University Press, London, 1957, p. 
128; F.L.W. Wood, A Concise History of Australia, Dymock’s, Sydney, 1944, p. 221. 
	
14 D.W.A. Baker, ‘The Origins of Robertson’s Land Acts’, Historical Studies: Australia and New 
Zealand, Vol. 8, No. 30, 1958, p. 179. 
 	
important in the sense that it would be required to mount a detailed inquiry. 
Rather, the significance of this episode lies in the desire for and potential to 
mobilise organised sections of an industrial bourgeoisie against the landed interest 
of the colonies. This class mobilisation signifies the historical point at which 
capital confronted a barrier to its accumulation across all spheres of the economy 
and utilised the state in order to remove this obstacle to accumulation. 
	
	
	
The ownership and control of mineral resources in Australia is vested in the 
government of the state or territory in which they are found. What this means is 
that governments, rather than private landholders, determine the basis on 
which mineral exploration and production occurs in Australia.15 Therefore, in 
regards to the question of how the mining industry affected the evolution of the 
broader political economy, the implications in relation to federalism are 
profound. Rather than contending capitalist landowners deriving differentiated 
rents according to the grade of minerals under their ownership and control, it 
then becomes an issue of competition between states based upon the 
comparative advantage of the royalties they appropriate. This peculiar 
arrangement in Australia then demands a rearticulation of the conceptual 
framework regarding land rent because the framework advanced by Ricardo, 
Mathus and Mill, was concerned with a semi-feudal system of land ownership 
engaged in petty commodity production. 
	
	
	
	
	
15 M. Crommelin, ‘Federal-Provincial Cooperation on Natural Resources: A Comparative 
Discussion of Problems and Solutions’, University of Melbourne Law School Papers on Federalism, 
Melbourne, MUP, 1985, p. 3. 
 	
The precedents set around the issue of native title from 1992 introduced 
another peculiarity to the form of landed property in the contemporary period. 
Strictly in the juridical sense, this precedent permitted entry to another group of 
people into the contest for the appropriation of surplus value in the form of 
ground-rent. Here the distinction between revenues and capital is significant. If 
the categories of revenue and capital are conflated, it could appear that 
indigenous communities who are privy to so-called rents from the sale of 
mining rights are in fact constituents of the modern form of landed property in 
Australia. This could be accurate if the vantage point of the analysis was static. 
However, from a dynamic view point, mineral-rent as capital may be distributed 
to indigenous claimants at the initial stage of contractual agreement, but it does 
not continue as capital. Native titleholders, therefore, do not qualify as part of 
modern landed property because they cannot effectively act as a barrier to the 
flow of capital onto land. Their juridical tenure permits them to gain some form 
of revenue but hey do not mitigate, effectively, the flow of capital onto land. To 
this end, native titleholders will be largely exempt from the analysis in this 
study. 
	
	
	
This chapter has suggested two things. First, the modern form of landed 
property in Australia draws its key features from various historical 
developments. After the European invasion of 1788, squatters effectively 
became an antipodean form of semi-feudal landed property. Their function in 
the emerging social formation was determined by the social progress of capital, 
or lack thereof. It was not until the influx of capital and labour after the 1850s 
gold rushes that any meaningful initiative to temper the political and economic 
 	
power of the squatters took form. The land reforms from the 1860s signalled 
the mobilisation of an emergent industrial bourgeoisie allied to the colonial 
working class under the auspices of bourgeois liberalism. It was from this point 
that the capitalist mode of production became the motive force on the continent. 
The subsumption of landed property into capital as a fraction begins from this 
historical conjuncture also. Federation codifies the juridical relations which reflect 
the new class dynamics and the struggle to acknowledge Native Title permits 
access to revenues but not control of capital. 
	
	
	
Second, the vital distinction between ownership and control within landed 
property has been established with reference to the complimentary relation 
witnessed in the traditional mode of production. This is a critical concept for the 
current study. The core thesis of this dissertation revolves around the 
distinction between the state, as owner, and the neocomprador fraction of the 
bourgeoisie, as manager. The modern form of landed property splits these 
functions and permits the appropriation of rent according to their ability to act 
as a barrier to the flow of capital onto land. The next chapter will elaborate this 
point by exploring the character and function of this class fraction within the 
context of the historical development of the Australian mining industry. 
 	
Chapter 7 
	
	
The Neocomprador Fraction of the Bourgeoisie in 
Australia 
	
	
	
	
	
	
This chapter examines the formation and social reproduction of the manager 
component of modern landed property, the neocomprador fraction of the 
bourgeoisie. The aim of the following discussion is to trace the evolution of a 
comprador bourgeoisie throughout the period of Australian colonial history up 
to the present conjuncture. Before proceeding it is necessary to make some 
qualifying remarks. First and foremost, this chapter is ultimately concerned with 
the formation and evolution of a comprador-bourgeoisie rather than a group of 
comprador capitalists or individuals who  function  as compradors. The distinction 
is analytically important. Comprador capitalists are those compradors who own 
the means of production and personify the relentless self-expansion of capital. 
Compradors are those who function as intermediaries, facilitating the 
accumulation of capital between domestic circuits of production and the global 
circuits of accumulation; they act as active conduits of capital accumulation 
across national boundaries. The bourgeoisie, however, includes the strata of 
non-owners of the means of production who help make the expropriation of 
surplus value possible. 1 In this sense, a comprador-bourgeoisie is the dominant 
fraction of the ruling class in a given historical epoch that determines the 
general structure, pattern and velocity of 
	
	
	
1 Op. cit. McQueen, ‘Class and Politics II’, 1977, p. 92 fn. 
 	
capital accumulation within a particular social formation in relation to the global 
totality of the capitalist mode of production. 
	
	
	
The use of the term comprador in relation to historical and political economic 
analysis of the Australian social formation is usually descriptive and almost 
always in reference to a bygone era. That is, the term is not considered relevant 
or worthy of examination in relation to contemporary issues. Moreover, the 
term remains an almost arbitrary characterisation of a passive functionary 
facilitating the needs of foreign capital. It is proposed here that the comprador 
bourgeoisie as an analytical category and as powerful social class has evolved 
beyond its previous incarnations in accordance with fundamental developments 
within the patterns of capital accumulation both at a domestic level and 
globally. As such, to heed the words of Engels, ‘It should go without saying that 
where things and their mutual relations are conceived not as fixed but rather as 
changing, their mental images, too, i.e. concepts, are also subject to change and 
reformulation; that they are not to be encapsulated in rigid definitions, but 
rather developed in their process of historical or logical formation’.2 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
2 F. Engels quoted in Op. cit. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume Three, 1981, p. 
103. 
 	
What is a (Neo)comprador Fraction of the Bourgeoisie? 
	
	
	
	
	
The word “comprador” derives originally from the Latin com-parare (com – 
with; parare – provide). Sometime between the 3rd and 7th centuries, otherwise 
known as the period of Late Latin, com-parare became comparātor which 
approximates to “a purchaser” in contemporary English. After the collapse of 
the Western Roman Empire within the Iberian Peninsula around the 5th century, 
comprador, appears in the Galician-Portuguese as well as Spanish languages 
meaning comprar (agent) -dor (to buy), and “buyer”, respectively. After the 
acquisition of Macao by Portugal in 1557, the term comprador gradually evolves 
from the title of the Chinese servants selling goods on behalf of the Portuguese 
merchants to broadly characterise natives of the Indian and Asian regions who 
performed various functions, namely commercial, for their European masters.3 
Richard Cocks, the head of the British East India Trading Company trading post 
in Hirado, Japan, noted in his diary on 9 July 1615, ‘I understand that yesterday 
the Hollanders cut a slave of theirs apeeces for theft, per order of justice, and 
thrust their comprador (or cats buyer) out of dores for a lecherous knave, who, 
with hym that is dead, have confessed of much goods (as cloves, mace, pepper, 
and stuffs) which are stolne per consent of Jacob Swager’.4 The Hobart Town 
Courier in 1828 reported that a comprador functioned simultaneously as a linguist 
and cash keeper.5 In 1840, during the First Opium War, Major Armine 
S.H. Mountain lamented the fact that ‘About 10 days ago, however, the Chinese, 
	
	
3 M. Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie 1911-1937, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989, pp. 38-39. 
4 R. Cocks and E.M. Thompson (ed.), Diary of Richard Cocks, London, Hakluyt Society, 1883, p. 19. 
5 Anonymous, ‘The Canton Register’, The Hobart Town Courier, 13 September 1828, p. 3. 
 	
having kidnapped our Compendor…which was a great object to us, as he was an 
active man, and the only Chinese who had come forward to serve us’.6 After the 
signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 the term comprador begins to appear 
more frequently in the Chinese lexicon to describe the Chinese servants to Western 
merchants called Mǎibàn that were exploited as house servants or as ship’s 
chandler. 
	
	
	
It was the function of the Mǎibàn to facilitate business dealings between the 
Cohong, the Chinese monopolies licenced by the imperial authorities to trade 
with the West, and the Western monopoly companies that set up warehouses in 
Macao and Canton seeking entry to Chinese markets and resources. 7 The Mǎibàn 
were also tasked with keeping ‘in surveillance the conduct of the merchant and 
report any misgivings to the authorities’.8 Evidently, the Qing dynasty viewed 
foreign merchants with a high degree of suspicion. In 1729 reports from the 
Guandong province noted that ‘merchants from all over China as well as foreign 
barbarians are constantly voyaging to and fro with their goods to trade’ and over 
a century later, Qishan, the Manchu Commissioner during the first Opium War, 
lamented that the people of Guangdong ‘dwell indiscriminately with 
foreigners…the utmost intimacy has grown up between them’.9 In more recent 
times, this “intimacy” has manifested in what Gao describes as the new 
“comprador class”, composed mainly of the children and protégés of political 
	
6 Armine S.H. Mountain quoted in Mrs. Armine S.H. Mountain (ed.), Memoirs and Letters of the 
Late Colonel Armine S.H. Mountain, CB: Aide-de-camp to the Queen and Adjutant-General of Her 
Majesty’s Forces in India, Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans & Roberts, London, 1857, p. 173. 
7 J. Heartfield, ‘China’s Comprador Capitalism is Coming Home’, Review of Radical Political 
Economics, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 199. 
8 C.W. Kwan, The Making of Hong Kong Society, Oxford, Clarendon, 1991, p. 55. 
9 Ibid, p. 10. 
 	
elites, which emerged during the 1990s.10 This new class of Mǎibàn is distinct 
from that which constituted the third of the three old mountains oppressing the 
Chinese people prior to 1949: imperialism, feudalism and comprador 
bureaucratic-capitalism.11 It is obvious that a clear distinction exists between 
the social formations that facilitated the rise of the “old” compradors under the 
Treaty-system and that which spawned the “new” compradors drawn from the 
ranks of the political elite. Nonetheless, it is instructive to focus on the 
similarities between these groups. As Gao notes, the compradors, new and old, 
are not ‘independent merchants’, have become the nouveaux richés, purchase 
status through self-appointed titles such as daotai (upper-middle rank officials 
during Qing China) and representatives of the National People’s Congress, and 
choose to educate their children in Western institutions. 12 The significant 
commonality though is surely that ‘China’s political, business and intellectual 
elites are acting on behalf of transnational interests and to benefit themselves in 
the process’.13 
	
	
	
It is clear from the etymology of the term and from its historical usage that 
comprador denotes a native agent who performs various duties on behalf of 
foreign interests. But this analysis is concerned with developing the concept of 
comprador bourgeoisie. As such, the discussion must now turn to issues of class 
analysis. 
	
	
	
	
10 M. Gao, The Battle for China’s Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution, London, Pluto Press, 2008. 
11 Ibid, p. 152. 
12 Ibid, pp. 184-5. 
13 Ibid, p. 182. 
 	
Marx’s exposition of class in Capital amounted to less than two pages14 not just 
because he died before completing the project but because the historical 
materialist methodology he practiced meant that class was not a static category 
but rather an evolving social relation which could only be approached 
dialectically. That is, following Connell, class analysis should be approached 
through a generative theory which takes as its object of analysis the dynamics of 
the capitalist mode of production which ‘generate a huge and complex historical 
reality’.15 Moreover, such an analysis should focus on the ‘processes producing 
social groupings, rather than the categories they produce; and on the activity of 
people, not merely their location in space’.16 The following investigation will 
attempt to develop a concept of a comprador bourgeoisie in Australia through 
analysing the dynamics of capital accumulation which gave rise to it. 
	
	
	
There is nothing new about labelling sections of the Australian ruling class 
‘comprador’. Throughout vast tracts of Australian historiography, this term has 
been used to describe the dependent fractions of the bourgeoisie who facilitate 
the accumulation of capital within Australia through catering to the needs of 
foreign capital. A few pertinent examples will suffice to demonstrate the way in 
which this term has been used. In this section, the extant scholarship employing 
the concept of comprador bourgeoisie will be surveyed in relation to the 
	
14 While Marx and Engels alluded to classes in various instances within their journalistic and 
polemical works, the analysis of classes in Capital amounted to a page and a half in volume 3. 
Chapter 52 entitled ‘Classes’, asks two questions: ‘what makes a class?’; and, ‘what makes wage- 
labourers, capitalists and landowners the formative elements of the three great social classes?’. 
The point here is that the conception of class was embedded within the entire preceding 
analysis of the capitalist mode of production which Marx and Engels had developed over their 
lifetimes. 
Op. cit. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume Three, 1981, pp. 1025-1026. 
15 Op. cit., Connell, Ruling Class, Ruling Culture, 1977, p. 5. 
16 Ibid, p. 5. 
 	
scholarship that dismisses the use of the concept as ill-informed  and problematic. 
The relevance of a ‘comprador-bourgeoisie’ as an analytical category has been 
a contentious issue in past discussions of the Australian political economy. 
Analyses which employ the term and seek to frame their explorations of 
Australian capitalism within the context of comprador class formation and 
mobilisation have been associated with a ‘radical economic nationalist’ approach 
to political economy. This approach is broadly identified as ‘Australian 
dependency theory’ and is linked to the radical dependency theorists concerned 
with core/periphery relations and social development. 
	
	
	
Kaptein argues that the comprador class lost its power base but does  not attempt 
to build on the theorisation of the concept or articulate any explanation of 
comprador class formation. The class is simply assumed and its function 
within the dynamics of capital accumulation, not explained.17 Tsokhas and 
Nowicki offer a theory of comprador class formation following Mao Tse Tung 
and Nicos Poulantzas. Their analysis looks to comprador finance and mining 
capital throughout the post-war period in Australia within the context of global 
circuits of capital accumulation characterised as dominated by monopolising 
US-based capitals (imperialism). Here the goal is to outline the contours of 
Australia’s dependent development in the context of US-led imperialism. The 
examination of the context does not however trace out in detail the mechanisms 
	
	
	
	
	
17 E. Kaptein, ‘Neo-Liberalism and the Dismantling of Corporatism in Australia’, in H. Overbeek 
(ed.), Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neo- 
liberalism in the 1980s, Rutledge, London, 1993, p. 91. 
 	
by which a comprador bourgeoisie was able to form or reproduce itself in the 
context of dependent capital accumulation.18 
	
	
	
Cottle takes up the theorisation of Tsokhas and Nowicki through an examination 
of the comprador landlords in the NSW countryside during the interwar period. 
Cottle puts forward a novel account which draws on political and economic 
dimensions of power as well as manifestations of class formation in art. Here we 
have a more nuanced approach albeit similarly limited in scope by the 
difficulties outlined in relation to the Nowicki and Tsokhas analysis.19 
	
	
	
Bryan contends that the preoccupation of economic nationalists with 
transnational corporations undermining national political and economic 
sovereignty lends to the use of the concept of a comprador bourgeoisie as a 
domestic representative of foreign capital. As such, the concept of a comprador 
bourgeoisie is at best redundant and at worst obfuscates critical analysis. This is 
due to a problematic understanding of the dynamics of capital accumulation in 
the contemporary era, namely with regards to the social relations of production. 
Or, as Bryan puts it, ‘the foreign-national juxtaposition is conceptually illusory 
and politically blinding’. 20 Moreover, the fact that ‘socialists in Australia 
continue to focus passion on the threat of transnational corporations loses sight 
of the fact that labour is exploited not by the foreignness of capital, but by the 
	
	
18 H. Nowicki and K. Tsokhas, ‘Finance Capital and the Australian Ruling Class’, Intervention, Vol 
13, pp. 19-38. 
19 D. Cottle, ‘A Comprador Countryside: Rural New South Wales, 1919-1939’, in D. Cottle (ed.), 
Capital Essays, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1984, pp. 92-104. 
20 R. Bryan, ‘Xenophobia or theory phobia: Economic nationalism and the question of foreign 
investment’, Australian Outlook, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1983, p. 68. 
 	
social relation of capital itself’.21 The point here is not to deny Bryan’s position, 
but rather to incorporate its criticisms into the current analysis in order to 
develop a more coherent and contemporarily relevant conception of a 
comprador bourgeoisie. 
	
	
	
Bryan, for the most part, is correct in his appraisal of the analytical utility of the 
comprador bourgeoisie concept. Its utility for analysing transnational circuits of 
production is negligible when it is constrained by foreign/domestic 
dichotomies. The concept is, however, useful when investigating the modern 
form of landed property. The concept of a ‘neocomprador’ fraction is 
appropriate for the manager component of modern landed property. These 
capitals, or firms, are a fraction of capital and simultaneously the manifestation 
of landed property. In this sense, they are wholly invested in the social 
reproduction of capital as a class but they also have the ability to mitigate the 
flow of capital onto land by virtue of the rent relation i.e. between capital and 
landed property. Rinehart’s HPPL, for example, purchases mining leases from 
the state of WA and enters into profit-share agreements with firms like Rio 
Tinto. The state apparatus and Native Title holders may own the land in a 
juridical sense but it is HPPL, by virtue of its monopoly over exploration 
activities, links to government and tenement holdings, that effectively controls 
access to it. HPPL is capitalist landed property and, as such, depends upon both 
the social reproduction of capitalist relations but is also tethered to a spatially 
fixed and  immobile  raw  material,  Pilbara  iron  ore.     The designation, 
	
	
21 Ibid, p. 68. 
 	
neocomprador, then is entirely appropriate for this unique fraction of the 
bourgeoisie that engages with transnational circuits of production but is 
tethered to its source of social reproduction within a domestic polity. 
	
	
	
The term ‘neocomprador’ is not entirely new. It has been used by many scholars 
to describe the re-emergence of a comprador class or class element as detailed 
above. Patnaik described a neocomprador class that emerged across South East 
Asia during the 1990s as ‘functionaries of financial institutions’ who promoted 
liberalization ‘in its quest to broaden international links’.22 Wilson considers the 
‘retention of these neo-comprador classes as separate political and economic 
entities’ within processes of decolonisation. 23 The point being that ‘neo’ 
designates the ‘comprador’ being retained. Satya and Pattnayak argue that 
‘rethinking the prevailing notions about democracy and mixed economies’ 
requires, among other things, ‘uprooting the neocomprador’ classes which help 
ensure ‘electoral regimes and processes remain hostages to imperial military 
strategies’.24 Finally, although there are many more examples, Amin uses the 
term to lament the fact that capitalist ‘worldwide expansion has reached the 
point where it dooms the Third World bourgeoisies to abandon their own plan 
once and for all, and accept ‘neo-comprador’ subordination’.25 These scholars 
employ    the    term    to    designate    merely    a    temporal    distinction.    The 
	
22 P. Patnaik, ‘Capitalism in Asia at the End of the Millenium’, Monthly Review, Vol. 51, No. 3, 
1999, p. 62. 
23 E.M. Wilson, The Savage Republic: De Indis of Hugo Grotius: Republicanism and Dutch 
Hegemony Within the Early Modern World System, 1600-1619, Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 
Boston, 2008, p. 451. 
24 S. Pattnayak, Globalization, Urbanization and the State: Selected Studies on Contemporary Latin 
America, University Press of America, New York, 1996, p. 31. 
25 S. Amin, Maldevelopment: Anatomy of a Global Failure, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 
1990, p. 127. 
 	
‘neocomprador’ in this sense is the old comprador but in a new time. The 
function of this class or class element has not changed in relation to the 
dynamics of capital accumulation. The only thing that has changed is the date of 
its existence. The novel concept articulated in the current study designates 
capitalist landed property in the contemporary Australian social formation as a 
unique entity. It is not the old comprador concept existing in a new period but 
rather a concept to describe a class fraction which functions in a completely 
different and unique way at a specific historical conjuncture. This is what 
distinguishes the neocomprador concept employed in this study. The discussion 
will now turn to exploring the historical development of the minerals industry 
in Australia in order to contextualise the emergence of this class fraction. 
 	
The Development of the Australian Minerals Industry 
	
	
	
	
	
The development of Australian capitalism has always been underpinned by 
primary resource exports. Since the end of WWII, it has been the extraction, 
processing and export of mineral commodities that has driven and determined 
the structure and path of development of the Australian economy. However, the 
Australian state apparatus has failed and is failing to maximise the potential 
rents from its vast mineral endowments. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
comparative advantage derived from Australia’s mineral endowments is in fact 
marginalised by the failure of its government to maximise mineral-rents and 
that the current model of economic development that is underpinned by, and 
dependent upon, the resource export sector is inadequate and unsustainable. 
	
	
	
Agricultural and pastoral commodities dominated the Australian export profile 
from colonial times until the material requirements of global industrialisation 
following the Second World War necessitated an unprecedented increase in 
mineral extraction, processing and export. In the contemporary period coal, iron 
ore and a variety of metalliferous ores have replaced the traditional export 
staples such as wool, wheat and beef. The current mining boom is the fifth in 
European Australian history and is by far the largest followed by the minerals 
and energy boom that began in the mid-1960s and ended with the onset of a 
global economic downturn in the early 1970s. 
	
The historical dependence upon primary resource exports is no longer a viable 
growth strategy. A long-run downward trend in agricultural and pastoral 
 	
commodity prices in the decades prior to the first post-war mining boom was 
offset by ‘discoveries’ of extensive ore reserves and the demand provided by a 
US directed industrialisation of Japan. Strong global commodity prices and the 
subsequent influx of foreign capital fed the 1960s mining boom which bolstered 
the final years of the nation building import-substitution-industrialisation 
strategy. However, the mining boom also facilitated a deterioration of the terms 
of trade and provided the impetus for dismantling the institutional 
arrangements protecting the labour intensive domestic manufacturing sector. 
Meanwhile, the foreign capital needed to fund expansion of the mining sector 
exacerbated the trend of increasing foreign ownership and control of Australian 
mining firms. T.M. Fitzgerald published the findings of a report on The 
Contribution of the Mineral Industry to Australian Welfare in 1974 which 
concluded that the sophistication of the Australian economy was obscuring its 
real interests and that increasing foreign ownership and control of the industry 
would undermine control over the future directions of economic development. 
Even more unsettling was the finding that during the six years between 
1967/68 to 1972/73 the government had received $286 million in taxes and 
royalties yet had awarded $341 million in industry concessions resulting in a 
$55 million deficit.26 The aftermath of this protracted structural adjustment was 
the demise of the domestic manufacturing sector and the confirmation of 
Fitzgerald’s prophetic vision, the loss of control over the direction of economic 
development. 
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By 2004, when the current mining boom had begun in earnest, the process of 
fundamental reorganisation of the Australian political economy in response to 
the sustained accumulation crises throughout the 1970s and 1980s was 
approaching its zenith. The country had enjoyed consistent economic growth 
since 1992 and the words ‘miracle economy’ were being used to characterise 
the Australian version of neoliberal capitalism. What the quarterly GDP figures 
and low unemployment percentage were hiding though were serious issues to 
do with the skewed economic profile inherited from the collapse of the post-war 
boom arrangement. Tom Bramble’s informative article published in 2004 
entitled ‘Contradictions in Australia’s Miracle Economy’ identifies widening 
income disparities, precarious employment and incredibly uneven distribution 
of profits across industries such as the financial corporate sector which 
registered a 185% increase in profits during the period 1996-2004 versus the 
non-financial corporate sector which increased profits by only 66%. 27 
Furthermore, according to Simon Mohun, the aggregate economic growth from 
1992 onwards was primarily driven by a long-run upward trend in profitability 
due to a general increase in labour productivity in combination with stagnating 
real wage levels.28 The increase in rates of labour exploitation throughout this 
period reconfigured the profit to wages share of national income in favour of the 
former. Essentially, the ‘miracle economy’ was largely facilitated by a rate of 
profit handicap resulting from a decade of heightened exploitation of those who 
constituted the wages share of national income. 
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Fitzgerald’s warnings should have been considered more seriously  in  1974. Since 
that time, the levels of foreign ownership and control in Australian mining firms 
has increased to the point that BHP Billiton was 76% foreign owned in 
2009.29 The Australian Greens commissioned economist Naomi Edwards in 
2011 to conduct an investigation into the levels of foreign ownership and 
control in the mining industry which found that as of 2010 the Australian 
mining industry was about 83% foreign owned.30 The average profit margins 
for the industry and the dividends which accrue to foreign investors were also 
critical to note. According to Edwards, the after tax profit margin across the 
industry in 2010 was 31% increasing from 26% in 2008/9 which is in stark 
contrast to the Australian industry average for that year which registered 8%. 
In addition, foreign investors will receive $265 billion in dividends over the next 
five years of which around $50 billion will leave the country and around $205 
billion will be reinvested in mining projects.31 These figures raise critical issues 
regarding the inability of the government to maximise the economic rent owing 
to its constituency. Furthermore, the indirect effects of the high foreign 
ownership levels and also of the grossly disproportionate profit margins in 
comparison to the industry average are likely to exacerbate the lack of control 
over the direction of future economic development. 
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The issues raised here warrant serious consideration due to the potential 
detrimental economic and extra-economic effects they entail. However, 
identifying high levels of foreign ownership and unbalanced profit  margins across 
industries is simply not enough. These issues, if they are to be seriously 
addressed, must be subject to rigorous empirical analysis guided by an adequate 
theoretical framework. The fundamental problem is that the current economic 
growth strategy is not sustainable and is likely to have adverse effects for the 
Australian political economy and the people who constitute it. 
	
	
	
The end of the Second World War in 1945 marked the beginning of an 
extraordinary period of economic prosperity and political stability throughout 
the global community of advanced capitalist nations. Heralded as the ‘golden 
age’ of Australian capitalism, the long postwar boom represented a defining 
chapter in the short narrative of Australian history.32 Key elements of this 
systemic social transformation included changes to the dimensions of 
international trade relations, reconfiguration of economic activity, development 
of alternative modes of capital accumulation and adapting to new economic 
development strategies.33 These elements will serve as a point of departure for 
the discussion at hand. 
	
	
	
Costly military campaigns during the War, in addition to the vast sums of capital 
required to finance the reconstruction effort in Britain, served to further erode 
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the last vestiges of power belonging to an empire already in decline. Given 
Britain’s fiscal handicap, Australia could no longer rely upon the mutually 
beneficial trade strategy embodied in the political catch-cry, ‘Men, Money and 
Markets’.34 Britain was simply unable to honour the arrangement to supply 
Australia with any surplus labour and capital for rural development in exchange 
for food, raw materials and an export market for British manufactures.35 The 
disintegration of trade relations between Australia and the UK became 
increasingly evident toward the late 1960s. In 1946-48, the UK was in receipt of 
approximately 37% of Australian exports. Two decades later, the percentage 
share of Australian exports despatched to the UK was a mere 13%. On the other 
side of the balance sheet, the percentage share of Australian imports from the 
UK was 50% in 1946-8, dropping to less than half that, to 22% in 1966-8.36 
Meanwhile, as the economic umbilical cord joining mother England to her 
belligerent antipodean offspring lay rotting in fetters, Australia began to forge 
closer political, cultural and economic connections with the United States of 
America. The passage of the United States Lend-Lease Act in 1941 may be 
perceived as the formal starting point for closer economic dealings with the US, 
especially in regard to Australian imports. However, even before the Act came 
into effect on March 11, Australia was forced to look to America for the goods it 
had formerly sourced from the UK, which had been unable to supply its trade 
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partners since the outbreak of hostilities in 1939.37 One rudimentary statistic 
that bears testament to the fecundity of this stately courtship is the increase in 
percentage share of Australian imports attributed to US manufactures. The 
percentage share of imported commodities from the US accounted for 9% of 
Australian receipts in 1946-8. Although, by 1966-8, US manufactures as a 
percentage share of total Australian imports had increased to 26%.38 The 
inverse relationship between deteriorating trade status involving Australia and 
Britain, juxtaposed with the positive trend of Australian market penetration by 
US firms is indicative of a broader trend throughout this period. Indeed, Catley 
and McFarlane portend that, ‘If one may summarise the result of the second 
long boom it was the transfer of Australia from the British to the American 
sphere’.39 
	
	
	
The dimensions of Australian trade relations during the postwar boom also took 
on a more regional character. The rapid industrialisation of South East Asian 
countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan provided new and demanding 
export markets for raw minerals, particularly from the 1960s through to the 
early 1970s.40 In September 1965 Australia signed a bilateral trade agreement 
with the Republic of South Korea which entailed commitments from both 
governments to provide for an ‘exchange of non-discriminatory treatment with 
allowances for existing preferences’ and also to ‘use their best endeavours to 
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increase the volume of trade between the two countries’.41 Their endeavours 
proved to be quite productive. Australian exports to Korea measured by value 
increased from nil in 1951/2, to $3.368 million in 1961/2, rising tenfold to 
$37.974 million in 1971/2.42 The upward trend of Australian exports to Taiwan 
is even more remarkable considering that, like Korea, exports were nil in 
1951/2, reaching $3.958 million in 1961/2, before posting a marked increase in 
1971/2 with $55.680 million.43 It is also worth noting that this increase in trade 
volume from Australia to Taiwan occurred without the benefit of a bilateral 
trade agreement, such as the one that existed with Korea. Although both Korea 
and Taiwan were examples of relatively new and hungry export markets within 
the region, their stories pale in comparison to that of Japan. As with Korea, but 
arguably more significantly, bilateral trade agreements had been signed with 
Japan after the War. An initial agreement was signed between the two countries 
in July 1957 and ratified by December of that year. This agreement was 
amended in August 1963 after the initial contract expired, becoming a fully 
fledged General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which was promptly 
ratified in May 1964.44 It is interesting to note that the GATT has an explicit 
emphasis on agricultural and pastoral commodities regarding the commitments 
ascribed to Japan. Clauses dealing with non-preferential treatment of wool over 
cotton, hard and soft stabilised wheat, sugar, butter and cheese make up the 
bulk of the document. The only non-agricultural or non-pastoral commodities 
that make an appearance are motor vehicles, assuming that canned meat is not 
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classified as both a pastoral and a manufactured commodity. Thus, the thrust of 
the agreement pertains to a commitment by Japan to ‘expand opportunities for 
imports into Japan of Australian’45 grain, meat and motor cars. The aggregate 
volume of this trade was staggering. In dollar terms the value of exports from 
Australia to Japan trend upwards from $97.627 million in 1951/2, then to 
$373.810  million  in  1961/2,  and  finally  reaching  the  formidable  total  of 
	
$1360.152 million in 1971/2.46 Or rather, to give these totals some perspective, 
consider the percentage share of total Australian exports consigned to Japan 
over the same period in comparison to exports to the UK and US. Exports to 
Japan accounted for 7.19% of Australian exports in 1951/2, whereas the UK 
was responsible for 30.84% and the corresponding figure for the US was 
11.44%. 47 Disregarding the nominal increase in percentage share of total 
exports to the US, a little over 1%, the figures in 1971/2 indicate a massive 
redirection of Australian trade. By 1971/2, Japan’s percentage share of total 
Australian exports is 27.78%, dwarfing the UK which only draws 9.17%.48 It had 
taken Japan only two decades to become Australia’s major export partner, a 
mantel that had been held by Britain for nearly two centuries. 
	
	
	
Due to the fact that Japan was in receipt of nearly a third of all Australian 
exports by 1971/2 is significant because it demonstrates a fundamental 
reconstitution of international trade relations. What is more significant is 
which particular commodities constituted this burgeoning exchange 
relationship. A look at the 
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top four categories of commodities exported is instructive here. In terms of 
value measured in dollar amounts, ‘metalliferous ores and metal scrap’ was the 
largest single category of commodity consigned to Japan in 1971/2, 
representing $424.873 million or 31.3% of total merchandise exports.49 Second 
on the list was ‘textile fibres and their waste’ which contributed $221.270 
million or 16.3%. Following closely in third position was ‘coal, coke, briquettes’ 
with $198.561 million which equates to 14.6%. The fourth category was ‘cereal 
grains and cereal preparations’, valued at $158.513 million or 11.7% of the 
total.50 It is important to note also that these four types of commodity were the 
only ones that exceeded AU$1 million in export value. In addition, the fact that 
metalliferous ores and metal scrap alone exceeds the value of textile fibres and 
cereal grains combined indicates the growing significance of mineral exports in 
relation to the traditional primary exports, namely agricultural and pastoral 
commodities. Moreover, the combined total of this group of primary mineral, 
agricultural and pastoral commodities constituted over 70% of total 
merchandise exports to Japan, Australia’s largest export market at the time. 
	
	
	
In July 1963, an article in the Sydney Morning Herald entitled ‘Major Importance 
of Discoveries: Minerals and Mining’, proclaimed that ‘the mineral discoveries in 
Australia during the last decade will rank in importance with any previously 
made in this country’s history’.51 The author of this optimistic declaration was 
the Secretary of the Department of National Development, Sir Harold Raggatt. 
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The discoveries Raggatt referred to consisted primarily of new metal ores such 
as bauxite, uranium, wolfram, scheelite, rutile and ilmenite. Vast bauxite 
deposits were discovered in 1955 by Harry Evans, a senior geologist employed 
by Zinc  Corporation, at  Weipa in  the Gulf  of Carpentaria  after a  failed 
prospecting mission in search of oil.52 Large uranium ore deposits were found in 
1949 at Rum Jungle in the Northern Territory and also in 1954 at Mary Kathleen 
in Queensland.53 Scheelite, the tungsten ore, had been sighted in 1943 on King 
Island and within two years this deposit would account for 4% of the global 
supply of this rare metal.54 The rich mineral sands that littered the coast line 
between Sydney and Brisbane were found to contain high concentrations of the 
titanium ores ilmenite and rutile. Production output for mineral sands exceeded 
£10 million in 1957.55 In addition to the discoveries of new metals, Australia 
had increased its production of existing staple minerals such as copper, coal, 
iron ore, zinc and lead. In 1963, Australia was the third largest producer of 
primary zinc and second only to the Soviet Union in the production of primary 
lead.56 The discovery of a large new ore body in Mount Isa resulted in a 
significant increase in copper exports from 1953 onwards and similarly, with 
iron ore, vast new reserves found in the Pilbara and Yilgarn districts in Western 
Australia further boosted the export profile.57 In combination with, or perhaps 
as a consequence of, the increase in global demand for these minerals, the 
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discoveries of vast new mineral deposits would underwrite an unprecedented 
phase of growth for the Australian mining sector. 
	
	
	
The increased global demand for Australian mineral commodities throughout 
the postwar boom was driven by the postwar reconstruction effort, the Cold 
War arms race and the advent of mass consumer culture. Minerals accounted 
for 25% of Australian exports in 1970/71 in contrast to wool which had fallen 
to 12% from nearly 65% in 1950/51.58 The growth in export share attributed to 
mineral and energy exports was staggering, increasing from 10% to over 50% 
within a decade.59 Investment was subsequently directed toward the more 
profitable mineral and energy sectors facilitating a fundamental restructuring of 
the industrial balance of power to the advantage of an ascendant mining sector. 
Currency appreciation driven by the resources boom adversely affected the 
Australian terms of trade to the detriment of both the traditional agricultural 
export sector and the import-competing manufacturing sector.60 In addition, 
demand for Australian manufactures contracted toward the end of the postwar 
boom due to the strength of the dollar facilitating cheap imports and the 
initiation of tariff reduction policies. The Whitlam Labor government began to 
dismantle the tariff wall in the early 1970s through enacting a 25% decrease 
across the board.61 
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Meanwhile, demand for Australian agricultural and pastoral commodities faded 
in the early 1960s as technological advances saw many of the primary export 
markets in Western Europe, the US and Britain become self sufficient in their 
food and textile needs. Also, the formation of the Common Agricultural Policy by 
the European Economic Community restricted access to European markets.62 
Thus, as the structural scarcity of food was altered by these technological 
advances, the Australian monopoly on fertile agricultural land used to produce 
both food and textile commodities also began to disintegrate. However, what 
was occurring simultaneously in the mining sector was the establishment of a 
new kind of comparative advantage occasioned in part by a growing global 
demand for minerals, but more importantly because the high quality grades of 
the Australian ores would necessitate lower production costs in comparison to 
those producers working with inferior resources. 
	
	
	
Toward the end of the 1970s and lasting into the early 1980s, Australia 
experienced another mining boom. This episode was primarily driven by the 
energy sector, in particular steaming coal, oil and gas.63 Bauxite can also be 
included as a major export during this period alongside shale oil and natural gas 
reserves that were discovered and developed with the influx of investment into 
the mining sector.64 Discoveries of oil and natural gas in the Moomba and 
Cooper basins in Central Australia coupled with the massive finds in Bass Strait 
during the 1960s and the north-west shelf from the early 1970s dramatically 
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improved Australia’s energy credentials.65 Whilst the international economic 
community suffered the effects of two OPEC oil price shocks which punctuated 
both ends of the decade, Australia looked well on its way to energy self- 
sufficiency by the end of the 1970s. 
	
	
	
In conjunction with the global economic downturn which pervaded the 1970s, 
two OPEC oil price shocks made Australia an attractive target for both domestic 
and foreign investment. Investment in Australian mining steadily rose toward 
the end of the 1970s and spiked in 1981 and 1982. In 1978 investment in 
mining as a percentage of GDP was around 1% and had reached 3% by 1982.66 
It was this influx of investment into mining that prompted Prime Minister 
Malcolm Fraser in 1980 to claim, ‘In my policy speech of 1977 I said Australia 
could look forward to $6000 million in development. Some amazement was 
expressed in this – even disbelief...And now prospective development is $29000 
million. This development promises to be as important to Australia and 
individual Australians as anything in the last thirty-five years’.67 
	
	
	
Fraser was not alone in his optimistic hopes for an energy boom that would 
kick-start the flagging Australian economy. The sense of euphoria about 
Australia’s future which accompanied the boom facilitated resurgence in wage 
demands and rising inflation.68 In response, fiscal and monetary policy was 
tightened to keep the economy in check. The exchange rate, which was still 
	
65 Op cit, Blainey, p. 133. 
66 Op cit, Battelino, pp. 2-5. 
67 T. Conley, 2010. ‘The Politics of Prosperity: Vulnerability, Luck and the Lessons of History’, 
Griffith Review, No. 28, p. 122. 
68 Op cit, Battelino, p. 5. 
 	
pegged against a trade-weighted index of currencies, was nominally appreciated 
to insulate the economy from rising inflationary pressures.69 However, despite 
the optimistic statements about the possibility of $6-$12 billion of chiefly 
foreign investment from the outset of the boom in 1976/77, very little of this 
capital outlay materialised.70 Ironically, the second of the oil price shocks in the 
late 1970s, which was in part responsible for directing foreign investment 
toward Australian mining, became the catalyst for a global economic downturn 
in 1981 that significantly softened the international demand for Australian 
energy exports. The prices and volumes of energy exports failed to reach their 
forecasted levels and consequently, in conjunction with the boom-induced high 
wage growth, inflationary pressures and the resulting tight fiscal and monetary 
policies, the domestic economy followed the global economy into severe 
recession by 1982/83.71 By the time Malcolm Fraser bequeathed his Prime 
Ministerial duties to the newly elected Labor leader Bob Hawke in 1983, the 
mining boom which he had so enthusiastically proclaimed as the most 
important event in the last three decades had come to an abrupt and 
unceremonious end. 
	
	
	
It is critical to note that this particular mining boom occurred during a period of 
protracted economic stagnation. This energy boom was a peculiar event in the 
long history of mining in Australia because every other mining boom in the past 
two centuries occurred within the context of broader economic prosperity. 
Indeed,  it  seems  that  this  unique  episode  was  both  underwritten  and 
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undermined significantly by contemporary global  economic  disturbances, namely 
the second OPEC oil price shock. The global pressures on energy markets induced 
by this price shock initially directed investment toward Australia, increased 
commodity prices and stimulated demand.72 However, the oil price shock was 
also the catalyst for a severe global economic downturn with a gestation period 
of two years. When the global demand for Australian energy exports declined as 
a result of the global recession, the expected capital inflows required to fund the 
expansion of the Australian energy sector also failed to materialise. Thus, 
whilst this particular boom may have been peculiar in the sense that it did not 
occur within a general period of economic prosperity, it still served to reinforce a 
characteristic of mining booms that is common to them all. That primary 
characteristic is that the fortunes of the mining industry are fundamentally 
dependent upon the international demand for mineral commodities. Moreover, 
factors which significantly affect this international demand for Australian 
mineral and energy exports must be taken into consideration when attempting 
to  manage  a booming  mining sector. In  this light, the present mining boom 
seems increasingly precarious. Whilst Australia has avoided a technical recession 
throughout the Global Financial Crisis, many of the global capitalist economies 
have been ravaged. Even if demand for Australian minerals and energy can be 
sustained by the industrial powerhouses of China and Japan, the continuing 
aftershocks of the GFC throughout western economies may soften demand for 
the manufactured goods produced in South 
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East Asia. Perhaps, for a second time in 40 years, resource export optimism 
could fall prey to the uncertainties of the global capitalist system. 
	
	
	
In June 2008, Lloyd posed the question, ‘has Australia once again become an 
economy driven by resource export dynamism with all the linkages associated 
with such a booming sector and economic, social and political connections that 
come to the rise to prominence of such a sector?’73 This rhetorical query came 
into print precisely three years after the start of an unprecedented Australian 
mining boom and exactly three months before the collapse of Lehmann 
Brothers signalled the beginning of the GFC. In the years since this vital enquiry 
was posed, a series of political and economic developments have elapsed which 
make its central supposition concerning the issue of resource export 
dependency more relevant today than in 2008. For example, political 
developments like the ousting of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and economic 
issues such as the protracted hostile debates concerning mining industry tax 
reform have brought the mining industry to the fore of political and popular 
debate. In regards to the primary question of determining if the Australian 
economy is once again reliant upon resource export dynamism, a cursory glance 
at key economic indicators is instructive. For example, mineral and energy 
exports have increased from 29% of merchandise exports in 1993/94, to 31% 
in 1999/2000, to 32% in 2003/04 before spiking at 44% in 2006/07.74 Latest 
statistics released by DFAT reveal that this trend has continued, whereby the 
percentage share of merchandise exports accruing to unprocessed primary 
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mineral and energy exports was 46.7% for 2009-10.75 Even more striking is the 
fact that the total percentage share of minerals and energy exports in 2009-10, 
inclusive of processed and unprocessed primary products, simply transformed 
and elaborately transformed manufactured products, and gold (which is listed 
separately to the former categories), amounts to 67.6% of total merchandise 
exports.76 
	
	
	
In conjunction with this increase in percentage share of merchandise exports 
accruing to the mining industry is an upsurge in investment flows. Private new 
capital expenditure in mining stood at approximately $10.2 billion or 18% of 
the total for Australia in 2004/05. This figure almost doubled to about $22 
billion or 29% of the total in 2005/06. To put these figures into context, 
investment flows into the mining industry reached a peak of only 13.6% during 
the 1966-75 minerals and energy boom.77 Indeed, in 2010 the Reserve Bank of 
Australia (RBA) stated that the current mining boom has induced a level of 
mining investment as a share of GDP that has been significantly higher than any 
previous booms. Furthermore, the RBA has noted that this level of investment 
was likely to rise further along with corresponding increases in demand and 
commodity prices.78 
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Moreover, in terms of industry income as a proportion of GDP, the present level 
for the mining industry has not been this high since the early twentieth 
century.79 In 2006 the income from the mining industry accounted for 7.5% of 
GDP in comparison to the peak of 15% in 1861 during the gold rush, and 6% 
during the boom from 1966-1975 (Cook and Porter, 1984). After hovering at 
around 10% in 1900 the figure dropped to around 8% in 1909. It took a 
hundred years before this level of industry income share of GDP was matched in 
2009 with an equivalent figure.80 Evidently, the extraction, processing and 
exploitation of minerals and energy resources are fundamental drivers of the 
broader Australian economy in the contemporary period. Moreover, it is critical 
to note that the present mining boom is historically unique. In terms of 
aggregate economic indicators, this mining boom has delivered unprecedented 
levels of merchandise export output, private new capital expenditure and 
industry income as a proportion of GDP. 
	
	
	
Looking beyond these aggregate economic indicators, it is evident that much of 
the strong current growth can be attributed to a significant increase in mineral 
and energy exports to countries like Japan, South Korea, India and China.81 
According to Ric Battellino, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, 
the current mining boom in Australia is in part driven by the large expansion in 
iron ore, coal and gas industries and also, to a large degree, driven by demand 
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for resources from emerging countries, with China being the most significant.82 
Australian exports to China increased from approximately $10 billion in 
2003/04 to around $23 billion in 2006/7.83 Moreover, the fact that Australia 
currently provides 40% of China’s iron ore imports and over 60% of Japan’s 
gives credence to Battellino’s claim that the demand for Australian resources 
has been largely driven by the industrialisation of emerging economies within 
the region.84 Given the increasingly symbiotic relationship developing between 
the Australian mining industry and the broader economy it would seem that the 
present bout of prosperity is one that has been dependent upon the growth of 
emerging economies within the region. Thus, it would be prudent to question, 
or at least examine the sustainability of such a dependent economic program. 
	
	
	
Levels of foreign ownership and control of the Australian mining industry have 
been a problematic issue for many years. In the wake of the 1960s to early 
1970s mining boom, various studies seeking to identify and analyse the extent 
of foreign penetration of the mining industry revealed disturbing results. In 
1978, the Australian mining industry was 59% under foreign control measured 
by value added.85 On a national scale, the percentage of foreign control varied 
according to particular minerals. For example, the percentage of foreign control 
in fuel minerals was 73%, brown coal and petroleum were 84%, black coal was 
59%, tin registered 81%, silver, lead and zinc were all 75%, mineral sands stood 
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ABS. find proper citation 
84 Western Australia Hansard, 2007. Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembley, 20 
November.C. Barnett. Perth, Hansard WA. find proper citation 
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at 62% and iron ore was under 47% foreign control. In nearly every case the 
primary country of ownership was the USA.86 Even the iconic Australian mining 
company BHP, or ‘The Big Australian’, was 21% foreign owned in 1980.87 BHP 
merged with international mining giant Billiton in 2001 without objection from 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission or from the Australian 
Foreign Investment Review Board.88 In 2007, the Chinese government via 
Chinalco raised concerns about the proposed merger between Rio Tinto and 
BHP Billiton, a veritable monopsony power, while the Australian government’s 
FIRB gave its tacit assent. 89 This process of foreign penetration into the 
Australian minerals industry predates the 1960s mining boom but it has 
certainly become more pronounced since that period. Today, the levels of 
foreign penetration have led some to believe that ‘the industry is so clearly 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of transnationalised corporations 
that it makes little sense to refer to it as an Australian industry as such’.90 
	
	
	
There exists a vast body of literature concerned with issues of transnational 
corporate power and the effects of foreign economic penetration. The central 
premise that underwrites  this body  of  scholarship denotes  that  transnational 
corporations, by virtue of their lack of national affiliation, are fundamentally 
geared toward the accumulation of profit without regard for the welfare of the 
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sovereign states that they operate within. Therefore, industries with high 
concentrations of transnational penetration may not necessarily function to 
benefit the national economy.91 A good example of this is the case of the 
Australian bauxite industry. In 1979, Australian owned companies made about 
$800 million from the export of bauxite and alumina. Had these raw materials 
been processed into aluminium, the export earnings would have increased five- 
fold and added three billion dollars to the credit side of Australia’s balance of 
payments. The increase from this alone would have equalled the combined wool 
and coal earnings.92 That the Australian mining sector is one of the most 
penetrated industries in the world means that the Australian people are being 
deprived of much of the profits derived from the extraction and processing of 
their mineral resources. Given that mineral resources are finite, the ineffective 
exploitation of this resource in the past and present is depleting the basis for 
any future comparative advantage93. Moreover, the leakages of  investment flows 
facilitated by inadequate corporate taxation regimes and lax regulatory policies 
monitoring levels of foreign penetration significantly undermines the potential 
for developing an economic structure that is not dependent upon capital-intensive 
resource exporting industries under concentrated foreign control. 
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One striking contemporary example of the inadequacy of the corporate tax 
regime concerns the Federal government’s unsuccessful attempt to impose a 
Resource Super Profits Tax on the primarily foreign owned dominant mining 
companies. The mining industry mobilised its vast resources to mount a 
powerful public campaign to discredit the proposed tax, employing a massive 
advertising campaign that cost around $100 million. The government launched 
its own advertising campaign in defence of the tax and was criticised for using 
public money to fund an advertising campaign which promoted a policy that did 
not enjoy majority popular support. However, the $100 million expenditure 
outlaid by the mining industry was in fact tax deductible which meant $30 
million dollars of public funds was used to reimburse the industry without any 
public scrutiny of the transaction.94 Essentially, the primarily foreign owned 
mining industry was able to effectively prevent the elected representatives of 
the Australian people from passing legislation which would repatriate some of 
the profits accrued from the exploitation of Australian resources. Then, to add 
insult to injury, the industry was reimbursed with $30 million of public funds to 
offset the cost of a self serving media advertising campaign. 
	
	
	
Another example of investment leakages relates to the findings of the 1974 
Fitzgerald report mentioned previously. Fitzgerald suggested that Australia had 
come to possess such a sophisticated economy that it had lost sight of its real 
economic interests. The main thrust of his findings raised concerns about the 
foreign ownership of the industry and showed how this would increasingly 
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undermine control over future directions of economic development. Probably 
the most recognisable aspect of the report was the section detailing the overall 
deficit absorbed by the government in its dealings with the mining industry.95 In 
the six year period from 1967/68 to 1972/73, Fitzgerald discovered that the 
government received $286 million in taxes and royalties but granted $341 
million in assistance and foregone revenues, resulting in a $55 million deficit.96 
The first point to note is that the evidence presented above demonstrates that 
Australian mining is heavily foreign owned. More importantly, the companies 
that dominate the industry are transnational corporations that operate with 
relative impunity across various national borders and are driven solely by the 
incessant drive for accumulating profit. Second, the current state of corporate 
taxation and regulation is riddled with loopholes that permit significant 
leakages of investment flows away from Australia. Third, and in direct relation 
to the previous point, the significant comparative advantage provided by the 
vast national mineral resources is being increasingly undermined through 
exporting raw mineral ores for processing overseas. The opportunity cost 
involved with minerals such as bauxite represents a phenomenal liability which 
could be seized to develop secondary industry in order to balance the skewed 
economic profile. 
	
	
	
This section has provided a selective historical analysis of the Australian 
political economy throughout the period 1945-2010, with a specific focus upon 
the mining industry. The primary themes explored concern the increase in scale 
95 Op. cit., Fitzgerald, The Contribution of the Mineral Industry to Australian Welfare, 1974, find 
page  number 
96 Op cit, McQueen, Gone Tomorrow, 1982, p. 84. 
 	
and scope of mineral extraction in Australia, the emphasis on exporting raw 
materials rather than developing domestic processing, the inherent dependence 
upon the international capitalist economy and the sustained increase in levels of 
foreign ownership and control of the industry throughout this period. It was 
suggested that as the structural scarcity of food and textile commodities 
declined in former export markets as a result of technological advances 
facilitating self-sufficiency, the comparative advantage of Australian firms was 
eroded. In contrast, as the rapid industrialisation of former third-world 
countries drastically exacerbated the demand for mineral commodities, in 
combination with the postwar reconstruction effort, the high grade mineral ores 
unique to Australia began to yield considerable comparative advantage, only 
this time to the mining sector. Thus, in regard to the redirection of investment 
and economic activity, the traditional export sectors of agriculture and pastoral 
industries registered decline as minerals and energy became ascendant. 
 	
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
	
	
	
This is the final substantive section of the thesis. The following discussion will 
entail three things: a brief summary of the key claims posited throughout the 
preceding analysis; a reiteration of the central hypothesis constituted by three 
separate yet interlinked claims; and, a brief outline of the necessary limitations 
of this dissertation along with an identification of concrete avenues of inquiry 
which stem from, and may now be pursued, in light of the findings of this 
current study. 
	
	
	
It is not necessary to list the key claims in order as they appear throughout the 
preceding sections. It is instructive, rather, to discuss the central claims in 
relation to the areas of contemporary scholarly debate in which they make a 
contribution. This approach informs the organisation of the next sub-section 
that will survey in brief the key aspects of the general argument as they have 
been presented above. 
	
	
	
The first central claim of this study relates to the debates surrounding the 
design and implementation of the legislative reforms variously referred to as 
the Australian ‘mining tax’. There were, in fact, two separate taxes, which 
stemmed from the Henry review. The claim made was of a general nature in 
relation to the theory of rent underpinning both taxes. It was, therefore, not 
necessary to venture too far into an empirical analysis of the political debates 
 	
themselves or the chronological detail of implementation, amendment and 
eventual repeal of the MRRT. The contribution of this study was, rather, to 
establish that the theory of rent informing the design of the tax was flawed and 
in need of reappraisal. This was the central claim put forward by this study in 
relation to the debates around the design and implementation of the Australian 
‘mining tax’. 
	
	
	
The next significant claim was put forward in relation to historical debates on 
rent theory. There were, in fact, a series of points made in relation to the 
development of rent theory in historical perspective but since they culminated 
in a coherent position they may be viewed as connected claims. The central 
theme was that the detachment of landed property from the theory of rent has 
obscured from analysis an important social relation in the contemporary period. 
The series of points leading up to this position related to specific debates on 
rent theory and shall need to be reiterated in order. 
	
	
	
The Physiocratic notions of rent, while incorrect, were seen to be important to 
the extent that they lent insight to the specific dynamics of capital accumulation 
at that particular historical conjuncture. The last vestiges of the feudal mode of 
production in Europe were disintegrating in the face of an emergent capitalist 
mode of production. The Physiocrats, while invested in the social reproduction 
of their own class basis, which was geared toward the dominance of landed 
property, identified the socially unproductive nature of landed property, as a 
class, within capitalism. This identification paved the way for Adam Smith and 
other members of the Scottish Enlightenment, namely James Anderson, to bear 
 	
witness to the continuing emergence of industrial capitalism vis-à-vis feudalism. 
This dynamic social process found theoretical expression in Smith’s  labour theory 
of value, which contained a theory of rent, and in Anderson’s elaboration of what 
would become the Ricardian theory of rent. While there were important 
distinctions, each of these theories maintained the importance of landed 
property as a barrier to capital in their conceptions of rent. This changed with 
the onset of the Marginalist revolution in the 1870s. Jevons and Walras led the 
charge for a dominant theory of general equilibrium while Marshall advocated 
for the qualified use of partial equilibrium analysis. In both frameworks the 
specificity of rent to land was severed as a consequence of methodological 
limitations. Rent, from this point in the history of economic thought, at least in 
the orthodoxy, was now generalised across all factors of production rather than 
revenue specific to land. The Formalist revolution of the 1950s saw to it that 
this admixture of Ricardian principles, or rent conditioned by the law of 
diminishing returns, and Marginalist principles would be enshrined in  the canon 
of modern ‘positive economics’. This argument weaved through centuries of 
developments in economic thought culminates in the claim that the theory of rent 
used to inform the design of the RSPT and MRRT was in fact fundamentally 
flawed due to its omission of a theory of landed property in capitalism. 
	
	
	
The next key claim relates to the debates on rent theory within Marxist discourse. 
The general point was made that Marx provided an alternative epistemological 
basis from which to construct a modern theory of rent that took account of the 
role of landed property in capitalism. Once this was established the discussion 
turned to constructing a novel and critical reading of Marx’s 
 	
theory of rent and the subsequent debates surrounding it. The culmination of 
this discussion was the consolidation of the position that a prerequisite for a 
contemporary theory of rent is a historically contingent theory of landed 
property. This is not a tautology given that the role of landed property within 
the theory of rent is contested within Marxist discourse. One contribution, 
therefore, of this section is to Marxist rent theory in relation to the debate on 
the necessity of a theory of landed property in capitalism. 
	
	
	
Another claim, made in conjunction with the preceding argument regarding 
landed property, concerned the form and function of landed property in the 
contemporary period. Landed property, in the contemporary Australian 
formation, it was argued, functions according to an ownership and control 
bifurcation. The state and indigenous landowners act as the owners of mineral 
lands while the neocomprador fraction of the bourgeoisie act as the controllers 
of mineral-lands. This division of labour within landed property stems from a 
novel contribution to Marxist rent theory and the substantiation of this claim 
was the focus of Part III of this study. 
	
	
	
Part III entailed the construction of a theory of landed property within the 
Australian social formation. The chapters in this part established the 
substantive basis for the theoretical positions elaborated above. There were two 
key claims within this discussion. The first related to the historical emergence of 
the capitalist mode of production in Australia. The claim was put forward that 
capitalism, as a coherent set of social relations prevailing in the colonies of the 
Australian continent, emerged during the land reforms movements in the 
 	
1860s. This claim contributed to the ongoing debates on the genesis of 
capitalism in Australia. The second key claim pertained to the historical 
development of landed property in Australia culminating in a bifurcated 
category, along lines of ownership and control, as a fraction of capital rather 
than a class in and of itself standing in opposition to capital. This claim 
substantiated the previous contribution to Marxist rent theory. It is also a novel 
contribution to debates in Australian historiography, particularly class analysis 
in Australian history. 
	
	
	
This concludes the brief summary of the key arguments posited in service of 
constructing the central thesis. The discussion will now turn to reiterating the 
central thesis in the context of the contributions to scholarly discourse just 
outlined. These concluding remarks will be organised according to the two goals 
articulated at the beginning of the introduction to this dissertation: constructing 
a substantive platform for a socially significant theory of mineral-rent through 
developing a historically contingent theory of landed property in Australia. 
 	
The Modern Form of Landed Property in Australia 
	
	
But very brief definitions, although convenient, for they sum up the 
main points, are nevertheless inadequate, since we have to deduce 
from them some especially important features of the phenomenon that 
has to be defined. And so, without forgetting the conditional and 
relative value of all definitions in general, which can never embrace all 
the concatenations of a phenomenon in its full development, we must 
give a definition of… 
V.I. Lenin (1917)1 
	
	
The form of landed property, in relation to the form of capital, is the primary 
determinant of the magnitude and distribution of mineral-rent. The period from 
1945 to 2014 witnessed the fundamental transformation of the Australian 
minerals industry in relation to both the capitals, which operated within the 
industry, as well as the structures of ownership of land. 
	
	
	
The modern form of landed property in Australia in relation to mineral 
extraction can be characterised as a dynamic agglomeration consisting of 
elements of the state apparatus and indigenous landowners, dominated by a 
neocomprador fraction of the bourgeoisie. These three entities all receive a 
share of the mineral-rent generated by the extraction of minerals within the 
bounds of the Australian state. The size of their share is determined by both the 
ownership of minerals and by the control of capital needed to extract the 
minerals. This has meant that the neocomprador bourgeoisie receives the 
largest share, followed by the state and finally the indigenous landowners. 
	
	
	
It has been established above that landed property entails two functions within 
the capitalist mode of production. To use the typology of anthropologists 
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observing the traditional mode of production of the Australian Aborigines, there 
is an owner and manager relationship to the land. Landed property acts as a 
barrier to the accumulation of capital across industries because it may prohibit 
the flow of capital by virtue of both its ownership and control of land. In the 
mineral industry of Australia, this division between ownership and control can 
be seen in the functions of the state, indigenous landowners and the 
neocomprador capitals which control access to minerals. The balance of power 
between these three constituents of modern landed property is evident, at a 
rudimentary level, in the distribution of gains from mining they each receive. 
Therefore it is clear that by any measure it is the neocomprador capitals that 
comprise the motive force of modern landed property. Their role as gatekeepers 
to systems of provision permit them to exact a toll for the extraction of minerals 
on the Australian continent. While they do indeed apply capital and labour to 
their own operations, constituting a profit, their ability to find, prove and then 
lease mineral lands permits them to act as rentiers. 
 	
Toward a Socially Significant Theory of Mineral-rent 
	
	
	
	
	
Before conclusions can be drawn from the preceding analysis, an important 
qualification must be stated. This dissertation did not seek to construct, in its 
totality, a theory of mineral-rent. The test of such a theory would be that, as 
Cyrus Bina has aptly noted in the case of oil-rent, ‘The phenomenon of oil rent in 
particular, and economic rent in general, becomes historically specific if they 
are able to explain the concrete conditions of leaseholders and their interaction 
with the flow of capital investment for the exploration and development of oil’.2 
Rather, this thesis has been concerned with contributing to the construction of a 
necessary prerequisite aspect of the theory of mineral-rent, the historically and 
geographically specific theory of landed property. The broad problems outlined 
in the first substantive section of this dissertation in relation to the political 
inability to implement rent-targeting taxes on mining stemming from the 
problems of economic theory are certainly issues directly related to the 
underdevelopment of mineral-rent theory. These problems however are far too 
complex in scope and magnitude to be dealt with in one dissertation. One 
fundamental aspect of this broader quandary of mineral-rent is the modern 
theory of landed property specific to the Australian continent. It is this task that 
has been attempted here. 
	
	
	
This dissertation has sought to construct a point of departure for the critical 
reappraisal of the prevailing theory of mineral-rents within a methodological 
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framework capable of explicating the social signification of the rental payment 
for the use of land and its appurtenances. This task is necessary because the 
flawed conceptions of mineral-rent which currently predominate have, and are, 
retarding the progress of political responses to the economic problems 
surrounding the issue of resource rent taxation. It is acknowledged that 
economic theories do not necessarily directly inform political processes. 
However, the appropriate action with regards to addressing the problems of 
resource rent taxation must begin with a reappraisal of what resource rents are. 
	
	
	
The limitations of the prevailing orthodox conception of mineral-rent are 
primarily linked to issues of methodology. Modern rent theory is informed by 
an admixture of Ricardian, Marginalist and Formalist traditions of economic 
thought. The basic premiss of this conception of rent is inherited from the work 
of Anderson and Ricardo: the magnitude of rent is determined by the price of 
land. This basic postulate was inverted by Marx who argued that it was the 
magnitude of rent which determined the price of land. The reason for this inversion 
relates specifically to aspects of Ricardo’s labour theory  of  value which Marx 
developed in his own theory of value. At its most basic level, the issue can be 
explained as the problem of attributing an exchange-value to land, a factor of 
production which contained a use-value but did not contain congealed labour-
power. This problem was resolved by Ricardo by the claim that all rent was of 
a differential nature. The significance of these debates for the current problems 
around resource rent taxation in the mineral industries are paramount. 
 	
A theory of mineral-rent capable of explicating the social signification of the 
rental payment for mineral lands is predicated upon a theory of landed property. 
This prerequisite is one reason the orthodox theory of mineral-rent is flawed. 
The Neoclassical theory of rent informed by Ricardian theory proceeds from the 
assumption that landed property does not exist in the capitalist mode of 
production. According to this line of reasoning, landed property was an institution 
which dominated in feudal society but does not exist in capitalism. If landed 
property is defined as a social class which functions to prohibit the flow of capital 
into the industrial sphere of mining by virtue of its control of access to mineral 
deposits then it is evident within the Australian social formation that there is a 
capitalist form of landed property. This thesis has examined the historical 
development of landed property in Australia and argued that a modern form of 
landed property exists. 
	
	
	
Property in land, according to capitalist conditions, did not exist on the 
Australian continent until the British invasion of 1788. The traditional mode of 
production in existence prior to this date was marked by communalist social 
relations of production and entailed no formal relations of land ownership. The 
form of landed property in the colonies developed according to the needs of the 
self-expansion of capital. As the industrial bourgeoisie emerged in the colonies 
along with a labouring class to fulfil their needs, the form of landed property 
changed accordingly. The turning point from the semi-feudal for of landed 
property to the tendency toward fully capitalist social relations of production 
occurred in the 1860s. The case study chosen to illustrate this shift was the land 
reform movements of Victoria and NSW from 1861. The process which began in 
 	
the 1860s solidified into a codified juridical expression in the Federation of the 
colonies to create the Commonwealth in 1901. While each conjuncture effected 
meaningful juridical changes upon the from of landed property, this class 
functioned according to the role of landed property in the capitalist mode of 
production from about the 1860s. Important changes to the form of landed 
property were identified as the Native title Acts. These developments constitute 
the emergence of a modern form of landed property in the contemporary period 
which is defined broadly as post-1945. The contemporary form of landed 
property in Australia is primarily constituted by the State and a comprador 
element of the bourgeoisie. 
	
	
	
There have been a series of significant contributions to heterodox political 
economy concerned with the relationship between host governments in the 
Third World and MNCs. This issue was extensively researched throughout the 
1970s and particularly during the 1980s when the discourse around the New 
World Economic Order was topical. The contributions to this scholarship 
concerned with mining and rent were broadly on agreement about the modern 
form of landed property as synonymous with the State. This analytical 
framework may have been effective for explicating the creation and distribution 
of rent in social formations where mineral ownership had been nationalised but 
it was not sufficient for the Australian social formation. While the State does 
have monopoly ownership of minerals, the access to capital and therefore the 
ability to use the land is controlled by entities outside of the state apparatus. 
 	
The access to minerals is controlled primarily by Australia’s neocomprador 
fraction of the bourgeoisie. This term needs to be qualified according to the 
contemporary conditions it seeks to understand. In this sense, it is distinct from 
the developments surrounding this term put forward by scholars in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The circuits of capital and the processes of accumulation are indeed 
transnational. The unique aspect of capitals involved in rent-seeking behaviour 
in the minerals industry is that the source of social reproduction of landed 
property is embedded within the ground of a particular social formation and 
within a specific juridical space. This has meant that a group of capitals has 
occupied the role of facilitator, of landed property, facilitating the penetration of 
capital into mineral production in Australia. While the state may own the 
minerals in a juridical sense, the neocomprador capitals control access to 
minerals through ownership of mineral leases. This makes these capitals the 
primary constituent of the modern form of landed property because landed 
property is the institution which functions to control the use of land. In this 
sense, the state plays a subsidiary role in practice when considering the barrier 
to capital accumulation posed by landed property. 
	
	
	
Capital in this schema is taken to be the multinational mining capitals which 
dominate production of mineral commodities. These firms enter into 
partnerships with the neocomprador firms in order to extract raw materials 
which belong to the state. 
	
	
	
The composition of modern landed property is threefold: the state, by virtue of 
ownership, is a major rent seeking aspect of this form; indigenous land owners 
 	
constitute another aspect, albeit economically insignificant part, of this form; 
the neocomprador bourgeoisie constitute the motive aspect of the modern form 
of landed property. The division  of landed property on the continent of 
Australia is characterised by the owner manager relation. At each significant 
historical conjuncture the division between owner and manager if land has been 
marked. 
	
	
	
In the traditional mode of production, the relation was one of complementarity. 
Owners were not involved in an antagonistic relation with each other because 
they were dependent upon mangers of land which controlled access and rights 
of use to their land. In the post-1788 period the antagonism between landed 
property was more pronounced. Those who appropriated land were able to do 
so at the exclusion of all others. The ‘squatters’, appropriated the so-called 
virgin land and were able to utilise the primary means of production to create a 
surplus. It was not until the initiation of land reforms beginning in the 1850s 
that capital began to assert its authority. The passing of the Robertson and Duffy 
Land Acts in the early 1860s heralded a change own the relation between 
landed property and capital. From this point on, the balance of class power 
rested in the emerging bourgeoisie rather than the landed aristocracy. 
	
	
	
The debates surrounding the design and implementation of the doomed mining 
tax, in all its forms, did not consider the fundamentally problematic notion of 
rent itself. The distribution of rent is perceived to be a zero-sum game wherein 
the state is pitted against firms involved in the extraction, processing and 
distribution of minerals. There is no consideration permitted of the role and 
 	
function of the manager component of modern landed property which has been 
subsumed by capital. The neocomprador fraction of the bourgeoisie is able, 
through its command over systems of provision, to exact the payments for 
access to minerals that should in fact fall to the state. Until rent, as a class 
relation, is properly understood, there can be no resolution to the problem of 
constructing a theory of mineral-rent which serves a social purpose. To this end, 
a prominent member of the neocomprador fraction, Gina Rinehart, provides a 
compelling call to action crafted in prose: 
The globe is sadly groaning with debt, poverty and strife 
And billions now are pleading to enjoy a better life 
Their hope lies with resources buried deep within the earth... 
Our nation needs…wiser government, before it is too late.3 
	
It is hoped that this dissertation will form a constructive point of departure for 
answering Rinehart’s plea. 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
3 G. Rinehart, Our Future, quoted in B. Bannister, ‘Gina Rinehart’s Poem Slammed by Poetry 
Expert’, ABC online, 16 February 2012, viewed 31/3/16, 
http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2012/02/15/3431797.htm 
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